East Asia’s Condensed Transition to Second Modernity

By Kyung-Sup Chang

1. Introduction

East Asia’s ascendance in global political economy is often conceived as a mainly economic phenomenon in which East Asian countries take turns in sequentially establishing themselves as industrial powerhouses (or “the globe’s factories”) and thereby catching up with advanced capitalist economies. From Japan to South Korea and Taiwan to mainland China, their phenomenal success in rapid industrialization and economic growth has made them an international model of national development. More recently, however, there is a growing awareness that East Asian development has involved a broad civilizational transformation under which political, social, cultural as well as economic aspects of national, communal and individual life have interactively and rapidly changed. Even in local public discourses, civilizational reassertion and / or superiority, not merely economic catching-up, is increasingly debated. At a most expressively political level, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have strived to enhance their international images through state-organized financing of overseas cultural events, academic research, and even national image campaigns, whereas China has initiated a more comprehensive wholistic approach called “soft power” (vis-à-vis hard power based upon economic and military mights). Regardless of such purposive propositions and arguments, East Asian societies do constitute a distinct group of sociocultural systems and political economies for which custom-made social theories and analytical methods have to be developed and improved across various social science disciplines.

The above scholarly requisite is true of the most recent civilizational stage of humanity – what Ulrich Beck dubs “second modernity” (Beck / Grande 2010). This seems to be the shared rationale of the stimulating articles by Zhang (on China’s reflexive cosmopolitanization in science), Tyfield and Urry (on China’s low carbon cosmopolitanism), Shim and Han (on South Korea’s marriage transnationalization), and Ishida et al. (on Japan’s stultified individualization) in the current special issue of Soziale Welt. In the current paper, I interpret East Asia’s second modernity within a continuum of compressed modernity that has civilizationally characterized East Asian societies in diverse periods and to varying extents since the late 19th century. In East Asia, second modernity has arrived in a post-compressed modern context, but this arrival itself has been extremely condensed, constituting another symptom of compressed modernity. Against this distinctly regional milieu of second (compressed) modernization, I will address East Asians’ recent social experiences and practices at the levels of individual, family, community, city, and nation, incorporating, where possible, the arguments and / or observations presented in the above-mentioned articles. (Since the condensed nature of second modernization is particularly conspicuous in China and South Korea (vis-à-vis Japan), the following discussion is mostly focused upon the two societies.)

1 This work has been supported by the SNU Asia Research Fund (2010). Direct all inquiries to the author at his email (changks@snu.ac.kr).
2 East Asia here refers to Northeast Asia, excluding Southeast Asia. More specifically, I will deal with China, South Korea, and, occasionally, Japan. Surely, Vietnam and Taiwan also deserve related attention here, but their experiences may be broadly inferred from those of China and South Korea.

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2. East Asia: Compressed Modernity and Condensed Transition to Second Modernity

East Asian societies are increasingly conceived as varying instances of compressed modernity (Chang 1999, 2010 a; Ochiai 2010). I earlier defined compressed modernity as “a civilizational condition in which economic, political, social and / or cultural changes occur in an extremely condensed manner in respect to both time and space, and in which the dynamic coexistence of mutually disparate historical and social elements leads to the construction and reconstruction of a highly complex and fluid social system” (Chang 2010 b: 446). This civilizational state can be manifested at various levels of human existence – i.e., personhood, family, secondary organizations, urban spaces, societal units (including civil society, nation, etc.), and, not least importantly, the global society. At each level, people’s lives need to be managed intensely, intricately, and flexibly in order to remain normally integrated with the rest of society.

The concept of compressed modernity was initially introduced to account for the unique civilizational condition of contemporary South Korea which, on the one hand, has undergone full-scale capitalist industrialization, economic growth, urbanization, proletarianization (i.e., the transformation of peasants into industrial workers), and democratization within unprecedentedly short periods, and, on the other hand, still manifests distinctly traditional and / or indigenous characteristics in many aspects of personal, social, and political life. While compressed modernity has proved quite useful in comprehending South Korea’s extremely rapid and complicated experiences of modernity, numerous scholars have come to agree that it is a broad East Asian experience.4 Japan’s early modern history represents a paradigmatic instance of condensed catch-up modernization. The Meiji Restoration would become a model for Park Chung Hee’s South Korea. An autocratic reformulation of politics under the name of the “October refurbishment” was staged under the supposed exigencies of political stability and economic catch-up.5 China, in turn, showed strong interest in emulating the South Korean achievement of rapid industrialization and economic catching-up. Ultimately, China’s condensed economic development and industrialization have seemingly dwarfed the South Korean achievement.6 Besides, the protracted coexistence of socialist and capitalist elements – a core syndrome of China’s gradual reform – tends to make its modernity even more complex than that of South Korea.7

East Asia in the early 21st century does not appear to depart from compressed modernity. In fact, the mutually competing dynamic of national development has driven East Asian societies into a civilizational race to higher stages of affluence and eminence, inevitably implicating Beck’s “second modernity”. According to Beck, second modernity is a civilizational condition in which various (mostly negative) ‘side-effects’ of (first) modernity add up to a

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4 For instance, Kyoto University in Japan initiated the Global Center of Excellence (GCOE) program of international collaborative research which is theoretically premised upon Asia’s shared experience of compressed modernity. See “Global Center of Excellence for Reconstruction of the Intimate and Private Spheres in 21st Century Asia” (http://www.gcoe-intimacy.jp/staticpages/index.php/policy_en).
6 It needs to be noted that the Stalinist heavy industrialization project in Maoist China as well as in most other state-socialist countries was pursued as an economic strategy of condensed industrialization in a political economic race with capitalist countries (Riskin 1987). Interestingly, South Korea’s Park Chung-Hee promoted heavy and chemical industrialization as a strategic effort to hastily overpower North Korea (Kim 2004).
7 For instance, the author has systematically analyzed post-Mao China’s risk structures as compared to South Korea (Chang 2008). Certainly, contemporary China’s modernity appears even more compressed than that of South Korea – particularly because of lingering effects of socialist institutions, values, and interests.
qualitatively different situation in which the fundamental values of first modernity are still respected, but have to be pursued with radically different social means and institutions under a cosmopolitan paradigm. This new stage of human civilization is characterized by global free trade and financialization, deindustrialization and corporate deterritorialization, informatization and cyberspace, bioscientific manipulation of life forms, borderless ecological and epidemiological hazards, transnational demographic flows, and even globally financed and managed regional wars. There are no permanent systematic hierarchies, sequences or selectivities by which different groups of nations – whether at different levels of development, in different regions or of different races – are exposed to these new civilizational forces in mutually exclusive ways. Wanted or not, they are every nation’s concern because they are structurally enmeshed with the new civilization process of “reflexive cosmopolitanization” – namely, the “autonomized” process of cyclically proliferating risks (as well as opportunities) across the globe on the basis of impulsively judged or practically negotiated activities by various supposedly rational or reflective agents of modernity. East Asia has been engulfed by reflexive cosmopolitanization no less gustily than any other world regions.

East Asia has been engulfed by reflexive cosmopolitanization no less gustily than any other world regions. (Joy Yueyue Zhang’s article in this special issue comprehensibly shows how this process takes place in China’s science domain.)

Just as with early modernity, East Asians have entered second modernity in a highly condensed manner. Compressed second modernity has been as much East Asians’ own developmental pursuit as an irresistible outcome of their subordination to cosmopolitan – or global neoliberal – forces. Under a strong nationalist sense of developmental urgency, new bandwagon projects – such as globalization, liberalization, informatization, and knowledge economy – have governed East Asian life since the 1990s, but not without serious economic, social, and even political impacts. While these proactive initiatives have been instrumental in rapidly ushering East Asia into a new civilizational stage and providing new sources of economic growth, there have also been disastrous consequences for society and individuals alike. In particular, the highly impulsive and thus haphazard way second modernity has been brought about for immediate developmental effects has crucially aggravated such risks – in South Korea, for instance, the national financial meltdown of 1997-98 being an indelible marker. Even after the swift recovery from the crisis, South Koreans and other East Asians have been

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8 See Beck (1999), Beck and Grande (2010), etc. Beck disputes ‘methodological nationalism’ in social theory and analysis and instead advocates ‘methodological cosmopolitanism’ in order to reflect international and global processes by which the nature of modernity in late-modernizing societies is critically determined.

9 To the extent that second modernity is an outcome of intensification of first modernity which, in turn, has pivoted around liberal capitalism in an overwhelming majority of nations, neoliberalization may be considered a critical manifestation of second modernity.

10 See, Turner and Khondker (2010), Globalization East and West for a highly comprehensive and balanced account of globalization in respect to Asia (as well as other world regions).

11 For instance, South Korea is now the world’s foremost information society as manifested in terms of its global competitiveness in ICT industry, its most widespread access to internet and mobile communication, etc. Its industrial restructuring and respatialization have been astonishingly swift, so that the national economy is now governed overwhelmingly by high-end technological industries whereas job-supplying industries have been heavily relocated to China, Vietnam, etc. Its exposure to experimental sciences and technologies both in industrial production and everyday personal life is seemingly unconstrained. Its world record-breaking pace of population aging has resulted in elderly people’s rampant poverty and social alienation and in widespread familial conflicts concerning care provision. Its labour market liberalization (‘flexibilization’) has been incomparably radical as measured in terms of the society-wide dominance of transitory and casual employment. Its financialization has been staggering in terms of an instant portfolio domination of major domestic industries by global capital, the snowballing debts of both the state and grassroots households, etc.
critically affected by a diverse range of new problems involving the state, industrial economy, labor market, business enterprises, trade unions, schools, and even families.

In sum, whether intended or not, second modernity has been incorporated into East Asian societies in an extremely condensed manner, constituting another instance of compressed modernity. Such condensation of second modernization is fundamentally linked to the nationalist developmental politics that has continued to govern East Asian societies ever since their entrance into modernity. In the 21st century East Asia, like elsewhere, individual, communal, and national (societal) life is increasingly beset by the syndromes of second modernity. More imperatively, as illustrated below in respect to various social dimensions, it is the condensed (and politicized) nature of second modernization that has most critically affected East Asian life and thus constitutes the distinct East Asianness in the second modern stage of humanity.

3. Global Family and Liquid Individuality

Under second modernity, many social institutions of (first) modernity – the state, political parties, market economy, welfare system, schools, industrial enterprises as well as families – abruptly become ineffective or dysfunctional. As these institutions increasingly show seemingly irreparable weaknesses in delivering social functions and individual utilities once taken for granted under first modernity, it becomes necessary for individuals to (re)design their biographies in terms of permanently individualized endeavors, pursuits, and existences. In this way, individualization is supposed to become essential to social change under second modernity. For contemporary East Asians, however, families have not necessarily reduced or shed off their highly multifarious and intense social functions. In fact, under the chronic deficiency of social services and security and the increasing instability of job markets, many East Asian families have rather intensified their functional overloading. A highly illustrative phenomenon is the globalized pursuit of children’s educational opportunities, for which numerous fathers have to become “wild geese” traveling seasonally to see their children and wives abroad.12 Such intensification of familial functions may help many people to cope with the challenging conditions of second modernity, but can simultaneously intimidate young people about the formidable burdens of marriage, procreation, etc. It is no surprise that filialist East Asians increasingly opt to live apart from family by delaying, denying or breaking marriage, refusing or minimizing fertility, reducing familial relations and duties, etc. However, as not many of such defamiliated East Asians are able to convert themselves into ideationally meaningful individualists, this leads to a pervasive phenomenon of individualization without individualism.13 (In this special issue, the article by Ishida et al. discusses a parallel trend in Japan.) A crucial manifestation of the timeworn family-centeredness of East Asians’ individual life consists in their relational life courses – that is, each stage of their individual life course being intensely enmeshed with age / gender / generation-specific familial duties, expectations, and entitlements, which in turn are finely tuned to the social norms and cultural values governing the societal age / gender / generation orders. The sudden dilution of such relational life courses may make defamiliated East Asians feel somewhat relaxed about familial concerns, but often tends to cause a sort of liquid individuality anchored on no stable alternative of gainful individual existence.14 As individualism in a genuinely positive sense has yet to arrive in this world

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12 This is the Korean description of the concerned fathers, but the same phenomenon is found across Chinese territories.
14 This constitutes a different path to “liquid” life from Zygmunt Bauman’s explanation, but the resulting state of individuality may be similarly liquid. See Bauman, Liquid Modernity (2000), and Liquid Life (2005).
region, many defamiliated individuals – whether never-married in thirties and forties, divorced, separated or childlessly married – feel pressured to live in low profile.

4. The Cosmopolitan Village?

Virtually in every East Asian society, the biggest loser under “miracle” industrial (first) modernity has been peasant community. Under what may be called a ruralist development strategy, rural communities and economies in East Asia have been subjected to various restrictive regulations and policies that are designed to reinforce the social and economic order anchored on familial peasantry.\(^\text{15}\) In spite of some protective social functions, this (under)developmental paradigm has mostly serviced urban-based capitalist industrialization in terms of absorption and gradual release of rural surplus labor, stable and cheap supply of foodstuff for urbanites, etc. On a sketchy glance most East Asian villages may appear rather stable and affluent, but they have been subjected to unprecedentedly massive and swift exodus of residents – young women in particular. While this may appear, in an economic sense, a due process of demand-supply equilibrium in the urban labor market, the resulting social and economic transformations have involved a fundamental dissolution of rural communities.

Paradoxically, such compressed (condensed) urbanization or rural emptying has recently led to a highly interesting episode of condensed cosmopolitanization – namely, the massive arrival of marriage migrants from neighboring poor countries. (See Shim and Han’s article in this special issue.) Unable to marry even until their forties and fifties, many Japanese, Taiwanese, and South Korean rural bachelors have desperately searched for potential brides from less developed Asian countries. In South Korea, for instance, this trend has been euphemistically called or framed as “multiculturalization”, implying that a much awaited qualitative transformation of this ethnocentric society is thereby heralded. Just as the overnight arrival of Japanese and American colonizers in Korean villages in the early part of the twentieth century, the sudden appearance of Asian brides has exposed South Korean villagers to a range of new experiences associated with the dissimilar languages, looks, values, and foods of their new family members. Unfortunately, the now familial duty of intercultural adjustment falls mostly on the foreign brides, practically limiting cosmopolitanization as a lopsided experience of poor marriage migrants (Kim 2010).\(^\text{16}\) Nevertheless, rural marriage in East Asia has become a seriously cosmopolitan, if often brutalized, experience, involving entire Asia as a cultural as well as analytical unit.

5. Global Cities, Special Economic Zones: Enclave Second Modernity

According to the “national systems of cities” literature, most East (and Southeast) Asian countries have been characterized by the urban dominance by each respective “primate city” – Tokyo, Seoul, Taipei, Bangkok, Manila, etc. Even in continent-size mainland China, Shanghai and Beijing overwhelm all other cities in terms of economic, social, and political influences (Chang 1994). To the extent that the contemporary development of East Asian countries has been predicated upon their externally dependent economic growth as well as civilizational

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\(^{15}\) See Chang (2005): Ruralism in China: Reinterpretation of Post-Collective Development. Extending Edward Said’s epistemology, ruralism denotes “all those social, cultural, political, and economic ideas and actions about rural peoples and places that have been devised and implemented by urban-based elite groups to justify urban-centered programs of economic and social transformation and necessitate self-negating changes (and non-changes) in rural people’s everyday life” (Chang 2005: 291).

\(^{16}\) It is perhaps for this reason that foreign brides from societies with Confucian cultural heritages are much preferred. In South Korea, according to the official accounts (Yonhapnews, 11 August 2010), brides from poor Vietnamese villages comprise the largest group of marriage migrants (i.e. 27.2 percent of the total of 118,773 marriage migrant women as of June-end 2010).
linkage to the West (and/or Japan), these primate cities have accommodated various types of comprador interests. At times of more direct colonial intervention, these primate cities used to house Western and/or Japanese institutions, enterprises as well as occupiers. Most recently, local political and economic elites are trying to reinvent these cities into global entrepots for industrial, financial, commercial, scientific, and cultural transactions. As these successively attempted and forced instances of external connectedness or dependency in the East Asian megacities have been linked up to the breathtakingly fast aggrandizement of the respective national economies and societies, many of them have developed into irrefutable “global cities”. However, it should be pointed out that the globality of these primate cities is paradoxically conditioned upon the highly centralized structure of political economic power and sociocultural influence. Above all, most of them are not only national capitals inhabited by authoritative (or authoritarian) political and technocratic elites but also economic and sociocultural centers in which major corporate headquarters, top universities, and even leading NGOs are densely located. It is here that neoliberal globalization of local economies and reflexive cosmopolitanization in culture, science and technology, policy-making, and so on are effected under the strong (developmental) statist initiatives. East Asian primate cities attest to the crucial fact that cosmopolitanized reflexivity is often conditioned upon concentrated nationalist and/or statist developmental endeavors.

Such globally oriented developmental will of national elites in the center sometimes results in an overnight creation—or, more precisely, declaration—of “special” zones in various domestic regions designed to attract both overseas and domestic parties with globally oriented interests. These include China’s “Special Economic Zones” (Ge 1999), South Korea’s “Free Economic Zones” (Chen 1995), etc. Usually accompanied by special national/local laws and administrative directives that exempt them from domestic regulations and duties and offer preferential (or “globally competitive”) terms in taxation, infrastructure, residential status, etc., these special zones, at least on surface, are hoped to become exemplary facilitators for global integration and ascendance of local industries and institutions. Under a developmental vision of economic (second) modernization, economic, technoscientific, and even sociocultural cosmopolitanization is strategically promoted in them. Some of them are also aimed at affirmatively promoting the economic and social interests of the physically involved areas or communities (with hitherto alienated or disadvantaged status). But, even in such cases, the existing characteristics and conditions of the local economies and societies are rarely integrated into the main operational features of these globally oriented special zones. The fascination of East Asian countries (in particular, those under the developmentalist governments) with such institutional enclaves is an unfailing indicator of their developmental desire to pursue economic and other cosmopolitanizations in a strategically condensed manner.

6. Diaspora Reinterpreted: Intra-ethnonational Cosmopolitanization and Flexibly Rigid Citizenship

For millennia, the state of China has always served as a source of epistemological obfuscation about the societal units of Asian existence. Thanks to the presence of imperial China—more precisely, due to their successful survival of Chinese physical aggressions and cultural influences—Korea and Japan have so long developed their national consciousness as well as the state systems based upon it. However, China itself has never existed as a comparable unit of nation-state. Instead, it has sit on a highly fluid system of mixing politico-military domination

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18 Even North Korea once promoted “Free Economic Zones”, however, without desired effects (Chen 1995).
19 Local residents often opt for “developmental profits” attending on the soaring prices of their lands.
(if not always direct governance), ethno-network (not ethnicity), cultural habits and assertions, and even (alleged) politico-historical memories. China’s chronic collision with neighboring sociocultural and / or political groups is a built-in feature of the Asian (or Eurasian) regional order.

Recently, this fluidity or flexibility in China’s nationness has critically manifested itself in terms of imagining a Chinese universe through the global huaqiao (overseas Chinese) network. When post-Mao China (People’s Republic of China) embarked on liberal economic reform, it instantly reconceived overseas Chinese, no matter where they legally reside, as brotherly capitalists and provided them with a special status as quasi-PRC nationals. Inside mainland China, there are individual regional centers harboring separate groups of overseas Chinese capital – Taiwanese capital in Fujien, Hong Kong capital in Gwangdong, Singaporean capital in Suzhou, and, if you will, Korean cousin capital in Shandong. Most recently, the Chinese drive to a globally competitive knowledge economy has induced Beijing to reach out for West-residing Chinese top scientists and experts – who are of course in massive numbers – with unprecedented material remunerations and status offers. The Chinese authority seems to have tried to cosmopolitanize the Chinese economy and society in a flexibly rigid manner – namely, imagining cosmopolitan China through global Chinese ethno-network.

Interestingly, South Korea has closely followed the suit, trying to attract overseas Koreans’ capital, knowledge, and, not least importantly, cheap labor. The Korean nation is one of the world’s most widely dispersed (or diasporic) populations, largely thanks to its historical subordination and exposure to colonial aggression and neocolonial domination. Ranging from major neighbors such as China, Japan, and the United States to remote Uzbekistan and Khazakstan in Central Asia, Koreans account for one of the most sizable minority ethnic groups of legal citizens in each country. Besides, numerous Korean migrant entrepreneurs, though in much smaller numbers than their Chinese counterparts, have aggressively explored economic opportunities across Latin America and Southeast Asia (Indochina, in particular). Also, Korean students (often along with their anxious parents) account for one of the largest foreign student groups in China, Japan, the United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and even the Philippines. Reconceiving the instrumental value as well as the historico-political right of these diverse groups of overseas Koreans (adding up to about seven million people), the South Korean government has tried to refashion the ethno-citizenship framework in a flexibly hierarchical manner – opening up economic and social opportunities to all overseas Koreans, but

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21 This is even reflected in the official statistical yearbooks, tabulating overseas Chinese-related investments and transactions as separate from those by other foreigners.
22 Many overseas Chinese businessmen have ended up developing long-term extramarital relations with local women (called ernai, or the second wives). This is such a widespread phenomenon that, in Taiwan, ernai are often considered a familiar part of the concerned businessmen’s families. See Shen (2005).
24 Ong’s (1998) observation on “flexible citizenship” in the Asia-Pacific region is premised upon individuals’ active accommodation of cross-border flows of information, culture, and economic opportunities, under which national and personal identities are often put in tension. The Chinese government’s effort to developmentally accommodate the resources and networks of overseas Chinese is flexible in the sense of reaching out globally, but rigid in the sense of limiting the initiatives only to the Chinese ethnicity.
25 For instance, South Korea has hosted the World Korean Business Convention since 2002, in order to promote “the formation of a global network of Korean entrepreneurs and business exchanges among overseas Korean businessmen” (http://hansang.korean.net). This was apparently to mimic the World Chinese Entrepreneurs Convention, initiated by Lee Kwan Yew in 1991.
preferentially treating the ones from richer countries. Through a quasi-dual citizenship framework, the South Korean government has tried to reconfigure the Korean nation as an integrated cosmopolitan entity and thereby bolster South Korea’s global political economic status in the gusty new world of reflexive cosmopolitanism and neoliberal globalism.

7. Cosmopolitanism: Cosmopolitan, Neoliberal, (State-)Nationalist

East Asia since the late 1990s has been engulfed by nationalist assertions and reactions both at the political and populous levels. Some of these moves reflect the timeworn intra-regional antagonism associated with the politico-morally unresolved legacy of Japan’s imperial past, but they much more critically reflect the widespread perplexity and anxiety of East Asians concerning their current and future status in the blustery new world of uncircumscribed global integration. There is no clearly agreed-on conception among East Asians concerning this historic global trend – neoliberal globalization, reflexive cosmopolitanization, or else. However, both the East Asian states and peoples have unequivocally upheld their much accustomed recourse to nationalism. Among the most conspicuous instances are the Chinese spree at daguozhuyi (grand country-ism) that was flamboyantly displayed during the Beijing Olympic Games, the patriotic reactions of South Koreans to the national financial meltdown of 1997-98, etc. Interestingly, but not ironically, these nationalist responses, often led by the authoritative (if not always authoritarian) states, have been oriented toward intensified global integration of East Asians’ economic, political, and sociocultural life. Such integration, despite all perplexities and instabilities brought along, is thought to accelerate national development and thereby bolster the global position of each concerned nation. In the immediate post-Asian crisis decade, the East Asian economic dynamism and strength have even been bolstered and their political and sociocultural influence has begun to be felt seriously across the world. The 2008 global (or, more precisely, cross-Atlantic) financial crisis, during which East Asian economies and states have critically augmented their international weights, has unambiguously testified that even neoliberal globalization (or, in the Davos rhetoric, neoliberal economic cosmopolitanism) does not necessarily help preserve or strengthen the West’s political economic hegemony. East Asia’s nationalist (and statist) approach to economic and other globalization reveals that cosmopolitanization in this late or second modern era is a self-reflexive process in which the involved actors’ preconsciously constructed cosmopolitan expectations and motives serve as the main impetus for actual cosmopolitanization. (See Tyfield and Urry’s article in this special issue for a persuasive account of China’s low carbon cosmopolitanism in this perspective.)

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26 See Lee (2010) for a highly systematic account of the related issues.

27 China’s recent obsession with the glorious history of the Tang dynasty is no coincidence. In most of the Tang era, China was highly cosmopolitan and extremely powerful. Relatedly, the twelve-episode historical documentary “Daguojueqi” (The Rise of Big Nations), aired on CCTV-2 in late 2006, openly signified China’s desire to rise on the global stage.

28 In this milieu, the mutuily dissimilar types of cosmopolitanisms respectively familiar in these countries – namely, China’s zhonghuazhuyi (China-centered narcissist cosmopolitanism), South Korea’s U.S.-dependent cosmopolitanism, and Japan’s self-apologetic cosmopolitanism – are also likely to reverberate in the future, complicating the regional characteristics of cosmopolitanization.


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