The Queer Intersectional in Contemporary Germany
Essays on Racism, Capitalism and Sexual Politics

With contributions by Judith Butler, Zülfukar Çetin, Sabine Hark, Daniel Hendrickson, Heinz-Jürgen Voß, Salih Alexander Wolter and Koray Yılmaz-Günay
The series »Applied Sexual Science« seeks dialogue: it has an interdisciplinary outlook and particularly aims to link theory and practice. Members of the academy and of practical projects such as counseling centers and self-help organizations get into conversation with one another at eye-level. In this way, it might be possible to shorten the often lengthy transfer processes through which practical experiences have been making their belated entrance in scientific institutions. At the same time science may thus contribute to underpin and contextualize new concepts.

The series is based on a positive understanding of sexuality. The focus here is on the question of how a self-determined and appreciative approach to sex/gender and sexuality can be promoted in society. Sexuality is regarded as being embedded in social contexts: in modern bourgeois societies it is an area of life in which gender, class, and racist relations as well as ideological preconditions intersect, and often conflictually so. Simultaneously, in this area negotiations about an open and diversity-accepting development of society take place.

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1 Introducing a German Chapter of the Queer Intersectional

Christopher Sweetapple

“In a world, which one would most willingly define as the blindest of worlds, the presence of people who nevertheless insist on the possibility of its change acquires supreme importance.”

Elias Canetti, The Conscience of Words, 1976

Near the end of one of the late Zygmunt Bauman’s final book-length essays, titled Does the Richness of the Few Benefit Us All? (2013), he contemplated the role of the writer in this present world of brutal disparities and looming catastrophes. Happy to concede that “most human hearts” value truthfulness and abhor hypocrisy (ibid., 91), Bauman painstakingly documents the widely-held, in fact, stubborn belief that trickle-down economics and elite capture of finite resources can and should somehow be tolerated – can be seen as rising tides lifting all society’s ships, as a bearable feature of “reality” (ibid., 92) under capitalism. A look at the balance sheet reveals a discordance between society’s words, deeds and the facts on the ground. Echoing a chorus of leftist exasperation with the unsustainable status quo, Bauman dolefully notes that “the world seems not well protected against catastrophes, but against their prophets” (ibid., 95). In this sense, Bauman sees the vocation of writers as radical truth-tellers who “build a bridge” (ibid., 91) between words, deeds and the graspable, empirical world.

To elaborate this idea, Bauman turns to an important but little-known speech by Elias Canetti on the topic of whether “there is something in which writers or people hitherto thought to be writers could be of use” (Canetti in Bauman 2013, 91–2). “For his starting point, (Canetti) picks a statement made by an unknown author on 23rd August 1939: ‘It’s over. Were I a real writer, I should’ve been able to prevent the war’” (ibid., 93). In this chilling statement, Canetti observes two important virtues of this unknown writer which he holds as exemplary for the entire vocation. These virtues imply a strong relationship between words, deeds

1 “(I)t may have been the Berlin poet Oskar Loerke”, wrote J.P. Stern in a 1986 issue of London Review of Books.
and the world. First, the “hopelessness of the situation” (ibid.) doesn’t defeat the author into silence; rather, it compels acknowledgement, spoken, written. Second, the author asserts their fidelity to writers’ “vocational responsibility for the state of the world” (ibid., 94, italics in original). Words and deeds must be jointly mobilized toward the world, toward making a difference “between well-being and catastrophe” (ibid.). The writer thus possesses the “desire to assume responsibility for everything that can be expressed in words, and to do penance for their, the words’, failure” (Canetti in Bauman, ibid.). Tasked with this tall order, Canetti’s virtuous writer remains absent (“There are no writers today”, Canetti in Bauman, ibid.) yet utterly relevant, as in the epigraph above: “In a world, which one would most willingly define as the blindest of worlds, the presence of people who nevertheless insist on the possibility of its change acquires supreme importance” (Canetti in Bauman, ibid.).

Writing as prophesy of the catastrophe – then, ongoing, to come. Writing as implement to know and transmit knowledge of the world as it is. Writing as urgency to insist that things could be – must be – otherwise. Writing as an ethical stance toward words, deeds and world. Tall order, indeed.

The essays collected in this volume, translated in 2017 and early 2018 into English, represent a modest supplement to existing English-language works which, taken together, provide a partial but forthright portrait of the burgeoning anti-racist queer left in urban Germany during the Merkel era, what I’m calling here a German chapter of the Queer Intersectional. “A German chapter”: the indefinite article, because this is one scene, one selection of authors, and, crucially, one national context, among many; “German”, because the writers’ texts, the politics practiced, and the lives conducted under my admittedly lofty heading do such in German, among other languages; “chapter” has here two intended resonances – both “local branch” and “portion of a book”; and with “the Queer Intersectional” – we’ll come back to that part in a moment.

Readers may have already encountered this recent development of anti-racist queer politics in western Europe, broadly, and in urban Germany, specifically, through the sophisticated works of Fatima El-Tayeb and Jin Haritaworn, both of whom have excellent monographs in English (2011 and 2015, respectively), as well as a wide selection of other published academic works since 2003².

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² See also the three excellent contributions to the “Special section on women’s rights, gay rights and anti-Muslim racism in Europe” in the February 2012 issue of European Journal of Women’s Studies: Haritaworn’s essay “Women’s rights, gay rights and anti-Muslim racism in
Or perhaps readers have encountered the story of Judith Butler’s speech at the Berlin Christopher Street Day awards ceremony in 2010, in which she castigated the organizers and award-givers for their collusion with anti-Muslim racism and announced her strident solidarity with local queer of color groups and organizations. But outside of these entry points, access to the sharp political analyses of this scene remains limited for non-German readers. This lack of access translates into a lack of familiarity, which, upon reflection, is doubly strange considering both Germany’s proximity to the beating heart of global economic and political governance and its rich, creative traditions of political activism.

Obviously, this lack of access and familiarity is one-sided. In Germany – as throughout the world – critical leftist politics are intensely aware of the goings-on in the Anglophone portions of the USA. This is, of course, both a feature of globalization as well as an artifact of the USA’s massive presence in Germany. But this is also a feature of many currents in global anti-racist and sexual freedom movements, both of which have been converging in recent years. In Berlin, Hamburg, Leipzig, Frankfurt, and other urban centers, critical leftisms routinely draw on theories and discourses about race and queerness – perhaps much more so than commensurate discourses of feminism and anti-capitalism – which originate in English-language contexts. Historiographies of the US American Civil Rights movement and subsequent movement for gay and lesbian liberation, learned in university educations and circulated in political networks, both provide contemporary activists and writers in Germany with images and strategies with which to identify and strive.

Still unparalleled in its wide scope and high-quality, the edited volume Karriere eines konstruierten Gegensatzes: zehn Jahre ‘Muslime versus Schwule’ (English: The Career of a Constructed Opposition: 10 Years of ‘Muslims versus Gays’), edited by Koray Yılmaz-Günay and first published in 2011 (the 2nd edition arrived in 2014), remains the finest introduction to this political-cultural scene. The majority of those texts are in German, but interested readers might consult the book for its three English entries, including a short text by Petzen which depicts this important episode with Butler in Berlin in 2010 (“Silent Echoes: The Aftermath of Judith Butler’s Refusal of the Civil Courage Award”, p. 163–168).

English-reading publics, on the other hand, have a surfeit of readily accessible works from non-German affiliates and chapters of the Queer Intersectional and writers working to elaborate anti-capitalist, anti-racist, feminist and queer theoretical insights in their respective disciplines. This could easily be the subject of a still-unwritten bibliographic survey which would helpfully sort through this thicket of writers and works.
This is not to claim that activists in Germany operate in a mode of emulation or mimesis with their projected American counterparts. I do, however, wish to suggest that this epistemic imbalance between German-speaking and non-German-speaking publics of critical leftists does produce deleterious effects, particularly for queer anti-racist activists in Germany. On the one hand, the absence of familiarity becomes, all too easily, a failure of solidarity, or worse, an opening for hackneyed political fantasies to seep in unchallenged. And on the other hand, conservatives and the far-right in Germany (and throughout Europe) jump at the chance to paint queer anti-racist interventions in the tawdry shades of unwelcome foreignness, imported decadence and/or moral menace. This conservative trend to dismiss the contributions and perspectives of queer anti-racists is also, worryingly, manifest on the left. In what amounts to a massive project of ethnoracial gaslighting, throughout Germany a weird coalition of anti-imperialist, anti-fascist and anti-nationalist traditions of street activism and urban politics have conjointly cast queer anti-racist prerogatives variously as inauthentic, crypto-antisemitic, or as manifest bigotry. This volume of translated essays militates against these dangers, providing readers with both first-hand accounts of queer anti-racist theorizing and, in the opportunity to grow international reading publics, a potential bridge to further solidarities in this moment of unprecedented interconnectivity and unstable conditions.

Queer and anti-racist political movements throughout Europe are not going away. In fact, they seem to be in a phase of metastasis and convergence. Political opposition to homophobia and transphobia is not only becoming co-extensive with political opposition to racism and xenophobia – a banal observation considering how entities like the EU, states or even corporations conspicuously broadcast their commitments to the rights of sexual and ethnoracial minorities. More pointedly, radical sexual politics and radical racial politics are increasingly finding common cause during this historic moment, at all scales, occupying precisely that cavity in leftist politics produced by obdurate and widening economic inequalities, persistent and ongoing racisms, and the ambivalent and volatile sociolegal inclusions of sexual and gender minorities.

In September 2017 the German federal election was held. I casually polled my friends and acquaintances here in Berlin about their voting moods. The first thing to come up was the scary voting projections for the Alternative for Germany\textsuperscript{5}, the

\textsuperscript{5} Sebastian Friedrich has written an insightful book about this far-right insurgent party, \textit{Die AfD: Analysen – Hintergründe – Kontroversen} (2017) which remains unfortunately untranslat-
new party who were rightly predicted to take seats in the Bundestag and become the first sitting extreme right-wing party in post-WWII German history. How many people will vote for them? When pressed who they personally would vote for, always the same refrain: “There’s nobody to vote for!” For a US American observer like myself, accustomed to a two-party system, this initially strikes as an overstatement. From the outside, the choices appear seemingly wide for the left-leaning voter. From the inside, however, there’s not one party who a voter committed to queer and anti-racist politics would unconditionally support. In Berlin, the Social Democrats continue to be associated with the kind of out-of-touch development politics and mismanagement of gay former municipal mayor Wowereit and the anti-migrant and racially-incendiary statements of former district mayor Buschkowsky. The Green party is still held responsible for their part in evicting the Oranienplatz and Gerhard-Hauptmann-Schule occupation demonstrations conducted by refugee activists a few years before. The Left Party’s biggest national politician, Sarah Wagenknecht, has been appropriating populist discourse about refugees and immigration in a campaign so despised that leftist activists threw a pie in her face. Of course, people voted strategically, holding their noses. But when I stated above that there is a real cavity which queer anti-racist activists occupy, this is a clear index.

In a cunning electoral move to defang the already-mostly-toothless Social Democrats, Chancellor Merkel slightly but significantly changed her stance regarding same-sex marriage legislation months before the election, allowing her party members to vote their conscience rather than as a party block. Annual polls had demonstrated that a majority of the public supported same-sex marriage legislation, Merkel’s previous steadfastness prevented it. A vote was quickly held in June, making same-sex marriage federal policy on October 1, 2017. Mainstream LGBT organizations organized festivities throughout the country. The election campaign went forth, without same-sex marriage as a distinguishing feature of party platforms. The Alternative for Germany party preyed on their far-right voters’ ambivalent opposition to same-sex marriage in the weeks leading up to the election; this, despite the fact that that same party is co-chaired by an out lesbian married to a woman of color.

While the election and the legalization of same-sex marriage were notable background events for the queer and anti-racist activists and writers I have gotten
to know here in Berlin, neither event were major concerns nor prominent targets of their politics or life projects. In fact, for many people I know, 2017 was a somewhat dreadful year of backlash, backsliding, and bad faith, epitomized by a loud, disagreeable book controversy.

Three of the four authors translated here – Wolter, Çetin, Yılmaz-Günay – live in Berlin; Voß lived here for many years and now commutes here regularly from his professorship in Merseburg. This “chapter” of queer anti-racist writers is, more or less, a Berlin affiliate of a larger international network. Last summer, after the same-sex marriage celebrations and at the height of the election campaign, I conducted two semi-formal interviews with Wolter, Çetin and Voß to listen to them discuss their writings and political activism. I had befriended these authors over the course of my own ethnographic field research in Berlin years before, had interviewed three of them formally during that time, and was thus well-acquainted with their writings and politics.

Months before our summer meetings – in fact, on the same day as Donald Trump’s inauguration in January – I got to witness firsthand how the writings and characters of Çetin and Voß – and by association, the critical interventions of queer anti-racist activists and writers writ large – would be maligned throughout the year. That day, Berlin’s largest queer club called SchwuZ hosted another of its many monthly entertainment series, this one called Polymorphia, organized by local drag performer and activist Patsy l’Amour laLove. This particular party series includes a public lecture and discussion, followed by a drag show and then dancing. The lecture, titled “Pinkwashing? Israel?!” (yes, both a question mark and an exclamation point), was to be delivered by Frederik Schindler, a youthful freelance journalist and Green Party activist from Frankfurt am Main. The circulated description of the lecture promised to discuss why “leftist groups”, especially in Berlin, relentlessly critique the “only Jewish state” and what their organizing against “pinkwashing” has to do with centuries-old antisemitic stereotypes.

For local queer anti-racist activists, the announcement of this edition of Polymorphia sent off red flags of concern and outrage. From the perspective of the event’s organizer, that was the point – Patsy’s public persona is crafted to be a

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6 More information about this iconic club is to be found in Çetin’s contribution to this present volume.
provocateur who flouts political correctness. But it was quickly pointed out that such a “public lecture,” at least in its description, upends a broad political more in Berlin which stipulates that public political discussions about international contexts and communities should strive to include those communities to speak for themselves. Berlin is home to the largest Israeli immigrant community in Germany, a demographically young and majority-leftist population, as well as a long-standing Palestinian community. Furthermore, the lecture was announced to be held exclusively in German – another more flippantly disregarded by the event organizers. How does an event about the Israeli and Palestinian political contexts not include Israelis or Palestinians, nor even presenters who speak Hebrew or Arabic? The event description’s characterization of local activists who organize against “pinkwashing,” many of them Israeli Jews and Palestinian exiles, as antisemitic also alarmed and offended many people, far more people, in fact, than just those activists who were simply intended. Even after my own many years of residence in Berlin, I must admit that it continues to astonish (not only) me when white Germans breathlessly accuse Jews of antisemitism. It’s creepy.

The lecture saw a packed room with a divided, boisterous, even sometimes rude crowd. Patsy moderated, striking a hard note at the beginning about the value and importance of civil but passionate listening, the irony (or hypocrisy, take your pick) apparently lost on her. For the better part of an hour, Schindler then clambered through his talk – the simultaneous English-translation of his speech near the front (a last-minute concession from the organizers), as well as audience interruptions, and the general tense mood, were all minor distractions. While one could almost admire his gumption, his polemic, such as it was, pivoted between straw-men, guilt-by-association, selective reading and outright misreading, with more than a dash of en vogue “whataboutery”, all poorly hidden behind the imprimatur of his haughty, academic style of delivery. 30 minutes into his talk, Schindler mentioned the recent work of Çetin and Voß as evidence of how the very concept “homonationalism” is wrapped up in antisemitic and Islamist-defensive discourses, in this case, imputing that the authors denied a statement about particular cases of homosexual refugees being threat-
ened by ISIS members as mere anti-Muslim hysteria. Needless to say, there’s more to it.

Only months later, Schindler’s lecture was published in an edited volume by Patsy I’Amour LaLove called *Biting Reflexes – Criticism of Queer Activism, Authoritarian Longings and Speech Bans* (2017), which collected 27 articles of more or less the same type of shabby polemic thinly disguised as academic research. Several of these authors then went on a media blitz, most notably in Germany’s oldest feminist magazine *Emma*. Seeing a threat in the recent gains of anti-racist interventions into German queer politics and discourse, these authors attempt to draw a straight line from theoretical concepts like the aforementioned “pinkwashing” and “homonationalism” to more diffuse activist discourses of “intersectionality,” “privilege” and “cultural appropriation,” threading these ostensibly authoritarian and sectarian concepts and politics to recursive accusations of antisemitism and racism, again and again. From its dust-jacket description to the sweep of its articles and the fierce publicity campaign, the book presented an impassioned attempt to take back the concept and identity “Queer” from all its current, villainous keepers.

The book became a minor hit. It sold well and received loads of media attention, dominating national and local discussions about the state of queer activism in the year of same-sex marriage equality and the Alternative for Germany. Wolter, Çetin, Yılmaz-Güney and Voß, as well as many other anti-racist queer activists I know in this Berlin chapter, found themselves having to variously respond to the myriad half-truths and accusations which smeared their bodies of work. The debate got loud enough to catch Judith Butler’s attention, who co-authored a rebuttal in *Die Zeit* with eminent German queer theorist Sabine Hark, which eloquently responded to many of the inaccuracies and defamatory accusations pedaled in the book. (A translated and updated version of this Hark and Butler text is presented at the end of this volume – more about that below.)

9 I think what Schindler is referring to here – at this point in his talk, he’s hopscotching around the mediasphere to explain to his audience how queer anti-racist activists and writers supposedly minimize the threat of Islamist extremists – can be found at the end of his section titled “Gay Kisses Are German Leitkultur” in Çetin’s contribution to the present volume. There, Çetin quotes at length the director of MILES – LSVD Berlin. While I’m told she’s a very nice person, that interview (not unlike LSVD’s politics), as one can read, is a mess. The casual tone, the weird deference to hearsay in a public interview, and the very serious reality behind those flippant words – none of it adds up. Consider Çetin’s measured take on this example, and then revisit Schindler’s shooting-from-the-hip characterization in his speech to get a little taste of what’s afoot here. I’m reminded of the recent Jordan Peterson phenomena. Correcting all this and that reanimated bullshit is such a disappointing waste of human resources.
Having spent many years investigating queer anti-racist politics in Berlin ethnographically, I understood the mood I witnessed among Wolter, Çetin, and Voß during our interviews last summer. That public discourse would treat the shrill charlatans gathered in Biting Reflexes seriously was indeed deflating. Institutions which supported the book – like the Rosa-Luxemburg Foundation – were materially supporting hollow arguments and denunciations of these and other very accomplished writers and activists. The Queerbuchmesse – an annual queer book fair – did not give the book any space, sparking outcries of censorship. Publications devoted inordinate space to deliberating caricatures of serious scholarship and devoted work.

Wolter, Çetin, and Voß, however, didn’t seem defeated. They were concerned, sure, even exasperated and angry. But also jovial, sharp as ever – and undeterred. This was an attitude I recognized from having collected many accounts of queer anti-racist work and activism over the years. And this is why I began as I did with Bauman and Canetti’s reflections on writing and writers, those who, despite miserable conditions, pursue the vocation of truth-telling and taking responsibility for both the troubled world and one’s failure to write it.

Queer and anti-racist political movements are swelling and converging like never before. Their relationships and commitment to radical feminist and anti-capitalist politics, traditions and analysis also continues to burgeon. These developments are to be found in Amsterdam, London, Paris and Vienna, as well as Berlin. In the US, the Black Lives Matter movement, instigated by the police murder of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri in 2014, was prominently launched by black straight and queer-feminist activists. The Movement for Black Lives, an umbrella organization which grew out of this powerful swelling of politicized resistance to anti-black violence, strongly features queer, feminist and anti-capitalist dimensions in their anti-racist works and policy recommendations. In fact, Black Lives Matter have chapters here in Berlin and elsewhere in Europe. As a tentative label for this multicentric, theoretical and political movement, I proposed “the Queer Intersectional”. Let me now explain.

With this label, I’m trying to put my finger on what I perceive as a global constituency of politicized actors – scholars, writers, activists, thinkers, dreamers – who task themselves with the synthesis of a number of critical political traditions

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10 I cannot thank enough the UMass Department of Anthropology’s European Field Studies program, the National Science Foundation, and the Wenner-Gren Foundation for their generous support of my research in Berlin.
and multiple lines of solidarity and concern. Frequently maligned and misunderstood, the term “intersectionality” has come to function as the signifier for this stance I’m describing, this posture of solidarity bent in multiple directions. Traditionally, the term refers to a methodology of Critical Legal Studies analysis which allows the social scientist to be sensitive to and account for multiple axes of juridical power and overdetermined designations, the effects of which tend toward the occlusion of compounding forms of discrimination. In the decades following the popularity of Angela Davis’ *Women, Race and Class* (1981), the term “intersectionality” took on a more relaxed usage, to generally refer to a sociological imagination attuned to multiple vectors – lines, hence the intersection metaphor – of oppression, at first sexism, racism, class inequality, then homo- and transphobia, ableism. Fast-forward 30 years to the era of the Anthropocene, the early 21st century, and suddenly the idea of distinct forms of oppression operating arm in arm in sociolegal structures sounds ... like exactly how leftists, whether at the chalkboard or in the streets, tend to understand the political world. “Intersectionality” has long since descended from its perch as a word solely for an academic methodology. It is now less a methodology than it is the condition we find ourselves in. *Intersectionality: the auspicious condition we experience when our multiple capacities for political solidarity are activated and coordinated.* This is what distinguishes “intersectionality” from “multiculturalism”. While both capacious labels are easily denounced, the former is a political discourse while the latter is a depoliticizing one.

I hope readers forgive me for being so bold as to admit that the Queer Intersectional is also my remix of Joseph Massad’s catty designation for “Western” gay and lesbian imperialism, what he infamously calls “the Gay International”. I actually believe the contrast of the two categories is apposite. Criticism of Massad’s thesis is plenty – at this point, one can even read Massad’s extensive response to

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11 Readers who wish for a clear historiography and explanation of the term in English-language scholarship have innumerable resources at their fingertips with the internet. I suggest Patricia Hill Collins and Sirma Bilge’s book *Intersectionality* (2016) for those who desire a deep and thorough inquiry.

12 Readers seeking a more robust explanation of “depoliticization” as I am using it here might well consult the first chapter, “Tolerance as a Discourse of Depoliticization” of Wendy Brown’s still vital *Regulating Aversion* (2006). On the topic of “multiculturalism,” English-language sources really are endless. I suggest Alana Lentin and Gavan Titley’s excellently researched *The Crises of Multiculturalism: Racism in a Neoliberal Age* (2011) as well as Rita Chin’s longer durée study *The Crisis of Multiculturalism in Europe: A History* (2017) for those wishing to be brought up to speed.
over a decade of criticism\textsuperscript{13}. But if one takes queer and anti-racist ideas seriously, it’s hard to deny that Massad was on to something. Put simply, I asked myself, who or what acts as a counterweight to the Gay International? While Massad is hypercritical of how feminism and gay and lesbian rights discourses have both been mobilized, he wouldn’t have given us the term the Gay International if he simply thought \textit{all} forms of struggle for sexual and gender freedom are evil conscripts to Euro-American imperialism. The Gay International is meant to designate something in particular. But Massad does not busy himself with explaining or even theorizing what this “otherwise” to the Gay International might be; it remains implicit in his theorizing. By the time Secretary of State Hilary Clinton delivered her “gay and lesbian rights” speech in Geneva in 2011, most readers and users of queer intersectional theories turned to Jasbir Puar’s contagious term “homonationalism” rather than Massad’s for assistance, the latter seemingly a bit out of focus when it came to properly naming the accelerating synergy between (inter)nationalism(s) and gay/lesbian legal inclusion.

Massad calls them “the Gay International” aptly – wealthy cis-men, as people and as norms, dominate global structures of governance. They’re awful, and we must challenge them. But he could well have called them “Gay Inc.” The unaccountable corporation is just as menacing and accurate an image as a conspiratorial “International” cabal. (Lisa Duggan’s popular term \textit{homonormativity}, while richly theorized and a likely synonym, leaves us with “normativity” to get worked up about, which is difficult.\textsuperscript{14}) Besides, from a Queer perspective, Gay Inc. is \textit{the} problem, domestically as externally, across national contexts. Wherever you find well-funded gay and lesbian organizations, disputes about racist, classist, sexist and transphobic exclusions are nearby. As gayborhoods underwent gentrification and waves of neoliberal, creative-class-modernizing, lesbian and trans* locales diminished significantly\textsuperscript{15}. This as true in Berlin or London as it is in San Francisco.

\textsuperscript{13} Massad first introduced his argument in 2002 in the journal \textit{Public Culture} with his text “Re-orienting desire: The Gay International and the Arab World” and expanded it in his book \textit{Desiring Arabs} (2007). Readers can find Massad’s response to his critics of that article and book in his most recent book \textit{Islam in Liberalism} (2015), a book fit for superlative descriptions like “magisterial” and “path-breaking”.

\textsuperscript{14} Don’t let my jocular tone fool anyone: Duggan’s 2004 book \textit{Twilight of Inequality? Neoliberalism, Cultural Politics, and the Attack on Democracy} – in fact, anything she writes – is to be read carefully and taken seriously. Her works are consummate examples of NYC Queer Intersectional writing.

\textsuperscript{15} Christina Hanhardt’s 2013 study \textit{Safe Space: Gay Neighborhood History and the Politics of Violence} is a noteworthy and highly readable account of these processes in North America.
Call the observable split in contemporary sexual freedom movements that between Gay Inc. and Queer. Keep “Queer” singular, to remind us that it is neither a person nor team, but rather a tendency and a tradition.

Call the emergent convergence between anti-racist, anti-capitalist and radical queer-feminist politics “Intersectional”. Keep it awkwardly singular, too, to signal its oppositional kinship with “International”.

Find and read your local chapter. Read other chapters, too.

This Berlin chapter of the Queer Intersectional introduced in the following volume is hardly meant to be the symbolic representatives or all-encompassing ambassadors for the movement. This volume came together organically, first with the commissioning of Wolter and Voß’s texts into English. Then we imagined a volume with two other texts – Wolter and Yılmaz-Günay’s chapter from Çetin’s 2013 edited volume, and Çetin’s chapter from Voß and Çetin’s 2016 co-authored book Gay Visibility – Gay Identity. I contacted my friend and colleague Smaran Dayal to translate Çetin, and Daniel Hendrickson agreed to translate Yılmaz-Günay and Wolter’s text. Suddenly, a feasible plan for this volume emerged.

My translation – with the excessive help of my husband Yossi Bartal – of Voß and Wolter’s two-essay, co-authored Queer and (Anti)Capitalism begins this volume. Already in its third printing, this slim book functions as a wonderfully lucid introduction to the synthesis of critical Marxist, queer and anti-racist scholarship which informs the politics of the Queer Intersectional16. Wolter’s essay charts the history of radical trans* and gay and lesbian liberation alongside his brief account of the historiography of capitalist development, from its inception through the present neoliberal era. He follows his argument – that anti-racism, queer rebellion and anti-capitalism are all mutually constitutive and empirically linked, and thus equally worthy of our solidarity and attention – through both German history, which will be especially helpful for the non-German audience, as well as through more recent US history, lingering over Marsha P. Johnson and Sylvia Rivera, for instance. Wolter’s essay concludes with a discussion of how Queer Intersectional theories – some of the authors he discusses, like Crenshaw, Foucault, Derrida, Spivak, may be quite familiar to English-language readers, while

16 Peter Drucker’s lucid – and long – book from 2015, Warped: Gay Normality and Queer Anti-Capitalism, remains a strong complementary text to the present volume, dovetailing with Wolter and Voß’s Marxist arguments and interest in history and, especially in its Chapter 5 (“Toward a Queer Sexual Politics”), providing correspondent exposition of key terms like homonationalism and pinkwashing, extensively used in Çetin’s and Yılmaz-Günay and Wolter’s texts.
German-language writers like Wagenknecht and Engel less so – find encouraging expression in contemporary anti-racist and queer activisms.

Voß’s essay offers a more detailed historical account of the development of global capitalism and its nasty effect on people, what he calls Deklassierung, which I translated as immiseration. This essay, a superb exemplar of historical sociology, puts post-colonial and Marxist scholarship into illuminating dialogue, spanning many centuries, demonstrating the sexual, gendered and ethnoracial dynamics of capitalist development with specific attention throughout paid to Germany, all in a manner which never loses sight of just how much coercion, suffering and misery European modernity drummed up and doled out in its quest for progress. After an interesting discussion of how homosexuality’s history is marked by these very same capitalist dynamics, Voß turns back to German history in the final portion of his essay, tracing both queer as well as anti-racist dilemmas and events in the 20th century. This history recounted here will be especially useful for readers less familiar with the West and East German contexts. Concluding his fresh intersectional account of capitalist development, Voß passionately pleads, like Wolter, for a renewed configuration of anti-capitalist, anti-racist and queer-feminist agendas up to the task of acknowledging and taking responsibility for the twisted societies we find ourselves in, complicit, as they are, in ongoing atrocities hiding in plain sight and riven by possibilities for alliance, co-ordination, and a major change of course.

Çetin’s essay comes from a book he co-authored with Voß in 2016 called Gay Visibility – Gay Identity: Critical Perspectives. Developing arguments made in some of his previous works, including his published doctoral dissertation Islamophobia and Homophobia: intersectional discriminations with the example of binational couples in Berlin (2012) as well as his sharp contribution to Yılmaz-Günay’s book (see Note 2 above), this article makes important conceptual bridges to scholarship indebted to Puar’s vivid concept homonationalism and empirical analysis of mainstream gay and lesbian politics in Germany’s political and cultural capital, Berlin. Çetin surveys a number of manifestations of the synergy between gentrification and the politics of institutionalization and securitization, thereby offering readers a concrete analysis of how prevalent discourses circulate, repeat and harden into misdiagnosed problems, shoddy policies and elite constituencies. As his translator Smaran Dayal recently put it to me, Çetin’s text courageously names names and does some heavy-lifting to connect ongoing activisms to academic and wider political debates hitherto disconnected from these activisms. Finally, his media analysis of different Berlin districts provides a much-needed connection between the sociology of contemporary Berlin and the burning questions of contemporary queer scholarship about racism and nationalism in Europe.
Yılmaz-Günay and Wolter’s polemical essay tackles one of the thorniest issues in German leftist politics, the ugly misappropriation of the Holocaust by mainstream gay institutions and talking heads. A wonderful rhetorical counterpoint to Çetin’s text, Yılmaz-Günay and Wolter take issue with the ways that “the figure of the Jew” is mobilized in the project of German gay and lesbian institution-building. The authors consider political speech about the Monument for Homosexuals Persecuted under the Nazis to show the bad faith arguments which spill forth from the mouths of gay actors wishing to validate their exclusionary vision of a historic, German gay community via crude – and oftentimes wildly inaccurate – Holocaust victimology. Tracing the rhetorical pattern whereby white gay identity seems compelled to cast Jews and antisemitism as analogous to gays and homophobia, their text interrogates the elisions this rhetorical move makes possible and the realities it denies, offering a stark anti-racist critique which rejects instrumentalizing Jews and a renewed call for solidarity with those victims of Nazi persecution these elite gay actors seem unable to imagine as comrades.

Our volume ends with two short texts from 2017. The first is co-authored by Çetin and Daniel Hendrickson in German for the documenta 14 exhibition in Kassel, Germany, in 2017. We chose to include this text to gesture toward the radically-changing domain of sexual politics in Germany at the time of publication – and undoubtedly into the future. The reverberations of two recent dramas continue to shake German society in numerous ways. The first, of course, took place in the summer of 2015, with what the English-language press settled on calling the “European Migrant Crisis”. Months later, the annual New Year’s Eve celebrations in Cologne (and a few other German cities) to mark the 2015/2016 transition were marred by mass sexual violence and assaults of women and petty crimes in the crowded central district. While analysis of each event is beyond the scope of the present work, this final text hints at some of the ways that they have impacted local sexual discourses, here in particular, about male hustlers and sex workers in Berlin’s cruising parks.

And finally, as a special to addendum to the political context I have described here in my introduction, and also in the spirit of acknowledging the rapidly changing terrain of sexual politics in Germany, we are fortunate to present Sabine Hark and Judith Butler’s timely rejoinder to the Beissreflexe volume and its noxious publicity campaign. After we translated their original text back into English, the authors combed through and ameliorated some of our more clunky formula-
tions, as well as embellishing some of their points and including some insights that were previously edited out because of space restrictions in Die Zeit. While neither Hark nor Butler belong to this Berlin chapter per se, their bodies of works have been hugely influential for Germany’s multiple Queer Intersectional chapters in general and this Berlin chapter in particular – they are cited in the following texts; Wolter even borrows Butler’s pithy phrase “refusing complicity” as a subtitle.

My invocation at the beginning of this introduction of Zygmunt Bauman’s musings on the duty of writing and writers for the present might be a bit melodramatic – but only a bit. Much like the Greek discursive tradition of parrhesia which fascinated Michel Foucault, or the spiritually prophetic tradition extolled by Cornel West, Canetti’s discourse about writerly solidarity becomes implicitly conscripted to Bauman’s self-portraiture, which I suppose one could call hubris, but which I prefer to see as a forgivable, even charming, act of ego. After so many pages and books describing the intractable problems of “liquid modernity,” might Bauman had held out hope that perhaps he, according to Canetti’s formula, qualified as a writer? This anxiety is familiar. This determination, too.

Queer Intersectional writing and activism, wherever it bubbles up, doesn’t shy away from reckoning with the ugly immiseration which haunts this most luxurious of human civilizations. It doesn’t give colonial patterns a pass. It doesn’t permit the fiction of equal opportunity and nominal democracy used to cheerily narrate the scary present. When it comes to ongoing oppression, in all its tricky forms, the Queer Intersectional doesn’t succumb to the inertia of accommodation or integration; it doesn’t “get over it” \(^\text{18}\). It takes responsibility for what it witnesses, and proceeds thusly.

To put it in personal terms: this is what makes the writers collected in this volume – along with the staggering number of still-untranslated others – worth my attention and time (and effort – I have to admit, German to English translation isn’t a stress-free cruise in the park). These are the types of texts I would want easy access to were I unfamiliar with but curious about the German context and/or were I working out of another chapter of the Queer Intersectional, scouring the record for comparable cases, stimulating analyses or political strategies.

\(^\text{CMS January 2018}\)

\(^\text{18}\) Martin Luther King Jr.’s famous comments about maintaining a proud “creative maladjustment” to the horrors of contemporary society, delivered at my undergraduate alma mater Western Michigan University on December 18\(^{\text{th}}\), 1963, are emblematic of this stance.
Bibliography

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Christopher Sweetapple is an anthropologist from metro Detroit. After completing his BA at Western Michigan University (Islamic Studies), he pursued his MA in sociocultural anthropology at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, became a graduate fellow in the Legal Studies program there, and is currently completing his PhD. He relishes teaching (and) adventurous scholarship. His dissertation is based on ethnographic fieldwork he conducted intermittently between 2006 and 2013, supported by UMass’ European Field Studies program in the Anthropology Department, The Wenner-Gren Foundation, as well as the National Science Foundation. In between teaching, studying and researching, he has also been engaged in labor, queer, and anti-racist activism. He now lives in Berlin, Germany.
2 Queer and (Anti)Capitalism I

Refusing Complicity: A Theoretical Introduction from an Activist Perspective

Salih Alexander Wolter

“The critique, the activism and the theoretical development of blacks and people of color have been, for decades, systematically elided, particularly as they do not further funding support and white careers. If it in fact seeks to be social and not particularistic, hegemony critique is thus permitted to be oblivious of neither itself nor history.”

Koray Yılmaz-Günay (2014)

Why Speak of Capitalism? And How?

When queer arrived in the German-speaking world in the mid-1990s, talk was also spreading of neoliberal conditions which would threaten via “globalization”. What was usually meant by this was the thorough economization of every domain of life, which in the meantime has advanced considerably. So far, in fact, that in light of a few years “deepening divisions of society, increasing economic inequality and the emergence of a new precariat have intensified the desire for capitalism critique within queer studies”. However, it seldom expressed itself with this title, nor that of “anti-capitalism”. Queer reflections on the theme instead likely announce themselves as “economy-critical”. We have decided otherwise, for two reasons.

Firstly, regarding the contemporary debate over the “correct” reading of Karl Marx, the concept is closely linked to Michael Heinrich’s critical Kapital lectures,

1 Translated from the German by Christopher Sweetapple, with Yossi Bartal.
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to which we owe many new insights. Central to his approach, however, stands
the “monetary theory of value,” which Marx is said to have advocated (Heinrich
2004, 62), whereas the received view showed above all that “the value of the com-
modity” represents “human labor per se” (Schleifstein 1972, 102). Post-colonial
critics of capitalism, of whom we are especially concerned in this book, based
themselves on the conventional interpretation. They take the international di-
vision of labor as their basis and see in racism and sexism no lesser contradictions
as with the capital relation, thus a class antagonism “of the capitalists on one side,
wage workers on the other” (MEW 23 [1867], 641). In short: feminist Gaytri
Chakroverty Spivak, even if she identifies as an “old-fashioned Marxist” rather
than a deconstructionist (see Castro Varela/Dhawan 2005, 64, 57), importantly
provides an emancipatory update to the much-maligned “traditional Marxism”.
However, we wish to avoid obscuring differences in an important theoretical
question merely to find refuge under the label “economy-critique”.

The second reason we prefer to call capitalism by name is precisely the arbi-
trariness with which this label is utilized for notions which directly contradict
Heinrich’s concern. His wish to demonstrate that “capitalism consists of system-
atic relations of domination” is dismissed by some authors from the white, queer-
feminist spectrum as a “regulatory fiction” while they rhapsodize about “free
zones” in which allegedly already, in the here and now, the good people – implic-
itly: people like us – can trade goods and services without any form of exploitation
(for an example of this sort, see Ganz and Gerbig 2010).

This kind of “economy critique”, which touts itself as “quite open,” is in our
view the opposite, casting its own horizon, “oblivious to itself and history,” as an
absolute. Following this view, the only thing in sight is how “we” best comport to
a neoliberal logic, which in turn is then seen as a mere “exaggeration” of an eco-
nomic system not fundamentally called into question. “Deconstruction” is called
into service here for exactly that “presentism” which its founder, Jacques Derrida,
subjected to a fundamental critique, invoking Karl Marx “in the name of another
future and a conception of justice beyond presence” (Postone 1998).

But even as “alternative” white queers, Heinz-Jürgen and I remain – even if
we happen to be precarious – the privileged within a neocolonial order and the
established relations of domination which, whether desired or not, make us into
accomplices in the “worlding” of global capitalism, to use Spivak’s fitting phrase.
Do the computers we need simply fall from the sky in order for us to make use of
the great new possibilities of the “information society”? Of course only with our
best not-capitalist intentions! Shouldn’t our shared hacker-space become a start-
up? Or must people perhaps mine ore? Which people? Where? Under which

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Salih Alexander Wolter

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conditions? Who constructs the things? How does the knowledge emerge which then spreads with the help of these devices? With whom, and how, do we share? And finally: which images of gender and sexuality are transported? Such questions have convinced us that real emancipation needs a perspective of society which inevitably must also be transnational and transcontinental.

This entirety around which everything circles we are therefore naming ‘capitalism’. The view that capitalism is “nothing more than an ‘economic system,’” is repudiated by, among others, historian Fernand Braudel at the end of his work about Europe’s rise to a world economy, regarding such a claim as absurd, in light of the unresolvable entanglement between economy, the state, the military and culture (Braudel 1986b [1979], 698). Commonly, these areas are viewed in isolation from one another; in this case, on the other hand, their historically developed context is to be outlined in a brief, admittedly compressed, overview. In order not to lose sight of this context when facing many technical analyses, the political scientist Georg Fülberth has proposed the introduction of a new academic cross-discipline which, not by chance, should be called “capitalistics” (see Fülberth 2008, 7ff). This is because the present society as a whole corresponds to his definition of capitalism: its mode of functioning rests “on the extraction of profit and the resultant accumulation of the deployed means (capital),” and is characterized by an unequal exchange, meaning “market-mediated domination” (ibid., 12, 47).

Of course, forms of capitalist economic activity had developed elsewhere long before modern Europe – from China of the Song-Dynasty (10th–13th century C.E.) to the sphere of the pre-colonial Islamic lands in the epoch of ‘our’ Middle Ages (see Amin 2012 [2010], 103). And just as “the Occident” was inaugurated by “the profane use of reason ... in a word, science,” and Latin-speaking thinkers were learning from “the Arabs” “that there could be a place on earth for a happy life” (Libera 2003 [1991], 87, 108; italics in original), so too did “anything in western capitalism of imported origin undoubtedly come from Islam” (Braudel 1986a [1979], 619). But these earlier societies had not considered – to summarize the European innovation with Marx – “the surplus-value-making as the last and sole purpose of humanity” (MEW 23 [1867], 782). According to sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein, first capitalism ‘as we know it’ brought about “the thrust towards the commodification of everything” (Wallerstein 1984 [1983], 10, 11).

Contemporary worldwide capitalism is already recognizable in the time of the so-called Reconquista, during the 15th century, and from the beginning it was globally oriented. Henri Pirenne, in his book Europe’s History, described in which way Al-Andalus, the almost 700-year-old Muslim-Jewish-Catholic civilization on
the Iberian Peninsula, was destroyed by champions of the “Occident,” who combined “religious commitment with actual profit-seeking as their motive for holy war”. The “goal was not the conversion, rather the extermination or expulsion of the Mohammedans,” even if they were baptized (Pirenne 1961 [1936], 465), and likewise the Jews were also dispossessed and banned from the country, while the converts among them were persecuted by the Inquisition (see the historical documents in Bernstein 1973, 43–48). For the prospective Spanish nation-state was to be not only religiously homogeneous, but also ‘ethnically’, namely, white: significant researchers see here the beginnings of modern racism and anti-Semitism (for an overview see Çetin 2012, 28f). At the same time, the European project for the colonization of the Americas began in 1492, soon served by the enslavement of millions of people abducted from Africa.

In the centuries to follow, the “successive incorporation of previously ‘outside’ regions” ensued – whereby “opposition between the ruling centers and the dominated peripheries … has been ever produced, reproduced and further intensified” (Amin German introduction 2012, 9). “Still, despite this permanent asymmetry, capitalism is one and indivisible. Capitalism is not the United States and Germany, with India and Ethiopia only ‘halfway’ capitalist. Capitalism is the United States and India, Germany and Ethiopia, taken together” (ibid., 84). This is also the view of Wallerstein, for whom capitalism cannot be first talked about only when and where the capital relationship has become common. He rejects consideration of places such as England or the Caribbean Islands as specific “analytical units” each with their own ‘production methods’, when discussing “a historical system” which “has its origin in the Europe of the late 15th century” and “still covers the entire world” (Wallerstein 1984 [1983], 14). Rather, classes, ethnic or status groups, are phenomena of the global economy that cannot be properly analyzed so long as they are examined within national states (Wallerstein 1979, 10, 24).

The philosopher Étienne Balibar deepened the context in which Europe conquered the ‘rest of the world’ and invented its own ‘nations’. While none of these nations has an “ethnic base” or corresponds to a “cultural community” (Balibar and Wallerstein 1992 [1988], 63) as a matter of fact, they wanted to be “ideally the ‘whitest’ in the competition for colonies,” and thus constituted “the modern idea of a European or Western, supranational identity” (ibid., 56). Racism – which, to put it plainly, means nothing more than white supremacy – could “fall back on very old images of ‘difference,’ but this became functionally effective to this day only in the wake of capitalist expansion. In a dual movement of exclusion and inclusion, or “assimilation,” racism was produced and reproduced within
the very space constituted by conquest and colonization with its concrete structures of administration, forced labor and sexual oppression”. On “the heritage of colonialism,” which is “in reality, a fluctuating combination of continued exteriorization and ‘internal exclusion,’” (ibid., 55) Germany also participates. Through the Joint European Border Protection, Germany enforces ‘difference’ outside its borders, with many deadly consequences for refugees, while internally upholding this difference through foreign-alien- and citizenship laws, as well as through the police practice of ‘racial profiling’, or the structurally inferior educational chances of children of immigrants not perceived as white and Christian – not to mention the almost incessant ‘integration’ debate with which a still white-German-dominated ‘civil society’ constantly reproduce alienation.

It is high time to understand the “Federal Republic of Germany as a (post)colonial entity”, as black feminists already proposed in the 1980s (Gutiérrez Rodríguez 2001, 50 with reference to Oguntoye, Opitz [Ayim] and Schultz 1997 [1986]). We must finally confront Germany’s colonial crimes throughout history and at the same time explicitly enlarge the historical framework with regard to labor migration into the country. It did not begin principally in the second half of the 20th century, but rather already in the so-called Gründerzeit (Wilhelminian period) of 19th century, and it was already regulated by an ‘immigration policy’, which, following the colonial pattern, strove for the maximal exploitation of ‘foreign labor’ for ‘our’ private economy (see Ha 2012 [2003]). Furthermore, it must be reckoned that in fully developed capitalism, racism still fulfills a necessary function – for, as Immanuel Wallerstein says, it is used for the “ethnicization’ of the working class” (Balibar/Wallerstein 1992, 1988). In the words of Koray Yilmaz-Günay, one of the initiators of queer-migrant self-organization in Germany: “The false whole cannot be understood without its analysis” (Bernhardt 2013 [Supplement]).

Likewise, according to Wallerstein, capitalism engendered sexism “necessarily,” whereby, in turn, it cannot be contested that women, especially in Europe, had already been oppressed beforehand. However, the division of human beings into ‘sexes’ – like their hierarchicalization according to ‘ethnic’ or ‘cultural’ traits – functions as a justification of persistent inequality “inside the work-system” (Balibar and Wallerstein 1992 [1988], 46). Alongside sexism, conjoined from the outset with racism (Çetin 2012, 29f), comes “the devaluation of certain ages hand in hand”. Thus general wage labor could be represented as something separable from domestic reproductive labor. Carried out mainly by women, children and the elderly worldwide, the latter is “dealt with as non-work”. By which these tasks
“are neither in the numerator nor in the denominator of the calculation ... one can pretend” that they do not “produce any surplus value” (Balibar and Wallerstein 1992 [1988], 46f).

Judith Butler’s decisive contribution to Queer Theory shows why this is so: “Gendered reading, interpreting and evaluating happens ... according to modes that have a broad consensus within society, but which require constant updating. It is accomplished via constant citation, seizing on and repeating these social modes” (Vöß 2011, 14). Is it not dissimilar to how the “specific unequal relationship of racism, embedded into the institutions of the labor market, citizenship and cultural hegemony, is lived and understood within a racist knowledge,” as the researcher of racism Mark Terkessidis writes (cited in Çetin 2012, 36). In both cases, it is about what Marx called the “religion of everyday life,” (MEW 25 [1894], 838) that is, a “naturalization and reification of social relations” which “is a result of an image developed among the members of bourgeois society entirely by itself” (Heinrich 2004, 32). Marx’s conclusions are drawn mainly for the categories of ‘political economy’, just as Butler had ‘only’ deconstructed the ‘heterosexual matrix’. But, racism, gender and the generational relationships cannot be separately comprehended without considering the capitalist mode of production as well, just as vice versa, it cannot be figured out without taking sexism and racism into account.

That entirety – capitalism – seems to vanish into the background through a dense “interwovenness of inequalities” (Çetin 2012, 85). Yılmaz-Günay formulates the theoretical and political task that results from an emancipatory social commitment:

“It is devastating that a lasting criticism is usually formulated only by the ‘affected’. One of the paradoxical situations that concern me most is the decoupling of Marxist analysis, feminism, and racism critique. If a cleaning lady with a headscarf has never aroused any scandal, but literally every woman with a headscarf who wanted to become a teacher does, then we have to think together sexism, racism and class conditions in the analysis” (Bernhardt 2013).

Already more than two decades ago in the FRG, the radical left, among them imprisoned members of the urban guerrillas, deliberated their failure to deal with the complexity of a society in which there are different “historical and structurally-rooted power relations, which exist simultaneously in interpenetration and reciprocal stabilization. The (autonomous) left lacks a theory which encompasses all these struggles (or even a position which enables it to recognize them), as well as
the ability to determine the objective conditions which give these struggles causes and limits” (Viehmann et al. 1991 [1990]).

Published in 1990 with the title “Three to One: Class Contradiction, Racism, and Sexism,” these authors were mainly problematizing a previously unquestioned basis of their convictions, namely the “privileges of their being white, their being German”. They lamented that the “millions of immigrants and refugee women and men in the FRG ... were never proportionally represented in the ‘68 movement nor in the autonomous left,” and yet they were assigned the blame for it. The writers had not recognized beforehand “that ‘others’ (according to sex, race, and class membership) have experiences of oppression and resistance, but experiences which are subjectively not accessible to us, and objectively only to a certain degree”. But “friendship is based on respect. And that is exactly what many people do not have for the ‘Turks’, and they sense it very precisely” (ibid.).

While the “white left, in its entirety, [...] believed in a fairly universal, often rigid truth,” the authors now observed that their “racial neutrality” had made the migrants “invisible”. They called out their own

"biased perceptions, distorted by racist white spots and Eurocentric angle of sight: with downsizing, it is not (‘race’ neutral) workers who fly into the streets, but instead the non-Germans; in the Trikont (which, in fact, should be differentiated much better than it is done here), does not starve a non-racialized underclass, but rather black poor people; there is the feminization of poverty, but there is first the ‘turkification of poverty’; state violence doesn’t strike (‘race’ neutral) at all those who pose opposition, but rather hits foreigners in the first instance, who get into more trouble and more jail. The list of examples could be elongated” (ibid.).

“Three to One” did not simply want to take into account a “racist (and sexist) division of the labor market, installed by capital,” but rather to broach the topic “that racisms actually exist in the working class”, “Eurocentric patterns of analysis” which tried to explain this “only as a result of capitalist insinuations or neo-Nazi ideology” were explicitly rejected. In contrast, it’s a matter of “uncovering the connection between sexuality and domination; the criticism of all dichotomies (divisions) such as body/mind, nature/man (man); the critique of the concept of labor” (ibid.).

In retrospect, the paper shows recognizable weaknesses – perhaps the greatest is that even in the radical self-criticism, their perspective of what is the “center” still resonates such that “the demanded ‘altruism’” in the approach to migrants functions thus quite paternalistically. Nevertheless, white German anti-capital-
ists, who were not expressly concerned with a simple ‘summation of oppressions,’
developed in this paper an ‘intersectional approach’ which will be declared as the
“new paradigm” in the institutionalized social sciences in Germany only in the
decade to follow. In contrast to many of the academic texts to follow, autonomous
leftists already anticipated queer criticism of the overly schematic construction of
identities from prefabricated structural elements. Instead, they contrive an image
“of a net-shaped domination, in which each thread and knot is retained above
and below, but no single cause, no chief contradiction is presupposed” (ibid.).

And yet “Three to One” came too late. The publication fell into the era of
a radical change from which the “enemy in the shape of the West German sys-
tem” would emerge transformed “at the tip of the new superpower of Europe
to the greatest degree of familiarity”. The authors had correctly forecast a great
deal: “The capitalist exploitation in the country (especially in the barely-still-
there-GDR) and the imperialist penetration are increasing with great strength.
Although hardly conceivable, the exploitation of the Trikon will be exacerbated.
Racisms change and become stronger overall. Against Turks, against Roma and
Sinti, against Poles and Vietnamese and Mozambiqueans. White women are also
to lose their positions and to be forced back into the invisibility of the proletarian
job/housewife”. No one in the white radical left was in a position to envision that
the transition to this ‘new world order’ – instead of encountering considerable
resistance – would be supported by a wave of German nationalist enthusiasm and
accompanied by pogroms, even to the point that the demands of the racist mob
could be implemented by an overwhelming parliamentary majority, as in 1993 in
the case of the de facto abolition of the right to asylum. In view of the oppressive
unity of the ‘Volk and the state’ during these years, the radical left proved to be
completely marginalized and no longer capable of getting its bearings.

At the same time, however, an autonomous feminist migrant left began to net-
work in the Federal Republic, to which this kind theoretical effort had nothing
new to offer. In a permanent and persistent debate with the women’s movement
of the white German majority, black and Jewish activists and women of color
(see Excursion One on terms of self-designation), partly in close exchange with
black feminists from the USA, had been working on postcoloniality and intersec-
tionality since the 1980s. Their work far exceeds what is now published by well-
established white academics under these headings, in terms of both political clar-
ity as well as intellectual differentiation. In the subsequent essay, Heinz-Jürgen
Voß will repeatedly revisit these foundational contributions. In the meantime,
they were, and still are, widely ignored by German leftists, who, about the latter,
the feminist migrant manifesto “We the Tightrope Walkers from 1994” put it:
“they blend into our liberation concepts, play themselves as benevolent patrons and reproduce and cement their privileges” (FeMigra 1994).

This text drew attention to numerous labor, housing, and anti-racist resistance struggles of migrants in Germany since the early 1970s, which were by and large – and differently than by the state power – ignored by the German left. Along with Spivak, the authors referred to a “feminism which is geopolitically situated at the place of work,” and wanted to “clarify that racism and the international division of labor structure relations among women”. At the center of their critique was the “national state idea in Western societies, especially in Germany”. The “tendency to recognize these produced differences as cultural, in order to readily utilize them without disrupting the order of things” was debunked as disguised “objectification and oppression of migrants,” which only seemingly contradicted rampant racism. The answer of the “tightrope walkers” to the then-just-emerging “multicultural” concepts was: “It is not just a question of granting migrant women a space to address their concerns, but also of questioning the privileges of German women. These (privileges) are produced through their inclusion in a national-racial community, which gives them (German women) access to power and to the public sphere” (ibid.).

At the very least, this also similarly applies to white, German gays. Partly in the aftermath of a development, which began in the US as early as 1973, and will be presented in more detail in the next section, the local gay movement of the 1990s focused on bourgeois respectability. Here as there, gays and lesbians calculated that if they “were constructed as analogous to an ethnic minority – that is, as a distinct and identifiable population, rather than a radical potentiality for all – lesbians and gays can demand recognition and equal rights within the existing social system” (Jagose 2001 [1996], 82). In the United States, white ‘gays’ had pushed their non-white protagonists out of their ranks, sometimes even violently, in order to subsequently advertise themselves as a community which struggles for equality based on the model of the black community. Here in Germany, one instead imagined oneself as a similar collective “like the Jews,” who were wrongly expelled and persecuted by the Volksgemeinschaft, thereby attempting to forget the participation of “Aryans” who themselves had same-sex tendencies in the anti-Semitic mass murder (see Yılmaz-Günay and Wolter, 2013). In both cases, the courtship of the ruling politics was rewarded with manageable concessions, and the usage of ‘gay rights’ as well as of ‘women’s rights’ was immediately declared an integral part of “western supranational identity” (Balibar [see above]).

What consequentially followed was “homonationalism,” first coined by the theorist Jasbir Puar, a consolidated interplay between discursive and material strate-
gies of global white supremacy. Today, for example, the so-called Human Rights Campaign, the most influential US gay and lesbian organization, can quickly make ‘Gay Marriage’ a priority topic worldwide with the help of an Internet-spread icon – their work is financed by the largest military weapon producers in the United States (Thrasher 2013). Homonationalism, especially since September 11th, 2001, has been leveraged within ‘western’ subgroups, especially against migrants (see for a comprehensive overview Yılmaz-Günay 2011b) and has a system-stabilizing effect: “The right to belong seems redeemable … such that a hierarchization of different segments of the population is not only condoned, but also actively supported; broad social emancipation must step back where the gay particular interest recognizes an opportunity for realization” (Yılmaz-Günay and Wolter 2013, 73).

The “Tightrope Walkers” turned against such tactics of divide and rule, and, seemingly paradoxically, pleaded for migrant self-organization. In fact, this society can only be changed by the organized interest of those who are most strongly repressed in it. This change might not benefit everyone, but clearly the vast majority, which is why, in supporting these groups unconditionally, meaning, on their own terms, we are in no way being unselfish. In the queer scene, the first to come together were the Turks, lesbians in Berlin since 1992 (İpekçıoğlu 2007), gays and trans* in Berlin and in Cologne and other cities since the mid-1990s, and likewise the Afro-gays, Jewish queer associations as well as gay immigrants from Greece and other groups. In Berlin they evolved to self-determined working groups such as LesMigraS (Lesbian/bisexual migrants and black lesbians and trans* people) as part of Lesbian Counseling and the association GLADT (Gays & Lesbians from Turkey), which are today internationally well-connected while also influencing a growing segment of the local society: umbrella organizations such as the Berlin-Brandenburg Migration Council, with around 80 member organizations, or the Turkish Federation, have in the meantime absorbed queer momentum to a degree that unfortunately is unimaginable in the non-queer institutions of mainstream society.

Excursion 1: Political Nomenclature

Black/white

As a self-designation the word ‘Black’ is capitalized.

To this, author, artist and musician Noah Sow, in her very recommendable book Deutschland Schwarzweiß: Everyday Racism, adds:
“Being Black is not what you really are, but rather stands for shared experiences that have been made in society. Whites can therefore not determine who is Black and who is not … Being Black does not necessarily mean being a migrant or the other way around. The fact that this discrimination does not revolve around foreignness is also clear in the experience of Black Germans which are equally affected” (Sow 2009, 26, 29).

On the other hand, whites (like us) are born with “an abundance of privileges that they have grown up with so self-evidently, that they do not even know that they exist” (ibid., 42). According to a definition by GLADT, ‘white’ is a

“political term for people who are privileged because of physical characteristics (e.g. skin color) and social location (e.g. mainstream society), because they belong to a structure which allow access to health, education, the media, politics, science, etc. only to specific people” (GLADT 2009).

**Migrants**

The term “migrant" was originally shaped as a term for political self-designation by FeMigra, the Feminist Migrant of Frankfurt, with which they wanted that “the history and politics of migration in Germany will gain center stage". According to their key text “Die Seiltänzer_innen" (English: “The Tightrope Walkers") from 1994, they had previously understood themselves “as Black women, that is, as women who suffer oppression, exploitation and exclusion not only through the lenses of sexism, but also through racist practices," albeit

“the category of blackness could not grasp our specific experiences … On the one hand, our skin color is not black, and on the other hand this category does not reflect the reason for our presence in Germany. The term migrant, on the other hand, marks the step of immigration, which in part was made by our parents or by ourselves, but which, above all, underscores the political-social component of the socialization process. The example of migration shows the function of racism in the national and international division of labor” (FeMigra 1994).

But this concept has been swiftly expropriated by the politics and media of majority society. According to today’s public discourse, ‘migrants’ are mainly “people with roots in the Muslim-majority countries or regions – in the German context, mainly Turks and Kurds as the largest group of migrants, followed by Arabs and Bosnians. In addition,
other people are also pigeonholed as ‘migrants’ due to their outward appearance, like Sinti, Roma or Black Germans. Obviously it is the view of the white German majority which decides who is being talked about” (Wolter and Yılmaz-Günay 2009, 38).

People of Color

The international term ‘people of color’ (abbreviated either PoC or poc) has replaced the term ‘migrants’ as the self-designation of people who define themselves as non-white in a political sense. Common variations are ‘women of color’ (WoC or woc) or ‘queer people of color’ (QPoC or qpoc), and any other terms can be made ‘-of color’.

In Germany, an early use of this terminology, in conjunction with the intersectional approach, is found in a call that Jin Haritaworn – as scientist and activist, one of the most important international trans*/qpoc voices – and GLADT co-founder Koray Yılmaz-Günay sent in April 2003 in English and German. They were invited to a Berlin conference on ‘queer and ethnicity,’ “directed exclusively at people who are queer of color, migrant, or Jewish,” and “focused on intersections of racism, anti-Semitism, sexism, homophobia, and transphobia”. The text stated, among other things, “in particular, we are looking for people who could share their experiences as queer migrants, Jewish or people of color in different organizations and movements”. The event “should give the opportunity … to form networks and to explore ways of fighting oppression” (Haritaworn and Yılmaz-Günay 2003). Today, migrant self-organizations such as GLADT usually have some white members. They are equal members, but cannot just call themselves poc – instead, they are referred to as allies.

We could hardly better express our position as white queers than did Judith Butler in Berlin in June 2010, as she was to be honored with the so-called “Civil Courage Prize” of the official Gay Pride of the German capital. On the previous day, however, she had met with Berliner queer people of color, who had translated the concept of “homonationalism” into German for the first time” (Haritaworn 2012, 47). They talked to her about the white gay establishment, which really wanted to award itself with the world-famous theorist. Perhaps they had informed her more precisely of the racist diatribes that some of these gentlemen had presented in the media for years; perhaps about the fake statistics and the ever-new “scientific studies” with which they were once again trying to prove the “culturally-induced violence” of migrants; perhaps also about the circulating pornographic phantasies with which these gentlemen slobber over the same “uncivilized”. In any
case, Butler did not feel like receiving this prize after the conversation. Instead of accepting the prize on the big stage at the Brandenburg Gate in front of hundreds of thousands of partygoers, she refused, in an impressive statement, “complicity with racism” (Butler 2010). We believe that this was a much more fundamental critique of capitalism, as if, for example, than had she simply been “economically critical” against the “commercialization of the Pride”.

**From the Invention of Homosexuality to Gay Lifestyle**

With the worldwide assertion of the capitalist mode of production, a model of thinking established itself “which claims to explain figures and being as a universal form,” wrote the social scientist Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodríguez, one of the “Tightrope Dancers” in the 1990s. According to her, on the basis of a “metaphysics that Spivak sees in the Occidental philosophical tradition, [...] an access to the world has become generalized, which could only prevail by the repression and marginalization of other modes of existence and interpretations” (Gutiérrez Rodríguez 2001, 37). The history of “male homosexuality” and its formation into an ‘identity’ with a worldwide recognition value verifies the correctness of this thesis – regardless of whether homosexuals are persecuted or have a political market value. “The process of curbing ambiguity through differentiation demands its sacrifices,” states the Arabist Thomas Bauer in his critique of global sexual discourse. “An early such sacrifice is friendship” (Bauer 2011, 274, emphasis in original.).

In the course of the “Reconquista”, a new evaluation of male-male eroticism began to assert itself. In Al-Andalus, as in the rest of the Islamic world, until at least the middle of the 19th century (see Bauer 2011, 290), it was regarded as a “fact which originates from humanity as such” (Klauda 2008, 51). Some of its physical forms of expression were punishable, though were hardly ever punished (compare to legal practice, ibid., 33–43). But now, in Europe, the “other form of power” that Michel Foucault spoke of in his unfinished, pioneering work of *History of Sexuality vol. 1*, pushed its way through. Compared to the earlier simple prohibition of certain acts, it is characterized by a differentiation “which is peculiarly no longer connected to specific actions, but to the subjects themselves” (ibid., 12). This goes back to Thomas Aquinas, the most influential Catholic theologian ever, who in the 13th century wanted to use the science acquired by Muslim thinkers and researchers to prove that the establishment of nature would confirm the reason of the doctrine of the Church. Since, however, the Sodomites apparently felt quite senseless pleasure in the forbidden, he provided them with
“a distinction deviating from the human species” (ibid., 68). In the high Middle Ages, the “unnatural” practices of the Muslims played an important role in the propaganda for the predatory European crusades of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (73f); under Christian tyranny in Spain all traces of Arabian sensuality were to be erased (see Goytisolo 1982 [1969], 65–70).

In contrast, the “anti-erotic onslaught” in France and the Protestant countries was later put forward “in the name of the new bourgeois ethics, which combats the ‘animalistic’ with the ‘rational’ concept of labor” (ibid., 67). We have seen how Wallerstein made clear the separation of a “feminine”-connoted domestic sphere from the (wage) labor system, formed by capitalism. It conceals the (reproductive) work mostly performed by women, but also by children and the elderly. As the man’s wage outside of the house appears as a “value of his labor” rather than as a condition of the reproduction of his labor power (cf. Heinrich 2004, 94ff, on Marx’s critique of the “wage form”). Although this “privacy” constituted as separate from the public domain retreated into the bookkeeping of capitalist enterprises, this separation seemed to the members of the emerging bourgeois society to be as ‘natural’ as the division of the world into competing nation-states, each with their own economic and trade balances. And it influenced the relationship between men who were no longer “mediated by the friend’s body” – and thus the ever-present possibility of passionate friendship – “but instead by formal contractual relations in which individual emerged as competitors to communal wealth”. While the “family … was constructed as an affective counter-pole to the business-like and increasingly impersonal relationships that prevailed in the domain of the masculine public,” (Klauda 2008, 95) repressed homoeroticism sought its own spaces: the sociologist Georg Klauda convincingly described the formation of “gay” subcultures in some European cities as an effect of this development since the early eighteenth century (ibid., 86–98).

However, the “universality of Western rationality,” wanting to convince itself of the “naturalness” of the gender and sexual relations of the West, still needed the “division which is the Orient” (Foucault cited by Bauer 2011, 268). In the 19th century, the Orientalist Richard Burton recruited this division, appropriate for the vast British colonial empire, to the “stodaic zone,” a “fictitious geographical strip which … was de facto demarcated not by climatic conditions but by the flowering of ‘inverted’ lusts,” and which stretched deeply into Africa from the Mediterranean, as well as South America and much of Asia (Klauda 2007). At that time, “the prerogative of interpretation of what was now called ‘sexuality’ had passed from religion to medicine,” explains Bauer in his Culture of Ambiguity. The science now “naturally assumed that a tender kiss and rape during wartime...
are one and the same domain of human nature” (Bauer 2011, 273f). On the basis of this assumption, and in light of the ‘unruly’ sex of the ‘others’, a clear distinction between solely two and exclusively complementary sexes was to be devised (see Voß 2011). As the cultural scientist Fatima El-Tayeb explains, the “rigorous application of the norms already tested in racial research … finally let only the white, bourgeois, heterosexual man appear as completely normal … Women whose behaviors were defined as deviant, such as lesbians and prostitutes, were also blamed for this degeneration, as well as men who did not adequately fulfill their roles, that is, gays. All of them – and often female workers, whose lacking bourgeois domestication as a whole made them suspect – were ‘deviant’ for the same reasons that made the savages ‘deviant’” (El-Tayeb 2012 [2003], 131).

“Homosexuality” was defined as such first in 1869 – not by chance by a “doctor,” Károly Mária Kertbeny (Karl-Maria Benkert), who argued that it was “innate and therefore subject only to the laws of nature, not to criminal law” (Jagose 2001 [1996], 38). The fact that heterosexuality was derived from homosexuality – that is, the norm results from deviation, rather than vice versa – confirms Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s core idea of “othering”: “The marking of marginality first creates the position of the center” (Gutiérrez Rodríguez 2001, 38). This center, however, does not appear to require further explanation. On the other hand, researchers have been intensively researching homosexuality for more than a century. In his own book, Voß has traced how many new biological, medical and psychiatric studies are being conducted to investigate its ‘causes’. In the process, both those who fight homosexuality and those who work for homosexual freedom were and are concerned with the question of its ‘naturalness’ (see also Voß 2013). In the course of time, a concept that was invented in a very concrete social situation in Europe – namely, the impending unification of the criminal legislation in Germany in the late 19th century – became a universally valid ‘scientifically-proven truth’.

El-Tayeb, Klauda, and Thomas Bauer rightly draw a line from the former orientalist construction of lusty warm countries to today’s prevalent picture, which represents the ‘Islamic world’ as anciently monotonous, and now depicted as prudish, hostile to women and homophobic. It is precisely the career of homo-identity that shows how precisely Spivak, with her reflection cited at the beginning of this chapter, encapsulates a fundamental mechanism of global capitalism, which contemporary German philosophers did not even recognize as a problem. Thus Karl-Otto Apel, who developed the concept of an “ideal communication community” analogously to Jürgen Habermas’s “theory of free communication”, was still optimistic in the early 1970s:
The difference between the language games of lifeforms has not disappeared, but it was, to some extent, outplayed through the – by all complexity still communicative and unifying – language game of science, or that of the technology of production, organization, and communication, which have grown out of its spirit ... Moreover, it is even probable that even the hardly translatable intimate areas of the different cultures or forms of life, because of the deepened knowledge about the different structures, at least in the sense of a practical understanding, for example an ethical political one, could be mutually interpretable” (Apel 1974, 1399, emphasis in the original).

The real transcontinental community of communication, however, is characterized by an epistemological violence, which builds on a “former economic text” – that of colonialist capitalism (Spivak 1988, 283). Accordingly, the interpretation is also one-sided: in the Islamic Republic of Iran, earrings worn by members of the Sufi fraternities since ancient times are now read as “gay” and their wearers are being prosecuted (Mahdjoubi 2003, 91) in the “Islamic Republic of Iran”.

Postcolonial theory and queer theory have introduced a new generation of students in the German-speaking world to thinkers labeled as ‘poststructuralist’, thinkers who drew entirely different conclusions, more fruitful for a critique of capitalism, from the philosophic-linguistic turn in the 20th century, than did the academic establishment in the FRG of past decades. Perhaps even more enlightening might be to next take a closer look at the origins of being queer.

Stonewall Revisited: A Short Movement History

When Judith Butler rejected the Zivilcourage-Preis of the Berlin Pride Parade, the attempt to completely assimilate the word queer into the gay mainstream temporarily failed. Thus, the word continues to have at least two meanings which partly contradict each other. On the one hand it serves as a collective label for everything that is “somehow not straight”. For example, the concept appealed to a gay party functionary who apparently felt compelled to sometimes list other gender and sexual identities simply because it “includes as many people as possible” and “spares us of these abbreviated solecisms (LGBTTIQ). One doesn’t forget anyone,” (Siegessäule 2008). On the other hand, there is a reference to a sometimes very highly-formulated intellectual critique of the binary gender regime, a knowledge produced mainly in universities. In Germany, the “imbalance between a great interest in the theory and a comparatively meager political practice ... led
to the fact that queer, more than in English-speaking countries, adheres to the malodor of the academic, the aloof and the unworldly,” (Woltersdorff 2003, 920). However, both usages have often in common an unreflective, white understanding, and in both cases, the interrelationship with capitalist conditions is still rarely interrogated. However, as Haritaworn points out, “Blacks and drag queens/trans of color from the working class,” who were already resisting the coercive system of heteronormativity in the 1960s, “called themselves ‘queer’, in differentiation from white middle-class gays and lesbians, long before the latter’s academic descendants appropriated this identity” (Haritaworn 2005, 26).

Whitewashing started of the ‘Queer Community’ (cf. ibid.) at the hour of its birth. Already in August 1966 in San Francisco, where, shortly before, homeless queer youth joined forces in the self-help organization Vanguard, black trans* women and sex workers revolted at the Compton’s Cafeteria Riot against police brutality (Stryker 2004, Baijko 2011). But with the yearly Gay Pride parades today in the metropolises of the ‘western world’, a later rebellion in New York City is being remembered – or, rather, the great tale of what was supposedly happening at Christopher Street in the Greenwich Village district at the end of June 1969 after it was expurgated by well-to-do gays of any references to class, ‘race’ and gender ambiguity (Gan 2007, 127; Monroe 2012).

According to reliable sources (especially Gan 2007, 131ff provides countless historical evidence), it went like this: in one of the usual raids, some visitors of the Stonewall Inn resisted the degrading identity controls. Next to white gays who wanted “to pick up boys of different races” there were in the club also lesbians and trans* of color (report Sylvia Rivera to Gan 2007, 131). As the resisting trans* and lesbians were to be taken away and were abused by the police officers (Gan 2007, 131f), more and more queers from the neighborhood gathered in front of the pub, among them the young homeless people who usually slept in the nearby park (Feinberg 1998; Monroe 2012). Molotov cocktails flew; during that night and the following nights were violent confrontations in the neighborhood; riot police were called in. It was the street youth and gender-variant people nearby – many of them working-class and of color – who were on the front lines of the confrontation. Those most targeted by police harassment, those most socially and economically marginalized, fought the fiercest (Gan 2007, 131; see also Monroe 2012).

Two of the Stonewall militants were transsexuals, noted Haritaworn (2005, 26): the only 17-year-old Latinx Sylvia Rivera, who had hustled already as a child (Feinberg 1998), and by her side, her eight-year older black girlfriend and ‘big sister’, Marsha P. Johnson (Gan 2007, 130f). Rivera is recalled today in gay histo-
riography as a “legendary veteran, [...] notable for helping to spark the event that ushered in the modern-day gay rights movement” (Matzner 2004). Johnson, who also worked as a drag-performer and was once photographed by star artist Andy Warhol, has even a certain posthumous underground cult status – the documentary Pay It No Mind from 2012 with original recordings was highly regarded. Immediately after the end of the street battles in Greenwich Village, both of them contributed significantly, as organizers and as activists, to the fact that the spontaneous rebellion could become one of the most successful political movements in modern times. That movement thanked them poorly during their lifetimes, to put it mildly.

Sylvia Rivera was one of the founders of the Gay Liberation Front (GLF) (see Bronski 2002) in the summer of 1969, whereby ‘gay’ in those first years after Stonewall quite obviously did not yet mean exclusively ‘homosexual’. The group understood itself as part of a larger revolutionary context and formed the core of the queers, who at that time aimed “to change oppressive social structures”. Similar to the lesbian feminists, they combined their engagement against male domination, racism and capitalism with “a constructionist understanding of sexuality,” as Annamarie Jagose elaborated in her introduction to queer theory. Additionally, they advocated “a radical transformation of social values, arguing that gay liberation would be secured only after sex and gender categories had been eradicated” (Jagose 2001 [1996], 80). Like the entire gay rights movement which ultimately goes back to them (Gan 2007, 132; Monroe 2012), they were inspired by Black Power. Vice versa, in the summer of 1970, chairman of the Black Panther Huey Newton spoke out for a joint struggle with ‘gays’ and feminists (Newton 2002). When Rivera met with him the following year (Feinberg 1998), the GLF had already disappeared – but she also put all her energies in the activities of the more moderate organization Gay Activists Alliance (GAA), especially in the campaign for a Gay Rights Bill in New York City (Gan 2007, 135).

But the radical harmony of people with actually quite different social situations suggested by the overarching label ‘gay’ proved illusory – in the GAA, Sylvia Rivera endured racist, classist and transphobic bullying. A functionary of the association is quoted as saying the “General Membership” perceived her appearance as “frightening”: “They’re scared of people from the streets”. In his research, pioneer of academic gay and lesbian studies, Martin Duberman, found that those activists, if “not shunning her darker skin, or sniggering at her disfluent, passionate English, then they were deploiring her blunt anarchism as inimical to order, or denouncing her sashaying gait as offensive to womanhood” (quoted in Gan 2007, 133). For her part, Rivera remained in solidarity with the organization and did
whatever she could. Once, she was even arrested in the attempt to climb up the façade of City Hall in Manhattan, clad in drag and high-heeled shoes, in order to disrupt a City Council meeting which was to discuss the *Gay Rights Bill* behind closed doors (Wilkins 2002; Bronski 2002).

Sylvia Rivera and Marsha P. Johnson also founded *STAR*, the *Street Transvestite* (now: Transgender) *Action Revolutionaries* in 1970, and are therefore also considered pioneers of the Transgender Movement (ibid.). In a commune in New York’s Lower East Side, the two offered refuge and, as we would say today, ‘empowerment’ to homeless ‘gays,’ especially trans* women and homeless youth, sustaining this shelter for a while through ‘hustling.’ The *Young Lords*, a radical union of young Puerto Ricans, energized Rivera and accepted her as she was, even demonstrating against police repression in East Harlem district with her and Johnson under the *STAR* banner (see Feinberg 1998). She thus saw the necessity of self-organization of people of color to create safe places from the white majority society. Nevertheless, in the early 1970s she seems to have believed in something like a general queer awakening (see Gan 2007, 133), until 1973 when she, like all trans*folk, was expelled from the GAA because the *Gay Rights Bill* was thought to have better chances if the organization was represented by gender-conforming people (see Bronski 2002, who notes dryly that it still took until 1986 for the bill to be passed). What had begun under the *Gay Power* slogan, borrowed and modified from the Black Liberation Movement, had become an advocacy group of a self-styled, white, gay-lesbian middle class.

Sylvia Rivera attempted suicide in 1973 after she was attacked by white gays and declared persona non grata for imitating women in flyers spread by white lesbians on her way to the stage at an event commemorating the Christopher Street rebellion (Gan 2007, 133). She was living with drug addiction on the streets when she was ‘rediscovered’ by Duberman, who interviewed her for his *Stonewall* book, published in 1993. Regnant gay politics of the last two decades erased her from memory (see ibid., 127). The following year, she led the alternative New York *Gay Pride* of Stonewall veterans. They were to have have listened to the speeches of the new luminaries of the ‘community’ at the official parade of the 25th anniversary as ‘survivors’ of the insurrection. “We didn’t survive it; we created it,” was their self-confident answer (compare Stonewall, 25). The following winter, Rivera was barred from the Gay and Lesbian Center in Manhattan because she had vehemently demanded that homeless queers be able to sleep there on cold nights. In the end, she lived in a Brooklyn home for destitute trans*folks, dying of liver cancer in 2002. Still in the intensive care unit, a few hours before her death, she agitated against the agenda of the *Human Rights Campaign* (see Bron-
ski 2002). Marsha P. Johnson had already been found dead in 1992, a few days after the Pride Parade of that year, at the pier at the end of Christopher Street. It is still unclear whether it was a transphobic and/or racist murder. The investigations were resumed in December 2012.

The tragedy of ‘our pioneers’ cannot be reduced to the fact that in the early days of the movement “the idea of ‘gender as a performance’ had yet to be clearly articulated,” as Michael Bronski, author of a *Queer History of the United States*, suggested in his compassionate obituary of Sylvia Rivera, clearly alluding to Butler’s theoretical achievement (Bronski, 2002). Jessi Gan, author of the most important study written from an -of color perspective about Rivera, opposes such a simplification and appropriation. She points out that difference and hierarchy are also pervasive trans* concepts: Sylvia Rivera “was poor and Latina, while some transgender activists making political claims on the basis of her history are white and middle-class” (Gan 2007, 127). People are not affected by the “overlapping of queer and living as trans*, with racism, neoliberalism, gentrification” (Haritaworn 2012, 51) in the same ways. What is therefore ‘tragic’ is rather that many of ‘us’, after the political awakening seemingly ushered in by the events in Christopher Street, were so quick to reestablish their bourgeois origin – gayness, lesianness, and sometime later even trans*ness should also ‘belong,’ period. Perhaps even more tragic is the conformity to one’s own privileged position as a ‘subversive practice’.

In a clever little essay nearly ten years to the day after the Christopher Street rebellion, Edmund White, the representative writer of the white generation of Stonewall in the USA, inquired into the reasons why “the gay sadomasochist, although he belongs to the elite, poses as a blue-collar worker – truck driver, construction worker, phone technician”, and yet secretly knows “that the lawyer would be the more daring and uninhibited lover”. In order to explain this role-play, the author descends into bleak childhoods in which the Daddies always wore suits, blathered about “stock options,” and “never scratched their deodorized crotches,” while the “only naked torsos” were those of “construction workers ... out in the street”. He refers to the “consequences of racial prejudice and sexism” visible everywhere, then cites hip French theory which hold that “class struggle goes to the heart of desire,” and argues that with the sexual enactment of dominance and submission, the violence that governs our society is exorcised. But the idea that ‘the gay sadomasochist’ might be a real black worker was something White was incapable of thinking at the time (White 1996 [1979], 101ff; the quotation is of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari).

A decade further on in the United States, out of erstwhile ‘Gay-Liberation,’
emerged, on the one hand, a budding “pink economy” into an “independent market niche”. On the other hand, an institutionalized gay-lesbian lobby sought to “integrate” its clientele, struck at the time by the AIDS epidemic “into American distribution politics,” especially by presenting gay men as an “eager-to-assimilate urban elite, longing for mainstream recognition” (Woltersdorff 2003, 914, italics in original). Queer, a critical-theoretical approach from the field of gay and lesbian studies first designated in 1991, rejected this trend (cf. Jagose 2001 [1996], 14, 160). More or less at the same time, under the same name, “a new form of alliance politics that emerged from varying social outsiders, which was thus also represented and symbolized as a ‘rainbow coalition’”. For example, in the face of AIDS, they addressed the catastrophic situation of people without health insurance or money for medical care – in the USA, it was non-whites “who traditionally belong to the poorer classes and who were particularly affected”. In both the seminar and the streets, the aim was “to move those positions marginal to official identity politics into the center” (Woltersdorff 2003, 915).

The popularity of queer in the German-speaking world was perhaps due to the fact that – as the cultural studies scholar Volker Woltersdorff formulated ironically – the loan-word “does not immediately disclose the dirtiness which is hidden behind it” (ibid., 920). In the beginning it was frequently used here as a synonym for gay-lesbian co-operation: a ‘we’ that had begun to formulate itself in the Federal Republic after the German unification of 1990. Within the framework of the new definition of the nation, mostly gay male ‘civil rights activists’ then demanded to have ‘our piece of the pie’ – which they’d get. Queer associations, which had developed during the period of upheaval in East Germany (compare Jagose 2001, 188), were to be either coopted into the future Lesbian and Gay Association (LSVD) by western junior politicians on the way to ‘gay power’, or else they barely registered in the media (see Stedefeldt 1998). The same happened to lesbian organizations of the old FRG, who wanted to remain independent, while gay groups, more or less oriented to GDR socialism, dissolved. Today, the LSVD and the so-called Queer Nations Initiative claim to represent the diversity of a ‘LGBTTIQ community’. In their names and consistent with the ‘national integration plan’ of the federal government, as the queer theorist Antke Engel criticizes, they formulate “demands on ‘the’ migrants …, who are self-evidently neither lesbian, gay or transgender, nor entitled to the right to politically transform the ground rules of social coexistence” (Engel 2009, 41f).

At the same time, queer serves as the self-designation of a scene spread in local university towns, mostly of ‘white-bread’ young people who want to distinguish themselves from narrow-minded gays via a politically “reflected” academic jar-
gon – meanwhile reproducing the exclusions of their class through their habitus. It is not by chance that these circles also consider it ‘difficult’ to speak of capitalism.

**Beyond Foucault? Capitalism and Relational Forms of the Sexual in Transition**

The development of the gay-movement displays a pattern that Fernand Braudel recognized as fundamental for modern ‘western’ history. ‘Culture’ – in the broad sense of daily life and understanding – always offers capitalism both “support and contradiction” all in one. After intense demonstrations of protests, it positions itself afresh “almost always protective of the ruling order, a process from which capitalism draws some of its security” (Braudel 1986b [1979], 699).

Seeing that Queer Theory, above all, perceives in the neoliberal socio-economic transformation of the society “cultural politics as a field of intervention,” as Engel writes (AG Queer Studies 2009, 106; cf. Engel 2009, 16ff), the culture concept must be qualified in order to be able to assess the relevance of this approach for practical capitalism critique. What proves precisely most fruitful – and, moreover, the closest to Karl Marx – and what most disturbs ‘traditional’ Marxists about queer theory: its “poststructuralist” legacy of the dissolution of the “subject.” Marx saw the origin of this philosophical invention in the European bourgeois society of the eighteenth century, when for the first time “the various forms of the social cohesion confront the individual as merely means towards his private ends.” He pointed out that “the epoch which produces this standpoint, ... is precisely the epoch of the most highly-developed social relations,” and he found, “production by a solitary individual outside society ... is just as preposterous as the development of speech without individuals who live together and talk to one another. It is unnecessary to dwell upon this point further” (MEW 13 [1857], 615, emphasis in the original). However, ‘our’ culture does everything it can for us to dwell on this point. Queer Theory, precisely here, is substantially subversive.

In the beginning stood the attack on the proud subject of gay emancipation, led by Michel Foucault. He wrote that “marginalized sexual identities are not simply victims of the operations of power,” but are “produced by those same operations” as power. Contrary to the simplistic “repressive hypothesis,” oppression and resistance belong “to the same historical network” (according to Jagose 1996). As we have seen, this net was knotted in the ‘West’ in an interplay of domination, economy and sexuality and cast over the whole world. While Foucault’s testimony
applied to the “homosexual,” as he had developed in the hundred years between the ’scientific foundation’ of his natural predisposition and the supposed beginning of his self-liberation, representatives of Queer Theory turn to the time after Stonewall. For example, Douglas Crimp rightly questions the belief that “upon our gayness, we built a political movement”. “Wasn’t it the other way around, an emergent political movement set the conditions for the formulation of a gay – rather than homosexual or homophile – identity?” (ibid., 80, emphasis in the original).

Accordingly, the realization that, more than ever, “queer, private-economic and state-images of ideas and discourses … are not neatly separated from one another, but rather are integrally interwoven” (Engel 2009, 227f) is a common starting point for the queer theorists Nancy Peter Wagenknecht and Antke Engel, both of whom offer a different emphasis in their respective works of economic criticism. A contribution from the former makes it possible to present in what follows some theoretical concepts meaningful for critical queer thinking, inevitably condensed.

For Engel, Michel Foucault’s “discourse-analytic approach,” supplemented with insights from psychoanalysis, remains authoritative because it allows her to take the desired “reflexive distance from the circulating viewpoints” of the relationship between queer and neoliberalism (ibid., 30). On the other hand, Wagenknecht, in his reflections on “how the mode of production of transnational high-tech capitalism forms its sexual subjects,” goes beyond the analytical framework the philosopher pushed with dispositif. This term means “a power structure … that regulates the practices of knowledge production and modes of life”. The dispositif is the result of power relations, which consists of a “multiplicity of won or lost struggles” and co-determines the “course and outcome of later conflicts” (Wagenknecht 2005). Although he advanced from pure discourse analysis to explain social change (compare Gasteiger 2008, 44f) Nancy Peter Wagenknecht argues that Foucault, on the one hand, “systematically underestimated” the role of “material production”, and, on the other, did not sufficiently elaborate that the dispositif “is also a regulation of the organization of collective interests”.

Wagenknecht, therefore, refers to considerations of Antonio Gramsci, who studied the “relational forms of the sexual” in his time in his extensive Prison Notebooks from the 1930s. His thinking demonstrates

”that he does not see a single determinant force behind the economic, instead investigating how it interplays with and is shaped by other forces. Nonetheless, he
makes it the starting-point of his reflections. In the texture of social production, individuals are assigned to gendered, racially-marked class positions, and thus belong to groups, ‘each of which represents a function in production itself, and which are put in relation to each other” (Wagenknecht 2005, quotation Gramsci VII, 1560).

As the leading thinker and co-founder of the Communist Party of Italy, imprisoned under the Fascist dictatorship, Gramsci pursued the question, why had Communists in the core countries of capitalism failed to build on the success of the socialist revolution in Russia? He saw the main difference in the fact that the state where the Bolsheviks could conquer it was “all”; in the ‘West’, on the other hand, it “was only an advanced trench, behind which lay a robust chain of fortresses and earthworks”: civil society (Gramsci IV, 874). By means of its consensus, it carries with it the power of the state (ibid., 916) and can be distinguished methodically, but not organically, from “political society,” i.e., the state directly exercising power (see Gramsci III, 498f; VII, 1566). This is not, therefore, a territory free of domination, in which people might engage with each other in a manner “civilized, and thus peaceably debated, unimpeded by gender hierarchy, class contradictions, racism, or similar evils”. In fact, civil society is the “location of the struggle for hegemony” (Wagenknecht 2005).

Additionally, one should refer to the Marxist theorist, Louis Althusser, who had a major influence on queer theory (see Jagose 2001 [1996], 101–107). Following Antonio Gramsci, he outlined a “different reality that obviously stands on the side of the (oppressive) state apparatus, but does not merge with it,” which he called ideological state apparatuses (ISAs). These correspond to Gramsci’s ‘civil society’ and lay bare what Braudel understood with the term ‘culture’: Althusser distinguishes the ISAs of family and religious life, education and judiciary, parties and unions, the media and finally culture in the narrower sense, to which he also counted sport. In each of these institutions, “the qualification of labor power … is reproduced in the forms of ideological submission,” and they all serve to “reproduce the productive relations, that is, the capitalist conditions of exploitation”.

Ideology rarely declares itself as “ideological”; rather, it operates in praxis precisely because it appears that we are self-determined subjects. Althusser attempted to illustrate this with the concept of interpellation. Through it, “subjects” are “recruited’ from the mass of individuals, or these individuals are ‘transformed’ into subjects”. He offers the much-cited example of the policeman who calls out on the street, “hey, you there!” – and all passersby immediately feel caught. The civic subject is thus a product of submission to the power of the police. According to the same pattern, a child, even before birth, is “appointed as a subject in and by
the specific familial ideological configuration in which it is ‘expected’ once it has been conceived,” and then “it must ‘find’ ‘its’ place, i.e. become the gendered subject (boy or girl) which it already is in advance” (Althusser 1971 [1970]).

On the basis of the observations of Antonio Gramsci, Nancy Peter Wagenknecht traces the development of individual lifestyles under the banner of ‘Fordism’ in the USA “through the overlapping of mass production, mass consumption and mass culture (guided by a rapidly evolving cultural industry)”. Gramsci saw “that the change in the mode of production” named after the American entrepreneur and anti-Semitic publicist Henry Ford “involved a complex, mediated and embedded puritanical impulse, which trained the male factory workers to use the full extent of their forces in assembly line work. A discipline of the body, and especially of sexuality, was necessary for this. Comparatively high wages made it possible for women to be turned into housewives,” entrusted with the care for a small family and the “consumerist regeneration” of the male labor force (Wagenknecht 2005; cf. Gramsci III, 529–533; Gramsci IX, 2086–2095). This was, however, essentially a white arrangement: Wagenknecht points out that black men and women, as well as migrants, usually worked for worse wages in particularly labor-intensive sectors.

Fordism was founded as a “class compromise” between “large-scale industry and financial capital,” on the one hand, and “white masculine skilled workers,” represented by strong trade unions, on the other. It became also the dominant model in Western Europe, “administered by national welfare states,” which at the same time supervised the observance of a gender regime “determined by rigid heterosexual norms”. Wagenknecht attributes to the Fordist dispositif how the resistance of feminists and lesbians and gays to this regime also served “forms of representation of common interests in relatively homogeneous collective subjects”. Their activities against patriarchy and compulsory heterosexuality had brought about a profound transformation of civil society in the ‘Western’ countries (Wagenknecht 2005). Observed from a Gramscian perspective, “in the sense that the political and cultural hegemony of a social group over society as a whole are regarded as an ethical content of the state,” (Gramsci IV, 729) the ‘sexual revolution’ meant a flexibilization of social conventions, which accompanied the rearrangement of more flexible forms of capital accumulation in the 1970s, until finally the neoliberal termination of this class compromise was brought to an end by the owners of the means of production.

The sexual-political battles thus contributed “to the downfall of Fordism”. But this did not lead to “a comprehensive liberation, but a contradictory chain of freedom gains with new hierarchies and restrictions, which are arranged ac-
cording to a new pattern of restrictions,” says Wagenknecht. The current mode of production propagates ‘diversity,’ but is “further regulated by the heterosexual matrix”. A new “form of discipline” reigns, which comes into being through self-conduct, and whose instruments are the old hierarchies believed to have been overcome by liberal equality, but which continue to exist under the surface, and which can be used to attack individuals at any time. This makes it possible to exploit ‘difference’ (i.e. the belonging to a lower level of the old hierarchical order) as a resource of creativity. It is, for the subject, a source of their inimitable individuality. But s/he must not go too far in their criticism of this hierarchy, lest s/he be replaced by another subject who makes it less difficult”. On these conditions, some white gays and women, and occasionally even migrants, are allowed to ‘rise’ today – although Nancy Wagenknecht emphasizes that the latter and trans* frequently fall completely out of the system (Wagenknecht 2005).

Antke Engel proposes the concept of “projective integration,” “in order to critically examine the functions of neoliberal diversity policies” (Engel 2009, 227), the latter which propagates “a positive, appreciative attitude toward difference ..., which appears usable as cultural capital and is no longer regarded as the ‘entirely different’ of a supposedly stable, autonomous self” (ibid., 42). In this way, on the one hand, “the reliability of the hegemonic normative horizon, to which assimilation and multiculturalism refer, is put into question, and the norm itself is subjected to proliferation” (ibid., 227). On the other hand, today “certain forms of homosexual and polymorphic existences ... could be figured as models of civil-society-, capitalist-citizenship”. The author notices signs that “a new hegemonic consensus is emerging that calls into question a clear hetero/homo opposition and replaces it with an alliance between mainstream and minority politics to the neoliberal social project” (ibid., 43).

In her book of philosophical reflections on popular images of queer and economy, Engel chooses not to decide between the one or the other. For her, the possibility “to understand queer cultural politics as the product of neoliberal developments” does not rule out the possibility that they could be “written as a challenge to neoliberalism” (ibid., 19). She suggests that one could already say of Michel Foucault that he “anticipates the assertion of neoliberal dynamics – or even supported it against his own critical pretension”. For he replaced “the understanding of bourgeois sexuality represented with the repressive hypothesis as one which follows the economy of deficits and the principles of scarcity” with a “consumerist image of continuous productivity and continual stimulus,” similar to the “late-capitalist logic of permanent production of difference” (ibid., 30).
In fact, neoliberal discourses expedite “a pluralization of sexual subjectivities and forms of life ... because they can epitomize an ideology of the free formability of one’s own life, including body and self. Insofar as this decision-making power is praised as a ‘liberation from repressive regulations,’ it serves to translate social responsibility into self-responsibility and to make the principle of efficiency and the reduction of social security more palatable” (ibid., 26). At the same time, Engel knows that those for whom “the ideological figure of independence is not effective, because of racist or classist positionings, are banished from the space of representation” (ibid., 92). Exactly as Wagenknecht suspected, this means that, despite all of the paraded diversity, society is essentially still structured by the old inequalities from which the positioning of ‘race,’ class and (this too has not changed much) gender have been produced. These new invocations are proof of the fact that white queers – especially white gays – are now an integral part of mainstream society, which in general segregates itself less via heterosexuals against gays, but all the more via whites against people of color. Engel is well aware of the problem. In her book, she presents numerous examples of racism that prevails in German gay politics. But again and again, she pushes against the limits of what can be achieved by a queer cultural politics that regards “continual political dissidence” as self-worth (ibid., 35).

These are the limits of the actual power relations in Germany, where, for example, staged ‘transformations’ – whether in “SM scenarios or drag performances” – take place “in the private, semi-private or subcultural spaces,” changing nothing (ibid., 94f). This is also the reason for the failure of the concept of “crossing”. It comes to German-speaking queer theory from the publications of Pauline Boudry, Brigitta Kuster, and Renate Lorenz about ‘sexual labor,’ which incorporated the “many decades of feminist criticism of unpaid housework and relationship work and the gendered division of labor” and “which demanded not just a different understanding of reproductive labor,” but rather demonstrated that working conditions “are fundamentally characterized by the fact that social requirements of femininity, masculinity and heterosexuality are translated into self-relations and social practices”. With the artistic means of the performance, “non-thematized sexual labor is to be brought into the field of public visibility”. Engel goes on to imagine a young black person “in an internet café in Namibia” discovering such an image online, who then could “appropriate it and devise their own phantasy scenario. But this does not mean that this person is in a position of power from which the capability of projection would also have the socio-political effect of being able to afford a projective integration” (ibid., 91f). This correct observation does not hide the fact that this ‘integration’ is obviously as
one-sidedly conceived as what mainstream gays propagate: Namibia should take up something devised by white German queer theorists. But why? And why not vice versa? Queer people of color rightly point out “that the anti-assimilationist currents of sexual politics do not exist beyond the imperialist project, and often even actively participate in it” (Haritaworn, Tauqir and Erdem 2011, 65).

Meanwhile, quite a few queer ‘deconstructions’ seem to presuppose the universal validity of the very white, middle-class norms they are against. Even within the ‘western’ sub-societies, these can only be regarded as obligatory, because a particular “critique of domination” effectively blocks other realities, just as they are suppressed by domination itself. Thus, for example, the ‘tightrope walkers’ pointed to Angela Davis, who criticized the demand for “wages for domestic labor” from the position of black feminism. As a sociologist, Davis had shown that “the gender-specific division of labor ... in slavery” constituted something different for the white women's movement. The “feminization” of black women was here determined "by their usefulness. They were genderless the moment the Master used them for certain activities. In the case of rape or the use of their childbearing ability, they were assigned a function as women". This resulted in a “completely different family image and therefore different gender relations” among black people (FeMigra 1994; cf. Davis 1982 [1981]). Similarly, the white gay ‘collective subject’ villainized those men who have sex with men without building this into a ‘personality’ and disdained (sub-)proletarian and/or migrant ways of life that permitted such uncomplicated sex.

The example of a “deconstruction” which ignores one’s own privileged position and thus reinforces domination, is also provided by J. K. Gibson-Graham – two white feminists who, under this joint name, published the book *The End of Capitalism (As We Know It)* in 1996, viewed by Engel in a predominately positive light. Although it has not been translated into German, its core theses dominate local discussions of “queer-feminist economic criticism” (for a detailed critical presentation, see Sauter and Engel 2010). According to these theses, capitalism, which supposedly came to an end, is not the reality that has primarily been the subject of what Marxist criticism has known under this concept – since “Das Kapital analyzed (or ‘deconstructed’) the logic of capital” (Amin 2012 [2010], 117) – but is rather the critical insight. For, they argue, such a ‘capitalism’ does not exist at all; it is rather to be understood “similar to Judith Butler’s conception of gender identity as a ‘regulatory fiction’”. Against this, at the very least, lies the objection that anyone who argues using “gender identity” is falsely explaining socially-induced inequality of human beings as naturally-given, while conversely using the
‘capitalism’ concept means to render recognizable – and, thereby changeable – the social structure that hides underneath the supposedly ‘natural’ order establishing inequality. Indeed, instead of real change, we are dealing here with the “counter-narrative to capitalocentric thinking beyond capitalist conditions of exploitation”. Quite seriously, the thing that comes to the minds of these “queer-feminist economics critics” is the example of the “male ‘normal worker’” who “goes fishing in his spare time and is in an economic exchange process with his wife, who works as a reproductive laborer. We believe that this deconstructivist perspective of sexual and economic identities can lead to transformative practices”. At the same time, it is argued that “commercial interests do not oppose non-normative ... identities any more per se, but rather virtually promote them”. “The presence of gay neighborhoods” is said to be one of the decisive “location factors when it comes to luring the ‘creative class’ into a city” (Ganz and Gerbig 2010).

Instead of entering the impasse of a transfiguration of the ruling relations, Wagenknecht’s analysis of the relationship between queer and (neo-liberal) capitalism enables us to advance. By linking Foucault’s approach to that of Gramsci, queer-theoretical criticism of the subject reaches a level at which it could indeed become politically relevant, even more so if more than just Althusser’s catchword ‘interpellation’ would be included in queer reflections. It is the level of society – understood by Karl Marx as “the whole set of activities of production, exchange and consumption the combined effect of which is perceptible to each person outside himself, as a ‘natural’ property of things,” while in reality “this complex of activities produces social representations of objects at the same time as it produces representable objects”. Whereupon the ‘subject’ is, together with ‘his’ conceptions of the world, itself one of these objects (Balibar 2013, 109f).

“Specters of Marx”

With the title of his worldwide bestseller The End of History, the liberal political scientist Francis Fukuyama delivered the slogan for the renewed vision, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992, of the “completion of history in bourgeois society ... His simple message is that the battle has come to an end. From now on, everything is as it is, and as it is, it is good” (Seibert 2000, 85f.). Fukuyama was referring to the philosopher Georg Wilhem Hegel, even though it is probably only a stubborn rumor that the latter had supposedly regarded such a blissful present state as already reached, when he examined the totality of the material conditions of life in which Prussia found itself in the 19th century, and, “following the exam-
ple of English and French thinkers of the eighteenth century, embraced the term ‘civil society’” (MEW 13 [1859], 8). But Hegel could imagine a ‘last synthesis’ in which the contradictions of the world were abolished. His critical disciple Karl Marx, on the other hand, held the view that this “social formation” laid bare the social revolution on account of the impending antagonism of labor and capital, closing “the prehistory of human society accordingly” (ibid., 9).

According to the classical Marxist view, there is a “dialectic of productive forces and production relations” in the history of humanity (Schleifstein 1972, 71). These production relations “describe a whole system of social, economic relations, in particular the position of the different classes of society in the production process, which results from ... property relations” (ibid., 70). Through this “struggle of the classes, whose interests either coincide or conflict with the progress of the productive forces, the production relations adjust, in one way or another, more or less rapidly, to the level of the productive forces” (ibid.). In its traditional reading, historical materialism was used to distinguish the consecutive ages of primitive society, slavery society, feudalism, and ‘capitalism’; it was supposedly even permitted, according to Marx and Lenin, under whose leadership the Soviet Union was founded, “to portray the development of social formation as a process of natural history” (ibid., 72). This was to be replaced by socialism/communism as a fifth and final stage (cf. ibid., 71). For, according to Marxist analysis, under capitalism and its forced technical progress, the contradiction is exacerbated between the social character of labor and the private ownership of the means of production, by which capital concentrates in fewer hands. The capitalist relations of production, which had initially stimulated the development of productive forces, would thus become their “chains” to be cast off (MEW 13 [1859], 9). But Karl Marx’s envisioned transition of historical stages through the victory of working men in class struggle remains, following the defeat of what was begun by Lenin, yet to come.

In lieu of this, many ‘western’ leftists, in those ensuing ‘five short, passionate, joyful, enigmatic years,’ as Michel Foucault described the period between 1965 and 1970, began to depart “from the class concept, which was revived in the protest movements of the sixties as a central category for social analysis ... As a result, newly emerging political and social movements turn to single issues, while theory building takes a deconstructive/postmodern turn. Both political praxis (in the form of the various New Social Movements) and (political) theory consummate a significant cultural turn” (Klinger and Knapp 2005). And so it seemed, as Georg Füllberth captured in his Little History of Capitalism, that after the ‘global triumph of neoliberalism,’ there was hardly any fundamental resistance to the sys-
tem. He established as a fact that neither the New Social Movements, to which he counts “the newly-significant women’s movement,” nor nationalist guerrillas in various parts of the world, nor “militancy invoking Islam”: “None of these movements had the goal of overcoming capitalism. This was a completely new situation in the history of its (capitalism) industrial phase” (Fülberth 2008, 294f).

The self-complacent “soft totalitarianism” of liberal democracy” (Seibert 2000, 86), which Francis Fukuyama sought to justify philosophically, was unexpectedly objected to, with reference to Marx, by Jacques Derrida, a prominent representative of the ‘postmodern’ thought which ‘orthodox’ Marxists are fond of putting under the general suspicion of “intellectual complicity” and encouraging the adaption to existing conditions. This side is especially against Derrida’s “normative (dis-)orientation on the principles of ‘disorder or irreducible disarray,’” which is so important for Queer Theory: “Without reference to the possibility of social change, criticism can degenerate into a domination-compliant gesture” (Seppmann 2010; for the significance of Derrida for Queer Theory, compare Woltersdorff 2003, 916f; Voß 2010, 24f). But it was Jacques Derrida in 1993 – when this seemed least opportune – who opposed those who marched in “lockstep rhythm” intoned by “the same old story,” that Karl Marx and communism were allegedly “dead, very dead”. In his book *Specters of Marx*, the philosopher stated: “a dogmatism is attempting to install its worldwide hegemony in paradoxical and suspect conditions,” and he contradicted the “dominant discourse … on the subject of Marx’s work and thought” (Derrida 2004 [1994], 78, emphasis in original).

Derrida presented a picture of urgent relevance in face of the triumphal cry of the ideologues of a ‘new world order’: “Marx remains an immigrant chez nous … still a clandestine immigrant, as he was all his life” (ibid., emphasis in original). Jacques Derrida wrote these lines in the time of the pogroms, when people of color were murdered everywhere in the ‘reunited’ Germany, and which have yet to be even slightly recognized. He noticed the contempt which the new discourse had for what Fukuyama calls, without much fuss, “the Islamic world,” and he harshly judged the exclusionary remarks of the political scientist: “It reveals the water in which this discourse consolidates its alloy of intolerance and confusion” (ibid., 90). In view of the concrete circumstances under which it was assumed that the history of bourgeois society was completed, he passionately pleaded not to make the unwanted Karl Marx “an illegal alien, or, what always risks coming down to the same thing, … to assimilate him so as to stop frightening oneself (making oneself fear) with him. He is not part of the family, but one should not send him back, once again, him too, to the border” (ibid., 238).
The founder of ‘deconstruction’ confessed that this strategy of subversion – the incessant questioning of all the assumptions that make the overcoming of domination seem unthinkable, and the destabilization of the allegedly rigid concepts in which it (domination) manifests itself – “has never had any sense or interest, in my view at least, except as a radicalization, which is to say also in the tradition of a certain Marxism” (ibid., emphasis in original). He spoke of a “spirit of Marxism which I will never be ready to renounce” and specifically meant “not only the critical idea,” but also “a certain emancipatory and messianic affirmation, a certain experience of the Promises” (ibid., 126, emphasis in original). The deconstructive thinking which mattered to him “has always pointed out the irreducibility of affirmation and therefore of the promise, as well as the undeconstructibility, of a certain idea of justice” (ibid., 127). Despite his perhaps unclear ‘religious’ terminology, Derrida explained: “all men and women, all over the earth, are today, to a certain extent, the heirs of Marx and Marxism. That is ... they are heirs of the absolute singularity of a project – or of a promise – which has a philosophical and scientific form” (ibid., 113). And he oriented practically-politically to the continued attempt to realize it. For “a promise must promise to be kept, that is, not to remain ‘spiritual’ or ‘abstract’, but to produce events, new effective forms of action, practice, organization, and so forth” (ibid., 111–2).

Through Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s ideally-matched translation of the linguistic-philosophical primary work of Jacques Derrida into English, deconstruction became internationally known in the 1970s. But with his book on Karl Marx, the “old-fashioned Marxist” found herself not entirely satisfied. Derrida had not considered “the central arguments on industrial capitalism” in Das Kapital. “Marx’ statement that the worker produces capital because he is the one who is responsible for the added-value with his labor power was amplified by Spivak to the effect that it is the ‘Third World’ which produces not just the wealth, but also the possibilities of the cultural self-representation of the North” (Castro Varela and Dhawan 2005, 65f).

Spivak, in her “debate with Derrida on Marx ... focuses on the exploitation of the female body in the Third World, where subaltern women secure the preservation of global production,” and covers with her Marxist interventions, among other things, ignorance in Western theory production with respect to racism and sexism” (ibid., 65). This leads to the question of the entanglement and simultaneity of different power relations – even if for Spivak, the economic interest remains fundamental. As already quoted, she wrote in one of her most famous essays that the “epistemic violence” of imperialism supplements a “former economic text” (Spivak 1988, 283).
Excursion 2: Karl Marx on Colonialism

According to Marx’ view, “the struggles of the Western proletariat for economic equality and emancipation in the nineteenth century represented a political interest in the whole of mankind, which palpably did not include disenfranchised groups like colonized subjects” (Castro Varela and Dhawan 2005, 64). Similarly, “traditional Marxism” often ignored how “the colonial power constellations were traversed by racist structures”. Again and again, “anticolonial intellectuals … faced the challenge to revisit and expand the Marxist concept of class struggle” (ibid., 16).

The author of Capital left Europe only once: in the spring of 1882, a year before his death, he visited the then-French colony of Algeria. The letters he writes to his daughters and to Friedrich Engels literally reproduce entire paragraphs from the forerunner of the Guide Bleu. Immediately confronted with the reality of a North African country under European rule, Marx, as the writer Juan Goytisolo puts it, develops an “almost systematic denial of direct observation, the need to rely on the documented to tell personal experience … Whether a lack of trust in his observation or laziness, or because of his lack of sympathy to the subject, he subordinate his own point of view to the authority of a rubber-stamped text”: namely, a guide popular with the bourgeoisie of colonial power (Goytisolo in Sievernich and Budde 1989, 127).

Decades before that, Karl Marx had shown that, just as the ruling class he fought against, he was convinced of a European mission in the non-white world, even if he assumed that ultimately it would have different results than the pioneers of imperialism planned. In a series of articles on the British colonial rule in India, he claimed that society there had “no history at all, at least no known history.” In the country, there were “gentle natives” which the “Arabs, Turks, Tartars, Moguls, who had successively overrun India” could not regenerate because of “the barbarian conquerors being, by an eternal law of history, conquered themselves by the superior civilization of their subjects. The British were the first superior conquerors, and they … destroyed it by breaking up the native communities, by uprooting the native industry”. On the other hand, they made it possible for the people of India to “accommodate themselves to entirely new labor, acquiring the requisite knowledge of machinery”. If we look at the railroad, the “the electric telegraph”, “the native army, organized and trained by the British drill-sergeant” – "self-emancipation", and possibly socialism, no longer seem too remote. (MEW 9 [1853], 220–226). Obviously, the idea of progress is deeply interwoven here with racism.

Quite different is the account in the end of Volume One of Capital, which states: “The prelude of the revolution that laid the foundation of the capitalist mode of
production was played in the last third of the 15th and the first decade of the 16th centuries”. In the famous chapter on “primitive accumulation,” Marx describes the violence with which brutally enforced what today appears to us as an economic and cultural ‘normalcy,’ namely, that the men, “free in the double sense” – free of both property and open coercion – “must become the sellers of themselves” (MEW 23 [1867], 743). When we recognize “the requirements of that mode of production as a self-evident laws of nature” (ibid., 765), we therefore accept the results of a history which “is written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire” (ibid., 743). Whereby “the discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black-skins, signalized the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production” (ibid., 779).

Marx portrays the unprecedented atrocities of the white conquerors, but also notes, “in fact, the veiled slavery of the wage workers in Europe needed, for its pedestal, slavery pure and simple in the new world” (ibid., 787). In colonialism he thus recognizes a presupposition, and not merely, as post-colonial criticism sometimes too harshly judges, a “side-effect of global capitalism” (Castro Varela and Dhawan 2005, 16).

Nevertheless, what Rosa Luxemburg had already criticized is true: “For Marx, these processes are incidental, illustrating merely the genesis of capital, its first appearance in the world”; for his analysis of capitalism “in its full maturity”; however, he ignores persistent colonial structures (Luxemburg, 1975 [1913], 313). But even for Luxembourg, a capitalist society can only be mentioned when the capital relation has become general – not “in the colonial countries”, where there are the “most peculiar combinations between the modern wage system and primitive authority” (ibid., 312). Capitalism is always in need of regions not yet fully developed, and “depends in all respects on non-capitalist strata and social organizations” (ibid., 314). If the entire world were capitalist, it would collapse (for a critique of Luxemburg’s theory of imperialism, see Fülbert 2008, 308ff; Amin 2012 [2010], 23f).

This prediction has not been confirmed. Marxist theorists of the “globalized law of value” assume that there is today a global capitalism with a “hierarchical structuring – itself globalized – of the prices of labor-power” (Amin 2012, 13). According to Samir Amin, the consensus across segments of society in the global North relies “on profits deriving from imperialist rent”, i.e., the over-exploitation of working people in the South. “The advance posts of the Northern peoples are dependent on defeat of the imperialist states in their confrontation with the Southern nations” (ibid., 98f).
Intersectionality, or, Sociality and the Directly Affected

During an interview with a German magazine, Angela Davis, for good reason in light of the events at the time, emphasized that “of upmost importance is to respect the leadership position of those who are directly affected” (Dorn 2010). The legendary Black Power activist, communist and feminist hailed Judith Butler for using the stage given to her by the Berlin Pride Parade organizers in 2010 to distance herself from the complicity with racism, of which she accused the city’s leading gay and lesbian organizations. Davis emphasized that “not only has she refused to accept the award for Civil Courage, she also said that the award is due to the queer people of color organizations who are trying to develop integrative and intersectional strategies by combining anti-racist with anti-homophobic strategies”. In that regard, she summoned the position of radical women of color in the US in the late 1960s and early 1970s. “We argued that a commitment to the feminist struggle was impossible without considering which role does racism and classism play ... Nowadays it is very difficult to find a person, male or female or transgender, who defines himself as a feminist and does not recognize that it is not simply an issue of gender, but also about class, ‘race,’ disability, social environment and other topics” (ibid.).

With her study Women, Race & Class it was Davis herself who has given the term ‘intersectionality’ substance even before it was invented (see Davis 1982 [1981]). Already the title Women, Race, & Class calls forth the three fundamental categories which intersectional approaches take to be entwined with one another. Unfortunately, this work was scarcely acknowledged by the established specialists in Germany, who discovered the concept of intersectionality only in the 21st century and who now speak of the “new paradigm of gender research,” whose “theoretical and methodological implications go far beyond feminist discourse” (Klinger and Knapp 2005).

In local overviews of the concept, the origins of intersectionality in American black feminism are usually vaguely discussed, and the black jurist Kimberlé Crenshaw – who worked with Angela Davis politically – is mentioned by name. In 1989 she was the first to use the image of the intersection of streets to draw attention to the problem of overlapping, different “patterns of subordination,” stressing the need for anti-discriminatory legislation to escape “categories conceived as mutually exclusive concepts” (Walgenbach 2007, 48, emphasis in original).

Crenshaw deals with a number of legal procedures, a synopsis of her analyses clearly showing her complex understanding of intersectionality (see Walgenbach 2012). In one such example, female black workers who were denied promotion by
General Motors could not successfully assert either racist or sexist discrimination in court because the company demonstrated that white women and black men had advancement opportunities (compare with Barkanmaz in GLADT 2009). In this case, two ‘characteristics’ recognized by themselves as a ‘basis for discrimination’ – i.e. as a non-legitimate “justification” for unequal treatment (cf. Çetin 2012, 97) – are applied to a group of persons, reinforcing each other and strengthening one another in the process. But a logic which treats these characteristics independently, or even plays them against each other, dismembers these persons into separate objects of investigation, in this case with the result that they apparently cannot be discriminated against, neither as women nor as black, since women and blacks are treated “equally”. The basis for this line of reasoning is the white man as an ‘unmarked norm,’ while the black women are composed of the halves, coming up, in both cases, empty handed. Or more concretely, to remain with the example, consider the case of black women workers. Because a further – structural – unequal treatment is evidently the prerequisite for their depicted situation, but it does not, however, come to light as a “basis for discrimination”: there are the people who have to sell their labor power in the car factory, and those who live on the surplus value which the factory produces. In another trial against General Motors analyzed by Kimberlé Crenshaw, it was particularly clear how the bourgeois “equal rights for all” can serve to continue the history of oppression. This time, black women workers lost because, in the course of upcoming mass dismissals in the 1970s, only the duration of the employment was used to decide who was going be fired – what was not considered consequently was that the company did not employ any black women in the preceding decades due to then still-legal racial segregation (see Walgenbach 2012).

This internationally-acclaimed lawyer continues the political struggle of radical black feminists by means of her investigations into the gaps of anti-discrimination legislation, which came first only through the effortful struggle of radical black feminists with other means. In light of the relative success of the civil rights movement, she considers it a mistake to undervalue insurgent groups such as the Black Panthers compared to reformist movements, since, in the end, these reformists benefit from the insurrection of such groups (see Crenshaw 1995 [1988], 121). On the other hand, with reference to Gramsci, she defends her decision to conduct her struggle within the legal realm against the accusation of nourishing illusions of a capitalist state constituted by racism and sexism. On the basis of Gramsci’s analysis of the importance of civil society in the West, he recommended to communists “the passing from the war of maneuver (frontal attack) to the war of position in the political field as well” (Gramsci IV, 816, emphasis in original). Crenshaw
agrees with his view: precisely because the ideology of this society plays too great a role for a direct attack on the ruling class to be immediately successful, it is necessary to move within the ideological apparatuses and expand their possibilities in order to gradually “create a counter-hegemony” (Crenshaw 1995 [1988], 119).

Deconstruction protects against the danger of falling prey to ideology on this arduous path. Crenshaw recalls with Derrida that the foundation of ‘western’ thinking is the continuous formation of pairs of opposites, the “other” being simultaneously constructed as the inferior (ibid., 113). Thus, as we saw, this is how racism and sexism function, this is how Orientalism functions, and this is exactly how homophobia functions, which is “inseparably linked to the identity of homo/hetero-binarism and is irremovable from this basis” (Klauda 2008, 26). Only those who keep in mind that none of these dichotomies are ever “natural” nor unchangeable can, at the same time, “take account of the current needs of human beings (in doing so also effectively counteracting current disadvantages and violence) and ... hold open the goal of a better society in the future” (Voß 2011, 15).

Meanwhile, the tendency “in German-language Gender Studies to reduce the work of Crenshaw to the metaphor of the intersection” meets with opposition, particularly with regard to the accompanying “depoliticizing decoupling of intersectionality from its original contexts” (Walgenbach 2012).

As the jurist Cengiz Barskanmaz describes, Crenshaw’s work has had a major influence on the debates on internationally-binding anti-discrimination policies (Barskanmaz in GLADT 2009). In comparison, the Federal Republic of Germany is clearly backwards: the ‘General Equal Treatment Act,’ which came into force only in 2006, categorizes only six out of thirteen bases for discrimination prohibited by the EU Charter – “class-specific discrimination is not included” (Çetin 2011, 105). This is at the same time structurally racist, insofar as the German economy and the ruling politics have, for decades, “conceptualized migrants as workers of debased rights” (Ha 2012 [2003], 70, emphasis in original) and thereby subjected generations to state-enforced “immiseration and marginalization” (cf. ibid., 72).

However, the increasing globalization of civil society not only makes it possible to demand in other places the results of struggles oppressed groups won in a particular country – such groups occasionally are able to strengthen their position via continuous conflicts with the help of supranational institutions. For example, the intervention of UN committees has made it possible to problematize gender-based intrusion against intersexed minors in Germany (see Voß 2012, 20). On the other hand, the International Convention which eliminated homosexuality from the catalog of diseases in 1991 (cf. Voß 2013, 67f) did not yet lead German law to cease classifying people along their sexual practices. In this sense, it would
be welcome if the “policies of international health organizations, which as part of their global awareness-raising work in the field of AIDS now consciously refrain from using the word gays and instead use the neutral formulation men who have sex with men (MSM)” would also be established in Germany. Unfortunately, standing in the way of this is an influential, mainly gay-male lobby who “conceives the formation of a self-confident homosexual identity as part of a process of western emancipation” (Klauda 2008, 133).

Butler was referring to such ideas when she said in 2010 that in order to combine the fight against homophobia with the fight against racism, it was not enough to “include groups like GLADT … and LesMigraS actively. It also means to orient oneself to these groups, to understand how a struggle against homophobia can look without supporting racist stereotypes and policies against migrants. If the movement does not succeed with this, then it falls prey to nationalism and European racism and ultimately supports justifications that legitimize wars” (Hamann 2010).

Since the 1970s and 1980s, about the same time as Jewish women were protesting against antisemitic elements in the “anti-patriarchal” discourse, black women also began to break critically and theoretically from mainstream German-speaking feminism (see Oguntoye et al. 1986). They described “racism and sexism as interrelated and simultaneously acting forms of violent oppression and discrimination” (Erel et al., 2007, 241). With these contributions, which were “for a long time not taken seriously” by white German women (Walgenbach 2012), the formation of intersectional theory in Germany began. Soon the first scientific interventions of migrant women followed, which were clearly situated in a concrete political context. Gülşen Aktaş illuminated in her essay, Turkish Women are like a Shadow, the manner in which residency status played a role in their experiences of violence, and thereby achieved substantial improvements for women’s shelters (see Aktaş 1993).

The academic institutions of Germany have for many years not only sealed themselves off from critical thinking of local people of color; they have also considered the debates in the USA on the interdependencies of gender, class and race as irrelevant for Germany. For example, it was and is still sometimes today claimed that the word “class” refers in English to a social “status” rather than the German “class concept” (see Beceren 2008, 25) – not a very valid claim in view of the fact that the most important US-American intersectional theorists explicitly refer to Marxist concepts. On the other hand, where the term race is declared taboo in view of the history of German fascism (cf. ibid., 26 and 35f), Theodor W. Adorno already replied: “The noble word ‘culture’ replaces the proscribed term ‘race’
though it remains a mere disguise for the brutal claim to domination” (quoted from ibid., 26f). As an explanation for the hesitant reception of intersectionality in the field of higher education, the evidence suggests that the generally reduced status of people of color in Germany is shown in their slight influence upon the so-called “sciences of reality” once described by Max Weber (cf. ibid., 34).

At the beginning of December 2012, the OECD presented its ‘first International Integration Report’. An analysis by the Federal Center for Civic Education stated, “as with PISA 2000, the differences in the performance of migrant children ... are, above all, a reflection of the social selectivity of the German school system” (Rebeggiani 2012; cf. Voß 2011, 19f, 45f). The study also showed that in Germany “the highly qualified immigrant children, who are already very few in numbers, are also disadvantage in the labor market”. Their employment rate was “below that of highly qualified Germans without a migration background. Also, they work in a job for which they are overqualified more often than Germans without a migrant background”. In addition, “the descendants of immigrants are more underrepresented in the public sector then in almost any other OECD country” (Rebeggiani 2012). Against the backdrop of such accessibility conditions, it seems almost cynical when white German social scientists idealize their privileged view from the protected space of the university as a critically theoretical “external perspective on a whole”, as though this alone would allow “the phenomena of injustice and inequality as characteristics of the societal structure to be reckoned” (Klinger and Knapp 2005).

Indeed, the sociologist Cornelia Klinger rightly thinks it is “useless to point to the overlapping or intercrossing aspects of class, race and gender in the individual worlds of experience without indicating how and by which means, class, race and sex are constituted as social categories” (Klinger 2003, 25). But this does not preclude a detailed examination of “how individuals are affected by their belonging to a gender, a class or an ethnicity, and which experiences they make with it” (Klinger and Knapp 2005). Especially not when those who carry out such examinations are the ones who are themselves directly affected. Umut Erel, Jin Haritaworn, Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodríguez, and Christian Klesse have turned against the abstract view of categorical interrelations in a pointed criticism of the preoccupation with intersectionality in the German academic establishment and demanded that “a textual analysis must always integrate an analysis of material conditions”. Investigations that do not take into account specific experience of oppression – and therefore do not have to contribute to the urgently necessary redefinition of the category ‘class’ – are not only useless, but possibly “even dangerous ... by posing a randomness of social differences, which can be used well against emancipatory
knowledge production” (Erel et al., 2008, 245f). In contrast, social scientists of color systematically evaluated interviews, which they had conducted with affected persons, and thus were able to present experience-rich intersectional analyzes of contemporary society, as they are indispensable to the course of emancipatory politics. Examples are Meryem Ertop’s work on gender-specific violence and structural exclusion (see Ertop 2008) and Zülfükar Çetin’s brilliant study *Homo- phobia and Islamophobia*, about binational gay couples in Berlin (see Çetin 2012).

Kimberlé Crenshaw defined intersectionality as “linking contemporary politics and postmodern theory” (Crenshaw 1995 [1991], 378). In Germany, her concept has been taken up and developed especially by queer people of color. People of color who were socialized in Germany, such as Fatima El-Tayeb, Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodríguez and Jin Haritaworn, who are among the most internationally widely discussed theorists in the cross-section of *queer*, post-colonial and intersectional theories, each teach at renowned British and North American universities. Transnational and transcontinental networking became an advantage for local queer people of color in their struggles, strengthened them with the necessary theoretical competence, and helped them to gain influence overall to shape their political orientation in the sense of a social orientation. Since Jin Haritaworn and Koray Yılmaz-Günay called for “queer migrant, Jewish or people of color” to form “networks and to investigate ways of fighting oppression,” (see Excursion 1) experiences from queer-migrant resistance to a seemingly overwhelming ideology, which consistently reproduces racism and sexism and thus keeps capitalism alive, has been pooled together and become utilizable for people of color in a much wider circle.

Nobody deters ‘us’ from learning from queer people of color.

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**Excursion 3: “Take a Look at the Power of Social Enforcement”**

Referring to the studies of the Bielefeld Institute for Interdisciplinary Conflict and Violence Research, Koray Yılmaz-Günay speaks about “group-focused enmity” which take shapes in different ways. But it is neither theoretically nor practically meaningful to regard individual ideologemes, “which assert not only an otherness, but also a different value of certain ways of life” separately from each other. For example, there is an obvious link between “the construction of gender within any given society and the lack of acceptance of same-sex life … both analytically and in the sense of successful prevention”, which is why “de facto, it is not possible to regard homophobia detached from sexism and transphobia”.

Likewise, in the face of “a largely ethnicized and religionized debate over homo-
phobia … it is imperative to have a common consideration of and approach to anti-racism and anti-homophobia. In order to speak about the social layers of discrimination and violence, we need not only take formations of (dichotomous) large groups into consideration, such as “Germans – non-Germans, men – women, heterosexuals – homosexuals”, each hierarchized with their specific valuations of characteristics. Instead, we must also examine the “power of social enforcement”.

“In order to be socially effective, prejudices need a powerful layer of support for institutions that create groups and facts beyond personal attitudes and behavior,” says Yılmaz-Günay, citing as examples “the creation of curricula, publications, scientific research, political or trade union representation, the issuing of laws and regulations, the decision on state and non-state grants, human resource and personnel development policies, etc.” Moreover, “it is irrelevant whether this class is numerically a majority or a minority in society. The decisive factor is its powerful position that allows for social enforcement” (Yilmaz-Günay 2011a).

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Translators
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Global Capitalism

Before discussing gender and sexuality in their historical development under capitalist social relationships, we should define again what capitalism means – and that the capitalism which became hegemonic is to be investigated as a global system.

The basic condition for a capitalist economy – whether initially regionally-limited or, later, as a global system – is “the presence of larger masses of capital and labor power in the hands of commodity-producers”, as proclaimed by Karl Marx in the Capital chapter on primitive accumulation (MEW 23, 741). The capitalist can take possession of labor power by forcing people to hand over produced goods or by inducing them by other means to deliver goods in such a way that he can gain profit in their sale – unequal exchange with those goods-producers is thus indispensable. The profit gained is then put to use to buy more labor power or products which will later make even more profit.

Historically, this was achieved especially by expropriating the labor power of people in rural areas, and then disposing the goods in distant urban centers of trade. For example, China in the sixteenth century exhibited such conditions, as the coastal strip increasingly benefited from long-distance trade and some people

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1 Translated from the German by Christopher Sweetapple, with Yossi Bartal.

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there became more prosperous, while the interior of the country was left behind (see Braudel 1986a, 653f).

Local manifestations of capitalist economy appeared in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries worldwide – in Japan, India and Arabia, and in some European cities like Venice, Florence, Genoa, Antwerp and Augsburg. However, at that time, none of these regions attained hegemony (compare the question of periodization: MEW 23, 743; Braudel 1986b, 57). Capitalism “had already developed as a subsystem, but not yet as a prevailing mode of production in those respective societies” (Fülberth 2008, 116). The merchants who operated as capitalists were constrained partly by political, social or moral beliefs, which conflicted with their actions (see Braudel 1986a, 645–654; Wallerstein 1984, 11). Up to a certain historical moment, the process of capitalist economization was repeatedly disturbed in one place or another.

In Europe, various cities periodically formed the centers of capitalist economies, profiting from trade relations with Arabia and India. Since the beginning of the 15th century – and ultimately central for the capitalist economic hegemony which was to emanate from Europe – this trade was primarily fostered through the implementation of colonial rule. Colonialism first enabled the large-scale appropriation of people’s labor power and the widespread trade of goods and humans. European colonialism differentiated from previous tributary systems: while in the latter the interest of the violent invaders generally aimed to preserve local economies in order to extort a regular tribute, European colonial rule was accompanied with a destructive plundering of the colonized areas (see Brentjes 1963, 209f; Mamozaï 1989 [1982], especially 39–58; Opitz [Ayim] 1997 [1986], 29ff). The anthropologist and activist Gloria Wekker of the Amsterdam-based black lesbian group Sister Outsider sums up these developments for the Netherlands in a clear and precise way:

“If one skimmed through the history of the ‘low countries by the sea’, one would find out that since the 15th century the very enterprising population flocked in all directions to find distribution areas for their trade, to ship slaves from west Africa to the New World, to plunder riches elsewhere, enabling the building of the edifice of canals which grace Amsterdam till today. Coffee, cocoa, gum, diamonds, sugar, cotton, pepper, wood, spices: all of this brought fortune to the Amsterdam markets. In the 17th century the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands reached a level of prosperity which made it the richest country in the world, and even today the Netherlands is among the richest countries of the world.

The trading fleet played a decisive role in this. The East India Company ruled over the world’s seas, from the Cape of Good Hope to Japan, and her sister compa-
ny, the West Indies Company, controlled the area which later became ‘The Middle Passage’. As part of the expansion of the Dutch empire, the commercial fleet and the migrants bestowed upon themselves the right to exploit overseas territories as cheap producers of important raw materials and as distribution areas for goods produced in Europe” (Wekker 2012, 142f).

The significance of colonization, not least for regimes of gender and sexuality, is underemphasized in the current thought of the global North. It is still common to consider the implementation of capitalism as a local phenomenon limited to Europe. Thus, the causative starting point for global capitalism is neglected, and the ways in which the global North profits from the work of the people of the global South – and how they are inseparably related – are all obscured. Samir Amin (2012 [2010]) and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (2011 [2008]), two major Marxists theorists of the global South, both make reference to this context, without which gender and sexual relations in both the global North and in the global South are inadequately understood. But also in the German-speaking world, there have been very good global analyses since the early 1980s, in particular those of black women and women of color who intervened in white women's/lesbians' movements. Consequently, discussions about nationalist and racist exclusions gained momentum inside the women’s movement, while there is hardly such a problematization to be found in the white gay movement in Germany, nor among white men overall in the Federal Republic.

Martha Mamozaï (1989 [1982]) and Katharina Oguntoyel et al. (1997 [1986]) view German colonial history – and white German women’s participation in that history – from the perspective of capitalist social relations. Neval Gültekin opens the collection Are We Really That Strange? (1985) as follows:

“More than half of the world’s population consists of women. From the total hours of labor in the world, women carry two thirds of them with their labor power. Although we women do far more than half of the work, we only get a tenth of the world’s income and own less than one hundredth of the world’s wealth! [...] But the better economic and social position of women in western industrialized countries is only possible because the other half of the world’s population, women as men, suffer under total exploitation and oppression. Women in Europe, Japan and the USA are beneficiaries of this exploitation. They live at the expense of the remaining world’s population, but above all at the expense of its female population” (Gültekin 1985, 5).
“Marx is boundless,” says Amin. He breaks plainly with the idea that still shaped the Marxist works, that of a steady upward development, and that, once the capitalist stage has been reached, its abolitionment already looms. Amin clearly opposes focusing on the capitalist center of the global North, also to be found in Marx’s writings. Rather, Amin urges for an analysis of capitalism as it historically came about and how it is today, namely a global capitalism. The global North and global South are indissolubly connected. The global North, the capitalist center, lives at the expense of the global South, the periphery. Only through colonialism was the North able to rise to its central position and to reduce the South to the periphery.

With “Marx is boundless,” Amin thus does not depart from Marxist analysis. Rather, he makes clear that the work of Marx “is not a closed theory. Marx is boundless because the radical critique that he initiated is itself boundless, always incomplete, and must always be the object of its own critique (Marxism as formulated at a particular moment has to undergo a Marxist critique), must unceasingly enrich itself through radical critique, treating whatever novelties the real system produces as newly opened fields of knowledge” (Amin 2012 [2010], 11, emphasis in original).

Marxism remains toothless and its analysis falls behind if perspectives of the global North dominate and if the examination of gender and sexuality happens only in a restricted context. Without further development of Marxist theory – also and especially from the perspective of the global South – it is easy to ignore how white people in the North benefit from the work of the people of the South, especially women. Nor will it be clear just how sexual stereotypes and fantasies of the global North still function on the basis of colonialization of the global South and on the backs of black people and people of color, who are alternately construed as sexually desirable or threatening, or even as both at the same time.

It is therefore necessary to change the perspective so that Marxist criticism will be repositioned from its head onto its feet. It is necessary to understand how the work of the people appropriated and exploited as a work force by capitalists, leading to the wealth of the few and the poverty of many. The extremity of poverty is generated in the global South, where the workforce can be bought for at least a tenth of the price of labor in the global North. As Amin elaborates:

“The capitalists are always trying to increase the rate of surplus-value, and this contradictory tendency is what triumphs in the end. This is how I understand what
is meant by the ‘law of accumulation’ and the ‘relative and absolute pauperization’ by which it is manifested. Facts show the reality of this law – but on the scale of the world capitalist system, not on that of the imperialist centers considered in isolation; for whereas, at the center, real wages have risen gradually for the past century, parallel with the development of the productive forces, in the periphery the absolute pauperization of the producers exploited by capital has revealed itself in all its brutal reality. But it is there, precisely, that the pro-imperialist tendency among Marxists pulls up short. For it is from that point onward that Marxism becomes subversive” (Amin 2010, 48).

Amin is explicitly opposed to a divide of workers from the global North and the global South. But he demands that internationalist Marxist theories continue to be honed. The aim is to take account of the overexploitation of the labor force of the global South, which in both capitalist and partly in pre-capitalist-feudal forms is bound to the generation of value and profit. Let us speak of the “proletariat of the periphery, subjected to super-exploitation by virtue of the incomplete character of the capitalist structure, its historical subordination ..., and the disconnection derived from this between the price of its labor-power and the productivity of its labor” and how “the exploited peasantries of the periphery, sometimes subject to dual, articulated exploitation by pre-capitalist forms, ... are thus always super-exploited, and as a result the proletariat’s principal potential ally” (ibid., 93).

Thus the main contradiction “does not exist between the periphery as a whole and the center as a whole”, but rather between the proletariat and the peasantry of the periphery, on the one hand, and the imperialist capital of the center, on the other. The local capitalists of the periphery – who participate in the exploitation of both the peripheral proletariat and the peasantry, but who still depend on the center – and also the proletariat of the center could be located along with their interests between these two polarities. Amin deduces from this that the proletariat and peasantry of the global South comprise the most exploited form, “the tip of the spear of the revolutionary forces on the world scale” (ibid.). And on the other hand, the exploited in the global North are often unaware of their oppression, or they do not wish to fundamentally alter the societal arrangements of the overexploitation of workers in the global South from which they benefit.

So far, even in Marxist considerations, the situation of the periphery was overlooked while the development of productivity was seen as the motor of the emancipation of working people. However, the starting point should be the emancipation of people – and therefore Amin delivers an excellently elaborate
basis. Capitalism must be seen as a whole, the impact of colonialism should be precisely taken into account, and capitalist values, especially productivity and work-fetishism, must be abandoned. Even the socialist countries of the Eastern Bloc were guided by the values of constantly increasing productivity and thus by an unconditional work-fetishism, thereby forgetting the very basic points of Karl Marx. Amin rejects those Marxists who merely blame capitalism “only of not being able to carry forward the march of progress effectively enough”. He refers to the Marx who wanted a society created according to human needs, in which humans are not only bound to one activity, or are not essentially defined by it: “No one is exclusively an artist or a lathe-operator” (ibid., 45). Work for work’s sake, or for an abstract increase in productivity, is pointless – rather, it is necessary to always align oneself to the realization of human needs and judge increases of productivity as means to an end, achieving less work necessary for survival and thus creating more space for other activities. In addition to the link to Marx’s goal of social development, Amin emphasizes the ecological significance of this goal: necessarily and logically, in the sense of constant accumulation, capitalism careens toward the destruction of the ecological basis of human life (ibid., 84–93).

From this global perspective, it is worthwhile to look at gender and sexual relations. Looking at the example of rural exodus in the periphery and the burgeoning of urban spaces in cities with tens of millions of residents all within a short span of time, it becomes clear how this was generated by global capitalist social relations. The economically-entailed expulsion and deracination of people, and in its most extreme form, the ways of life of migrant workers, are shaped by current global capitalism (see Ngai 2010, 2013; see also Mamozai 1989 [1982], 105–118). The factory was only relocated: “It now exists in the mines, the fields, the bedroom and the backyard, in hidden paths, in garages, on the parking lots where day workers wait. It disgorges into the world and ... industrially produces countless groups of subalterns” (Steyerl 2011 [2008], 9f).

It is also clear that, through the forced quest for survival in which people have to travel long distances and live in slums, their family life is also influenced. Family associations come apart, cohabitation is primarily dependent on accommodation possibilities, leading many people to live in small spaces, without being able to choose with whom.

Investigations which only linger over the capitalist center without observing the periphery remain incomplete, even neglecting the most essential. It falls from view how people from the global North profit from the colonization of the South until today. Spivak sheds light on this in her work on the women of the global South, stressing how they are subjected to a double oppression, “through eco-
nomic exploitation as a result of imperialism and a forced subordination as a part
the patriarchal system” (quoted in Castro Varela and Dhawan 2005, 58). This is
tolerated or even sponsored by progressive movements of the global North. toler-
ated and partly even protected. Though Spivak directs her attention in particular
to western feminism, the gay movement is minimally ripe for such critical exami-
nation. Spivak shows that the claim of western feminism to represent all women
fails. If colonial and post-colonial conditions are not questioned, the emanci-
patory struggles benefit exclusively women of the global North. “International
Feminism” is for Spivak primarily a discourse of the North, and its engagement
with the women of the South is often nothing more than a paternalistic mission
in the direction of the “poor” sisters in the “Third World” (Castro Varela and
Dhawan 2005, 59). Apart from paternalistic tutelage, this discourse – often un-
intentionally – reproduces colonial images. Women of the South are constructed
as needy creatures, while the women of the North appeared as liberators, as some-
thing better. Ultimately, such campaigns lead to the self-aggrandizement of the
white women of the North.

In addition, the stereotypes emanating from the colonialization of the South,
widespread through the global North, also mean that women of the South are
being silenced. They are being prevented from effectively arguing their own po-
position. The central example Spivak refers to is the Indian widow’s burning. While
the widows were stylized from local patriarchy as the ‘protectors of tradition,’ they
served the colonizers, and till today the western world, as a proof of the ‘barbar-
ic’ oppression and ‘backwardness’ of India. A distinct struggle of women which
serves neither of the two sides’ interests is not possible in such circumstances –
both are silenced by this ‘predicament’ (see Spivak 2011 [2008]; see Steyerl 2011
[2008], 12).

Women in the South must always already lose when colonialism and the
western construction of the Other for its own self-aggrandizement are not fun-
damentally surmounted. Basically, it seems that only self-organization from those
at the periphery can lead to fundamental changes. For the global North, Spivak
suggests: conscious perception and the unlearning of its own privileged posi-
tion remain the basic conditions for enabling the speaking from an oppressed
position – which will not always reproduce hegemonic stereotypes based on colo-
nial patterns. And yet the possibility of speaking for oneself from an oppressed
position is the basic condition for emancipatory change. There is no possible
representation from a privileged perspective, much less a possible representation
from a subaltern position, for instance, by intellectuals. Much more, representa-
tion always implies a hegemonic position and self-aggrandizement:
The subaltern cannot speak. There is no virtue in global laundry lists with 'woman' as a pious item. Representation has not withered away. The female intellectual has a circumscribed task, which she must not disown with a flourish” (Spivak 2011 [2008], 106).

The Emergence of Gender Relations in Capitalism

In accordance with the historical nature of global capitalism, with its European origin, we now take a look at local changes in life and gender relations. It becomes clear how local and cultural peripheries became dependent of local centers of capitalist economization (the latter by the cultural immiseration of individuals and groups of people) – with negative effects for living conditions.

Feudal Order: The Peasant Family and Skilled Trades

Feudalism “is characterized by the relation of land-owning nobility and landless peasants,” (Fülberth 2008, 91) in which the peasants lived in serfdom. They were tied to the ‘soil’ – the piece of land that they cultivated for the landlords to whom it belonged and which secured their livelihood, which is to say, providing food to some extent, while at the same time holding the right to ‘corporeal punishment’. What distinguished the status of serfdom from slavery was the fact that serfs could not be sold.

From about the year 1000 onwards, peasants were given some other limited possibilities: nobles who owned land east of the Elbe river recruited peasants by securing them to a new legal relationship, cultivating the aristocrats’ land independently against the payment of fees and performing other chores. Such a relationship is named bondage, and not serfdom. The taxes were to be delivered in fixed numbers – peasants were allowed to keep anything which was produced above it. This resulted in an incentive for an increase in productivity; however, the surplus could still be extorted by the aristocrats (cf. ibid., 92).

Some of the peasants west of the Elbe fled and bound themselves to nobles in the east. Through this movement in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, more and more masters in the west were forced to give up the form of serfdom relations in favor of lordship with bounded peasants. But the bondage, too, meant unfreedom, as peasants could only secure their livelihood on the basis of the cultivated land. In addition to the obligation to pay fees to the landlords,
peasants were also obliged to give donations for the clergy and provide other services.

In addition to serfdom and bondage, there were in some regions, for example in Scandinavia, also ‘free’ peasants, who cultivated their own land and paid fees which resemble today’s land-leases. The peasant family is to be classified as a “patriarchal married family” (Tjaden-Steinhauer and Tjaden 2001, 123–130). The Christian religion added an important aspect to the suppression of women. Women were characterized as “the vessel of sin,” while men were only sinful when they surrendered to women (cf. Kuczynski 1963, 14). Whether this categorization had any meaning in the concrete living environment of the ordinary people – the peasants – is almost impossible to answer. Certainly, the peasant family (wife, husband and children) were all involved with work. It was a “production and consumption unit” (Fülberth 2008, 93; cf. Kuczynski 1963, 86f; Haug 2002), in which everyone contributed to the preservation of life. Often only the most miserable nutrition could be secured by the cooperation of all family members, but rarely was there also a small prosperity among the peasants (cf. Kuczynski 1963, 8f; Braudel, 1986a, 274–283). Eventually, many poor villages and regions were forced to accept “a higher birth rate and a lower marriage age” as they wished to produce a “relatively large numbers of workers” (Braudel 1986a, 272).

These “production and consumption units”, did not receive a ‘wage’ or anything comparable. Rather, they were given the bare minimum for survival (serfdom) or had to pay fixed or proportional fees (bondage and ‘free’ peasants), provided by the peasant family as a whole. Respectively, women were not neglected according to the severity of the work. As the social historian Jürgen Kuczynski writes:

“In the time of early feudalism, when there were hardly any cities and craft was essentially still directly tied to agriculture, the vast majority of women who supplied their labor power were maids, who were bound to some degree. The activity of such maidservants was extremely diverse ... ’Beginning with sheep-herding and the dressing of flax, they had to help with the laundry. They were also used in the cultivation of the fields and all other rough work, such as milling the crops, heating the furnace, washing, and were also used in the barn ... ’ We find women at the plow as well as at the hay harvest or at milking. In fact, there was hardly any agricultural work in this early period, however hard it may be, which women were not used for” (Kuczynski 1963, 7f).

Also in cities which were increasingly developing since the 11th century, women were given numerous possibilities, including crafts. Up to the 15th century, women
had the right to be a member of guilds – only in a few associations were there restrictions on women, or even their exclusion (see Books 1910, 14–23; Shoemaker 1927; Kuczynski 1963, 9ff). Women could thus act as foremen; more frequently, however, they were maids, whether they were bound or free. Bound maids received only food and clothing, while ‘free’ servants received a small payment (Kuczynski 1963, 11). And with this payment arises for the masters a “retrenchment potential” – according to the few available sources from the fifteenth century, women were paid clearly less than men (cf. ibid., 12f).

After 1500 CE, the position of women changed greatly. More and more artisans were active in the cities, leading to overproduction. Thus, hindering the entry of newcomers to the guilds and limiting the passing down of craft from father to son were sought. Regulations, which coupled commercial activity with an obligation to engage in military service (of which women were excluded), had not previously detrimentally affected women in the guilds. Now, with reference to the non-possible military service, women were excluded from the trades. That concerned even tailoring, which now clearly defined what women could do and what was to be reserved for the male tailor (cf. ibid., 13f).

Theoretical Reflection: From Communal Family Work to the Development of Decoupled ‘Gainful Employment’

Even if in the feudal social order patriarchal discrimination of women manifested, mainly founded on the Christian religion, it still did not mean a clear distribution of activities between women and men in peasant families. The fees which were to be given to the masters and the clergy never concerned “the individual peasants” (ibid., 86ff), but rather referred to the piece of cultivated land managed by the whole family and which secured the diet and the overall maintenance of life. This situation in the feudal order resulted in the rare or hardly-existing possibility of different compensation for men and women. Under these conditions ‘gainful employment’ could be not be detached from ‘domestic work’. Rather, it is to assume a familial economy or a household economy, “whereby under household economy we should understand the agricultural work on the farm as much as the spinning and weaving at home, in addition to cooking, children rearing, etc. ... In the countryside it was a matter of course that man and woman worked together. They married and had children, making work on the farm a prerequisite. Exactly the same applies to marriage in the case of craftsmen who become the master” (ibid., 87).

When peasants were temporarily forced to go to work in the cities for wages,
this meant only in supplement to the land and to the family, and was by no means enough from which to survive (ibid., 88). Changes came first with the formation of manufactories (small factories), which were guided by profit-making and needed many workers. The first victims of the manufactories were the poorest in the society – the vagabonds, feudally bound women and men, and poor journeymen. The poor were forced to work in the manufactories.

“Many manufactories were swiftly populated as penal institutions for the sake of convenience and especially built by arrested beggars who were sentenced to forced labor ... In prison, lunatics, beggars, the feeble-minded, thieves, adulterers, child murderesses, children in need of education, and unruly servants had to work together for the employer – spinning wool, reeling silk, and dyeing and scraping pigmented trees” (ibid., 22f; see also ibid., 35f).

Similar compulsory institutions were the poor houses. Edmund White describes this in his biography of the French writer Jean Genet, who researched the living reality of such institutions for his novel *Querelle*, institutions which existed since the late medieval period, and their importance for the functioning of production – the aspiring great power of France forced strays and vagabonds at that time also as galley slaves onto ships. Genet sketched in *Querelle* the relevance of these conditions for the sexual relations between the male prisoners (see White 1993, 205ff). Such institutions were lucrative and coveted, as seen also in the high ‘redemption payments’. In 1723, the King of Prussia gave an edict, which forced all poor women who “were not fully utilized” – so, mainly beggars – to spin and deliver a weekly pound of wool for free (Kuczynski 1963, 23f). Kuczynski writes: “Compulsion and terror, terror and compulsion – that is the way of the woman from the street to the manufactory” (ibid., 24) – and of the capitalist order.

This finding is interesting in two ways. On the one hand, it is often overlooked in current scholarship that the constituent moments of the bourgeois-capitalist order are strongly shaped by violence (see MEW 23, 743). Thus it was not created by ‘incentives’ around ‘free wage workers,’ as some suggest today. Even today, compulsion is on the agenda at the global scale and even in the capitalist center – think on, for example, the obligation to work according to the Hartz legislation\(^2\) or the conditions in so-called handicapped workshops. On the oth-

\(^2\) Translator’s note (CS): Voß here is referring to the social welfare reforms of 2002, which, like similar welfare-to-work reforms in the USA and UK, made benefit reception contingent on onerous participation in federally mandated labor programs and intrusive caseworker oversight.
er hand, manufactories and later technologically-advanced factories established themselves in the areas that from time immemorial are seen by privileged circles to belong to the “female spheres of activity”, like basketry. The starting points of ‘industrialization’ were indeed the technical innovations in the weaving industry, which increased production output to such an extent that everything was undertaken to design the spinning mill more productively, initially by compulsion to work in this area (there were also soldiers who were compelled to spin, and spinning was also expected from their families), and eventually here also via technical innovations in the second half of the eighteenth century. In this sense both the manufactory as well as the factory were shaped at the beginning especially by women’s labor (see Haff 2002).

Spinning is also interesting for our subject in a different way: the scarcity of spinners finally led to an increase in the scope of influence of the free people working in this sector – that of those who were not held in compulsory institutions. They could improve their working conditions by leaving a manufactory with the worst working conditions, knowing they were probably able to find employment in a different place. The pay in this now ‘free wage labor’ became compatible. However, also here field restrictions were enacted at once by the rulers – keyword: coercion – which limited the free assessment of wages and the possibilities of workers to change between the manufactories (see Kuczynski 1963, 28ff).

These conditions were also found in the manufactories of other sectors of the economy, such as the porcelain manufactory and the so-called ‘putting-out system’ (in the latter, textiles and other commodities were produced by work-from-home and then centrally distributed by a central agent; the agent provided money or raw materials in advance, and the homeworkers were thus bound). In the manufactories there already appeared a significant difference between women and men. Women usually earned only a fraction of the men’s wages, often about 30 to 40 percent of it. Thus here began the distinction between sexes in a new, capitalistic way, to be inscribed into the living conditions of the poor (see Haug 2002; Weiss 2010).

In the initial guiding principle, that the working women and men who mainly cultivated a small patch of land now only obtained additional earnings through this wage labor, two competing ideas later prevailed amongst the privileged: 1) On the one hand, there was the patriarchal perspective that the man, unlike the women, has a family to feed, and this resulted in a difference in wages. This viewpoint could be used to establish a higher level ‘family wage’ for the men, but a small one as ‘additional earnings’ for the women (see ibid.). 2) On the other hand, the labor power of people under capitalism is a commodity for which the
employer has to spend only the absolutely necessary – anything else will diminish profits. According to Karl Marx the ‘value’ of labor power as a commodity is now to be determined, as follows, and, if necessary, is to be stipulated at this low-level by coercion:

“A certain mass of necessities must be consumed by a man to grow up and maintain his life. But the man, like the machine, will wear out, and must be replaced by another man. Besides the mass of necessities required for his own maintenance, he wants another amount of necessities to bring up a certain quota of children that are to replace him on the labor market and to perpetuate the race of laborers ... After what has been said, it will be seen that the value of laboring power is determined by the value of the necessities required to produce, develop, maintain, and perpetuate that laboring power” (MEW 16, 131f).

In addition to the simplest food and accommodation, some other questions arise for some of the workers, like training and qualification – the main point here is, however, that in the second of these competing perspectives, the wage of the labor force should be kept to the bare minimum. As Amin calls it, the “capitalists ... always try to increase the rate of surplus-value,” and thus effect the “relative and absolute pauperization” of the vast majority of humanity (Amin 2012 [2010], 45). If one groups together both perspectives, even from a bourgeois ideal of a ‘family wage’, for the man, is in decline. It proves much more lucrative for the employer to employ all members of the family, so that then four or five people together earn the ‘family wage’, which was previously earned by only a single labor power.

The more capitalism prevailed, the more this development became clear: where the wages were not so low that the entire family in the working class had to contribute for the maintenance of life, they were pressed down by the employers in the end of the eighteenth century and in the course of the nineteenth century (see, among others, Kuczynski 1963, 86ff; Working Group on Youth and Education 2010, 8ff, 34ff).

The downward spiral of wages is, of course, not a ‘natural law’ – especially through social struggles, minimum standards had been negotiated, which meant more than the simple preservation of labor power and its reproduction. Such struggles have been successful in the past – and some of them will be presented below. For the present theoretical reflection, a primary concern is, in what ways equal pay for equal work for women and men can become a reality. In fact, women of the working class consistently worked equally as hard as men. Their lower pay had nothing to do with the actual work done, but rather with the bourgeois arrange-
ment of additional earnings that they had to combine with the children for the man. This was justified in various ways by the rulers: 1) women were denied (initially totally negligible) training and promotion opportunities. They performed in manufactories and factories activities which were classified as preliminary work. 2) Different economic sectors were increasingly categorized either as ‘female’ or as ‘male’. 3) The bourgeois talk about physical and physiological ‘female weakness’ in comparison to a postulated ‘male strength’ was transmitted to the working class and could ‘justify’ the unequal distribution of women and men to the individual economic sectors and their different remuneration (see Voß 2011b).

To this day, wage differences exist between women and men, as well as a different appreciation for sundry social and economic sectors. Following Marx’s assessment of labor power as a commodity, the same wage for activities might be possible if wages are reduced to the absolute minimum degree necessary. Women and men could receive in this way the same low wage. This would only suffice for the preservation of the labor force and their eventually necessary replacement. To force an increase of wages or a provision for old age, workers’ struggles are required. Depending on the strength of the struggle, a better life situation for the workers could be achieved – or, if the ‘fighting capacity’ of the worker is weak, the life situation again will deteriorate to the minimum necessary to maintain and reproduce the labor force (cf. Kuczynski 1963, 98ff). At this point, it should be pointed out that – as Amin explained – wage increases in the global North were achieved through struggles, but ultimately went at the expense of the global South. Through this oppressive situation, created by the North, it was impossible to carry out wage increases.

The Sexual Character of Wage Labor

“Though the family in the Middle Ages was already patriarchally structured and the man-as-house-manager was bestowed legal and social privileges, it was only with the changed conditions of production that the economic and ideological structures which pressured unemployed women into economic and emotional dependence on men were forged. With the separation between the private sphere and non-domestic production, the wife of the bourgeois – excluded from professional and political life – obtained the role of the faithful spouse, housewife, and mother. This disempowerment was idealized, whereupon, in the eighteenth century, the majority of women in Germany could not correspond to these new women’s ideals because they toiled in factories and manufactories” (Opitz [Ayim] 1997 [1986], 25).
With the imposition of the bourgeois-capitalist social order, a ‘wage labor’ emerges, detached to a certain degree from activities of other areas of life (see Wallerstein 1984, 19ff; Haug 2002). Whereas in the manufactories people were either initially forced to work or were feudally bound to a piece of land, in capitalism, free wage labor had imposed itself. This ‘freedom’ of the workers from their land had to be first enforced with violence, as for example, in Scotland, where peasant families were displaced from their small patches of land as the manufactories began to operate. To survive, the ‘free wage workers’ were, and still are, forced to sell the only thing they have: their labor power. For this, they get a wage that is sufficient to preserve themselves and their labor power (historically, and even up-to-now, often under miserable conditions). The employer buys the labor power to initially produce ‘value’, from which he can gain profit. Since most people are forced to offer their labor power, the employer can select the labor power of those who offer him the most affordable terms. The ‘free wage workers’ thus compete with each other – in particular, the demanded salary (in proportion to their recalcitrance and the level of qualification) decides whether they get employment and secure their preservation. Under these circumstances, employers could enforce the worst working conditions, initially and in large without restrictions. Working hours in workhouses and factories of up to 16 hours were often the rule, and only what was necessary for survival was granted. Also in other services, the circumstances were no better than for factory workers. Domestic servants had to be available whenever needed by their lords, that is, 24 hours a day (see, for example, Braun 1979 (1901), 209–431; Youth and Education 2010, 8ff, 34ff).

The free movement of workers between employment sectors could be legally limited by the ruling class – when, as stated above, the demand for spinners outnumbered the amount of available workers. Thus it was ensured that wages remained low. The current restriction of the free movement of workers by national borders has the similar object. While the ruling class can operate globally – guaranteed by free trade agreements, etc. – the free movement of those who are obliged to sell their labor power is curtailed, lest they flee the worst working and living conditions and sell their labor power in other geographic regions.

Further restrictions on freedom of movement between possible services persist in traditional ideals, rooted in age-old family ways of life, making it seem self-evident that man, woman and children live together. Till today, this makes it easier for the boss to enforce lower wages for women and children. After all, their earnings are only supplemental. Furthermore, the free movement of women is limited by this family relationship because they: 1) have to work in the environs of their place of residence, and 2) because of low wages (and through traditional
ideals and laws), they do not have the possibility to escape patriarchal conditions. This has a particularly productive effect for the profit of the employer.

However, these conditions become obstructive for the employer when relatively high wages are achieved through the fighting capacity of the workers and when not all family members have to be employed. This partly happened in the Federal Republic of Germany as the so-called ‘breadwinner model’ asserted itself and the man was allocated to perform the wage labor while the woman was kept unpaid at home to ensure the reproduction of the family and the man’s labor power (see Weiss 2010; Federici 2012). Such a way of life somehow restricts the sale of goods; the reproduction work is done in the families and the direct ‘valuation’ is set aside – to a certain extent the latter is, of course, also productive for the employer, since reproduction work does not enter his calculation of profit and loss as a cost factor (cf. for a good overview of feminist analyses: Haug 2002; Federici 2012).

It becomes clear that under certain social conditions within the prevailing capitalist order, it might appear reasonable to involve all men, women, and possibly even children in wage work. More labor power means more profit for the employer, since any ‘value’ ultimately arises from human activity. More wage workers also mean that: 1) not every person should receive a ‘family wage’, the wage can be negotiated for less, and 2) wage decreases arise as a result of increased competition among the workers for jobs or, rather, for their survival – as argued above, with Karl Marx and Samir Amin, i.e. when the workers pose a diminished fighting capacity – their wages sink to a minimum. Currently we can observe this development in the periphery, and it is in progress even in the capitalist centers, also in the Federal Republic of Germany. This development which tries to incorporate all people in wage work goes hand in hand with social developments which strongly emphasize the individual (see, for example, Kofler 2008 [1985]; Wagenknecht 2005; Sigusch 2005).

In this sense, the question must arise why individualization, especially today, becomes so meaningful, and how this is on the one hand the prerequisite, while on the other hand is also the consequence of the current conditions of capitalist economization. Interesting for our discussion is the following description of the bourgeois-capitalist social order in *The Communist Manifesto* (1848):

“The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society ... Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish
the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their
train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-
formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into
air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses
his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind” (MEW 4, 465).

Individualization, possibly associated with less sexual and gender discrimination,
does not signify a breaking out of capitalist conditions. It is merely a variant of the
conditions in which labor power at a given time can be best exploited. Less dis-
crimination due to certain gender or sexual characteristics may be conducive for
this goal (see, among others, Gültekin 1985, 5f; Wallerstein 1992 [1988], 131ff; Sigusch 2005).

In contrast to gender and sexual discrimination, racial discrimination is more
difficult to resolve because the maintenance of national borders and the obstruc-
tion of the free movement of people are both fundamental for capitalism to
regionally enforce bad and worst working conditions. With open borders peo-
ple could eventually flee to places with better life and working conditions. The
limitation of people’s freedom of movement, as opposed to movements of free
trade and capital flows, is an important condition for higher profit margins for
the employer. To sustain such a system – and thus make workers fear each other
and reckon borders as necessary – racism is a significant and beneficial variable
for the current stage in the development of capitalism. This could change if the
working and living conditions – in particular, wages – could equalize between
different geographic regions. From a strictly capitalist view, people who are not
racially discriminated against seemingly appear to be more productive.

Center and Periphery in Context:
The Over-Exploitation of the Global South

As has already been pointed out, Marxist and queer-feminist analyses of the glob-
al North were up to now in many ways neglectful of how the global North and
the global South are necessarily interwoven within capitalism. At the time it was
possible for the capitalist to gain profit in global trade relations because he was
privileged enough to own a ship and thus was able to obtain scarce goods from
far away territories. This trading system, however, quickly will bring under his
control an ever-increasing amount of labor power that will enable the new invest-
ment of the achieved profit, thus facilitating additional profits.
The appropriation of the labor power of many people did not only take place by forcing people in Europe into workhouses and creating always-larger quantities of goods through productivity increases, but rather especially through the colonialization of the rest of the world (see, among others, Davis 1982 [1981], 7ff; Mamozai 1989 [1982], 43ff, 107ff). This is thus shown conclusively by the ever-larger mechanical and industrial production of goods as productivity increases, entailing a continuously increasing generation of raw materials. Just like the described increase in productivity in the weaving industry meant that the productivity of the spinning mill had to be increased, both were equally dependent on plantations that produced always larger quantities of cotton. This was achieved, on the one hand, through the colonial subjection of ever-broader geographic areas and the appropriation of the labor power of the people, and, on the other hand, the territory of plantations was increasingly extended. The same applies to mines, in which the ores had to be won so as to be processed in increasingly bigger amounts. Currently speaking, the steady increase in the sale of car manufacturers like Volkswagen is self-evidently based on the continual expansion of the exploitation of ore mines through (poorly paid) workers. The success story of European industrialization was therefore bought by the enslavement of a large part of the world’s population, whether through complete deprivation of humans by direct slavery or by their dependent employment and the extortion of the goods they produced (cf. Mamozai 1989 [1982], 43ff). As Marx puts it in Capital, “In fact, the veiled slavery of the wage workers in Europe needed, for its pedestal, slavery pure and simple in the new world” (MEW 23, 246).

Increasing sales figures of products and growth rates of the economy are always based on human labor power and its extensive exploitation. What Hito Steyerl vividly describes for contemporary relations applies to the global South as a whole – from the beginning of colonialization by the global North. Its factories are in particular “in the mines” and “in the fields” (Steyerl 2011 [2008], 9f). Regionally successful labor struggles have only brought forth profit increases in the interests of capitalists as not only the production of raw materials but also their factory processing was shifted to the global South (see Gültekin 1985; Ngai 2010; Ngai 2013). On the other hand, in the global North, greater orientation toward the service economy opened up other profit opportunities, which are being accompanied with lifestyles less ‘factory’ oriented.

A regional change in capitalist conditions with a greater orientation toward services, flexibility, individualization, and the stronger emphasis on creativity, leading to new techniques, printed books, cultural goods, etc. (see Wagenknecht 2005), always happen within the capitalist system on the basis that, elsewhere,
labor power is more thoroughly factory-like in organization and exploited (see Steyerl 2011 [2008], 9f; Ngai 2010; Ngai 2013). That, too, can be ‘individuated’ and by no means strictly occurs in fixed family circumstances (so many migrant workers do not live in ‘traditional family structures’), but it does mean ever-increasing exploitation of labor power and a stronger commitment of people to their labor power – and only this.

With all of this background, analysis and criticism must always be international. By now, discussions about wage discrimination of white women in the global North and the marginal pay and social disregard for female reproductive work have spread widely in white leftist and emancipatory circles (for an overview, see Federici 2012; Haug 2002; Weiss 2010). What comes more hesitantly into view is how black people and people of color in the global North are more extremely exploited through racist structures both in terms of labor and reproductive work. But it would be highly problematic to forget the global context: most of the reproductive labor for the labor force in the global North is done by people in the global South under miserable conditions and poor wages, producing raw materials, raw products and finished products.

Without, for example, the production of soy for meat or tofu schnitzels, without rice, corn, tomatoes, fruits and spices, without mined ore for the components of technical devices for evening-use such as TVs, dishwashers, computers, or the phone for tender or hasty communication, without toys, video game consoles or textiles, without the produced raw materials for electricity, and so forth, the reproductive labor of the global North would not have taken place the way it did. Only through the extreme exploitation of the global South does the current way of life in the global North succeed (see Gültekin, 1985). For if we share Amin’s assessment, “one sole value of labor power on the scale of globalized capitalism,” (Amin 2012 [2010], 85) then the relative prosperity, also of workers, in the global North (with their relative poverty in comparison with northern capitalists) is achieved through wage inequality and poorer wages and living conditions for the workers in the global South. Were the same wage per working hour paid in the South just as in the North (let’s say, for example, at 10€ per hour), the consequence would be an incredible impoverishment of the workers in the North, but they would no longer profit from the extreme exploitation of the labor power of the people of the South.

It is worth noting that in this historical review, we encounter time and again the importance of textiles – the importance of weaving, spinning and cotton production. This indicates that the basis of production of surplus value has not changed so fundamentally as it appears to some in the capitalist center. Rather,
it is still the raw production – the production of cotton, the cultivation of food, the extraction of ores and the production of building materials and carriers of energy – which is the indispensable basis of capitalist accumulation and at the same time the area in which the lowest wages and the worst living conditions obtain.

Successful struggles in the global North should then always happen in reference to the periphery – improvements in living conditions must be reckoned internationally. And, last but not least, the international perspective makes it clear that capitalism does not function in a just manner, that it always lives off the impoverishment within which the mass of people has to live. Acceptance and ‘trivialization’ of a ‘social market economy’ or a ‘green capitalism’ forget these global connections and the essence of capitalism, to steadily achieve more and more profit. Amin’s finding that labor force has the same value worldwide, that an unequal remuneration constitutes a massive racist discrimination, clearly brings into view that capitalism must be overcome effectively and globally, “for it is from that point onward that Marxism becomes subversive” (Amin 2012 [2010], 45).

Cultural Colonization – Gender and Sexuality in Focus

Colonialism means subjugation and plundering of vast parts of Asia, Africa and the Americas by Europe. Many millions of people were abducted by European colonial powers from Africa especially to the Americas, and there – enslaved – were forced to work especially on plantations and in households. This happened with no consideration for people’s lives: already with the kidnapping into slavery and during the marches to the shores, 30 to 50 percent of the abducted people died, and during the slave transports another 30 to 50 percent of the remaining died. The rest were forced to work under miserable conditions with a poor diet. They were often punished drastically or even ferociously murdered for the slightest disobedience (see Brentjes 1963, 209ff; Mamozai 1989 [1982], 43–58, 119–124; Davis 1982 [1981], 14, 23f).

In the Federal Republic of Germany, it is common to underestimate Germany’s past and current role in the colonialization of the world (see Mamozai 1989 [1982]; Oguntoye et al. 1997 [1986]; Ha 2012 [2003], 57–63). German merchants and princes had already taken part in European colonial enterprises since the 16th century – among others, in 1528 German merchants sailed to India and Venezuela to become “the House Colony of the merchant and banking
house Welser” (Mamozai 1989 [1982], 11ff). Elector Friedrich Wilhelm von Brandenburg commanded the building of the Fortress Groß-Friedrichsburg in 1683 on the African ‘Gold Coast,’ “as the outpost of German colonial power” (ibid., 12).

No later than the 17th century, German merchants and princes were also involved in the slave trade (Walgenbach 2009 [2005], 378f; Mamozai 1989 [1982], 12ff). Finally, in 1871, when Germany achieved political unification, it procured itself colonies in Africa, Oceania and China. The living and working conditions were terrible – reports from the countries subjected to German rule in the beginning of the twentieth century are as following:

“The working conditions for the colonialized people were almost everywhere miserable: poor diet, inadequate health and medical care, corporal punishment and abuse, twelve-hour and longer working days, the lowest wages, all marked this system of exploitation ... In the protocols of the Board of the West-African Merchants Consortium from 1913 comes the following statement from the merchant Victor, noted on the occasion of his visit to Cameroon: ‘I cannot give any exact figures about mortality ... While I was in Cameroon last year, it was said that on the Tiko plantation, 50 or 75 percent of the workers had died in six months’” (Mamozai 1989, 1982).

German industry in particular profited from the exploitation of the workers in the parts of the world colonized by Germany and Europe for the production of raw materials, which were then used for manufacturing and industrial production. Among other things the German spinning and weaving industries demanded cotton in ever larger amounts. The main concern for the German colonialists was the functionalization of people into labor power. For the colonists, the ‘worker’s question’ was “how to physically subdue the workers, and to control their number, which was always too low because of resistance, high death rates and women’s refusal to give birth” (Mamozai 1989 [1982], 52). President of the Reich Paul von Hindenburg made clear even still in 1932 this connection between colonized regions and German industry: “Without colonies there is no security in terms of raw materials, without raw materials there is no industry, without industry no sufficient prosperity. That is why Germans must have colonies” (quoted in Mamozai 1989 [1982], 27; see also Opitz [Ayim] 1997 [1986], 29ff; Ha 2012 [2003], 68f, 72–81).

But German industry’s profiting is far from the only aspect of German participation in colonialism and its effects today. German science ‘explored’ the
colonies – and is central in the formulation of ‘exotic’ travel literature and the development of the racist distinctions between human beings (see, among others, Mamozai 1989 [1982], 60ff, 258ff; Walgenbach 2009 [2005], 378f). German natural scientist Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752–1840) was the first to propose a division of people into ‘races’. Later, this distinction became further entrenched, as people were murdered for scientific investigations, their skulls transported to Germany to be surveyed. Just in the Charité Berlin, 7000 skulls from such racist research remain stored. Only in autumn 2011 were the first skulls returned to Namibia (see Küpper 2011; Becker 2011). In the uprisings of the Herero and Nama in German South West Africa – today’s Namibia – 100,000 people were murdered.

Excursion 4: Genocide against the Herero and Nama – Excerpt from the Testimony of Manuel Timbu

“On our way back we stopped in Hamakari. There, near a hut, we saw an old Herero woman of about fifty, sixty, who was digging in the earth for wild onions. Von Trotha and his people were present. A soldier named König jumped from his horse and shot the woman in the middle of the forehead. Before he shot her, he said: ‘I will kill you’. She looked up and said: ‘thank you’. That night we slept in Hamakari. The next day we moved on and came across another woman, about thirty years old. She was also busy digging wild onions and did not acknowledge our presence. A soldier named Schilling approached her and shot her in the back. I was an eyewitness of everything I hereby report. In addition, I saw the bleeding bodies of hundreds of men, women and children who were lying along the road as we passed. They had all been killed by our vanguard. I was almost two years with the German troops and always with General von Trotha. I know of no case in which a prisoner was left alive” (Mamozai 1989 [1982], 121).

The description of physical and physiological differences between people is central to the racist subjugation of black people by white Europeans and white Germans. The people of colonized regions were described as ‘wild’ and ‘barbaric’, and here in particular gender and sexual stereotypes were constructed. Colonial scientific literature attributed to the colonized a lesser markedness of binary gender differences, a greater ‘feminization’ in particular of the men of the Orient (but also Jewish males in Europe), and a greater inclination to same-sex sexual contact.
In another context, they were constructed by colonial literature as ‘aggressive’, ‘promiscuous’ and ‘hyper-masculine’; black men were identified by whites as potential rapists and a threat for white women (compare with Said 2003 [1978]; Davis 1982 [1981], 88f, 165ff; El-Tayeb 2012 [2003], 130f; Castro Varela and Dhawan 2005b, 48f; AG Gender Killer 2005; Petzen 2011 [2005]).

Today racist attributions often take place more subtly. ‘Exotic’ is currently one of the central racist terms. Frequently found in travelogues, its use is to present geographic regions and their people as ‘other’ to be ‘discovered’ and ‘explored’ (Gleissner-Bonetti 2012). The stereotypes remain the same. Whites keep on attributing to black men either ‘hyper-masculinity’ or ‘feminization’ (see, among others, El-Tayeb 2012 [2003], 130f; Killer 2005; Petzen 2011 [2005]); white people – and now also explicitly white lesbians and gays (cf. Haritaworn, 2005; Petzen 2011 [2005]; Haritaworn, 2009; Yılmaz-Günay [ed.] 2011b) – present themselves as the ‘saviors’ of the ‘poor people’ of the global South who need to be rescued from ‘barbarism,’ protecting in particular black women and queers of color from black men. Therewith they carry forth the hegemonic narrative of colonialism. In the year 1990, the black German journalist and author Sheila Mysorekar retaliated against these aspirations:

“White feminists have made it unmistakably clear via experience – that is, black experience – with whom they primarily show solidarity: with white women, of course. “After all, we are all victims of sexism”. That’s right. No black feminist will dispute this fact. On the other hand, we are attacking what is behind this argument: the hierarchization of oppression. Black women are equally discriminated by sexism and racism. No repression is less worse than the other! ... Before I can unconditionally fight with white women against sexism, I demand them to face up to their racism. Otherwise, any solidarity remains superficial and questionable. This is also the case for cooperation with black men in the fight against racism. No black man can expect the solidarity of black women if he is not ready to fight his own sexism. This dispute must, however, be carried out by black people themselves – in this case among black Germans or foreigners in the Federal Republic of Germany. In this process support and exchange of experience are vital. But what we do not need are feminist surrogate mothers” (Mysorekar 1990, 22, emphasis in the original).

The activist, social scientist and philosopher Angela Davis shows in Women, Race & Class how the colonial narrative works. The situation of black women and men in society did not change after the emancipation of slaves in the US –
black people still had the worst jobs, particularly in agriculture and as domestic workers. Sexual abuse at the hands of the estate patriarch remained an ongoing threat for female domestic workers. In courts, their testimonies on sexual abuse were not believed to be true. Simultaneously and on the basis of these sexual assaults by white men, the myth of ‘amorality’ and ‘promiscuity’ of black women was established. These stereotypes were set against degrading service work in the white narrative: “Any white man of ‘decency’ would certainly cut his daughter’s throat before he permitted her to accept domestic employment” (Davis 1982 [1981], 89). The blame for sexual assaults and rape by white men was given to female domestic workers and, in turn, a warning was made to white women not to be active in such employment.

The power exercised in the US by whites against black men functioned similarly – and this also after the end of slavery. It required just one white woman to accuse a black man of rape, and he was de facto guilty, the verdict by the white court was only a formality – this if he was not already lynched by white men. The statements of black women and men were not believed in court. The literary scientist and feminist activist Tobe Levin, who teaches at universities in the US and at the university of Frankfurt am Main, researched how white women used this power over black men:

“The entire black community was terrorized in the name of the white woman. The one who supposedly raped a white woman was lynched ... With verbal accusations, every white woman could exercise power over the black group. The fact that in the overwhelming majority of lynching murders, no rape had actually happened, is known by the work of activists such as Ida B. Wells-Barnett” (Levin 1990, 62, emphasis in the original).

Apart from how white people inflicted lynchings, executions and long prison terms on black men and permanently justified the repression of black men and women based on sexual attributions after the end of slavery, the effects of this reach to this day. The white stereotypes of the ‘promiscuous black woman’ and the ‘hyper-masculine’ and ‘menacing black man’ persist and thus prevent or at least hamper anti-racist and anti-sexist struggles with white participants.

The Arabist Thomas Bauer explains European colonizers’ gender-sexual attributions of Arabia, explicitly specifying sexual conduct between men. The ‘world travelers’ from the West were apparently appalled by the interactions of Arab men among themselves. The naturalist and former engineer in the French military navy Charles Sonnini reported: “Love against nature ... constitutes the
pleasure, or said better, the infamy of the Egyptians ... To the disgrace of civilized nations, such degeneration is not foreign to them at all and is widespread in Egypt. The rich are as equally infected as the poor" (cf. Klauda 2008, 17f). The white gaze was shaped by such reports. Men in Arab countries were attributed by white men with ‘moral corruption’ and also ‘feminization’. At the same time, these views were also accepted by Arab scholars, and the Arab history appeared to them just as corrupted. Bauer says: “The European discourse of the Orient as stagnant, backward and decadent, which was to legitimize the European imperialist ventures, was eventually heard and received in the Middle East” (Bauer 2011, 305).

While Davis and Levin analyze the situation based on materials from the US and Bauer looks at the French and English colonizing gaze for the Arab lands, Martha Mamozaï (1989 [1982]) and Katharina Walgenbach (2005) have researched in detail how the German colonialists inscribed stereotypical attributions to the colonized. Also big parts of the bourgeois women’s movement – consisting of white women – saw their mission in supporting the ‘civilization’ of people in the colonies; even parts of the Social Democratic Party viewed colonies and the subjugation of the people living there as important for the German Reich, also with stereotypical attributions. Looking at the founding of the women’s union, Lotte Hoppe retrospectively explained: “The time to found the federation was favorably chosen. The German woman is raised today under the compulsion of time and circumstances for public life, such that she cannot stand by any longer when it concerns such things of great value to our people, such as the colonies” (quoted in Walgenbach 2005, 143; compare Mamozaï 1989 [1982], 135–157; Dietrich 2009 [2005]; Hoffrogge 2011, 167–180).

Gender and sexuality play important roles in the European justification for colonialization and the construction of black people and of people of color as ‘others’ compared to the white European colonizers. It is interesting to also take a look at the current descriptions with which military invasions are justified and with which people of color in the global North are being stigmatized. The political scientist Krista Hunt titled this renewed commitment of feminism to the enforcement of imperialist claims of power, analogously to the designation of the military-dependent journalist, as “embedded feminism” (Hunt 2006, 53; see also Engels and Gayer 2011, 18, 29). But at the beginning of the 21st century, it is no longer merely the “figure of the subaltern woman who needs to be emancipated” which is used to justify military interventions, rather “gays and lesbians are now stumbling more into imperial liberation rhetoric on the right as the left of the political spectrum” (Brunner 2011, 51; see in detail Puar 2008 [2007]; Harita-
worn et al. 2011 [2006]). Even such right-wing politicians who act against the dismantling of homosexual discrimination and the equality of women in working life use the arguments of gay, lesbian and women’s liberation (cf. Yılmaz-Günay 2012). However, it strikes us as even more problematic that left-wing people support and advocate the “imperial liberation rhetoric” so massively.

The colonialist attributions still work today. Black and people of color are depreciated as ‘the others’ and marked as ‘uncivilized,’ while in the west, white men/gays and women/lesbians exalt themselves by the vilification of ‘the others’. Only through this differentiation do the whites appear to themselves as ‘civilized’ – as a secondary effect, sexist discrimination and violence by whites and the west are whitewashed. The ‘other’ is constructed as menacing and, in the same breath, fetishized as desirable: “At the same time that the migrant is scolded for being pre-modern and unable to integrate, his supposed violent nature is fetishized in the mainstream German gay community as sexually irresistible. The colonialist imagination of the untamable primitive is despised in view of integration, but coveted as a sex partner; by no means should ‘southerners’ be civilized in the bedroom” (Petzen 2011 [2005], 40).

**The Invention of (Homo-)Sexuality – and the Governing of People**

Sexual acts between people in Europe were being homogenized and became objects of government – increasingly so with European modernity and the establishing of capitalist relations.

The problematizing of sexual acts had already occurred with the assertion of Christianity. The Christian point of view presents the sexual act between woman and man as problematic, that it should only be executed if it directly serves reproduction. Even then, pleasure must not be felt. Sexual acts which do not serve reproduction were stigmatized and prosecuted in church law as ‘sodomy’. These included same-sex sexual acts, anal intercourse with the same- and the opposite sex and ‘fornication’ with animals. The problematizing of sexual acts in Christianity was accompanied with persistent speech about sexual activity. Central to this speech is the confession, which not only calls for the confession of pleasure in order to be emancipated from it, but also requires that sexual activities would be reported in detail. This assessment constitutes the starting point of Michel Foucault’s studies on sexuality (Foucault 1983 [1976]; Klauda 2008, 11, 82ff).

With confession and the problematizing of sexual acts, the Church estab-
lished one of the central control and governmental practices, albeit with limited effectivity (Klauda 2008, 72). At the same time, the church ensured both the cohabitation of man, woman and children and sexual activity between woman and man to be considered as a matter of course. This was new in that respect, because in Greek and Roman antiquity same-sex sexual activity between people was not problematized. With the Christian coercion of confession, the ascertained passion (inclination) during the concrete act, and – in the case of ‘sodomy’ – the act itself became the content of the confession. On the other hand, it did not lead to a narrative style that a man, who once acted as a sodomite, now would always have to act as one. No regularity and no clear identity derived from such activities, and people were not defined by them. Also, the effects of the confession remained limited; numerous people confessed their “sins” only on their “death bed” (cf. Klauda 2008, 72).

Persecution on account of sodomy reached a greater magnitude at the end of the Middle Ages and in the early modern times, and it was only then that severe penalties or even the death penalty were increasingly enforced. But sodomy remained even then a broadly defined factual situation, which more likely defined a variety of activities than one clear term: “Masturbation, coitus with animals, thigh or anal intercourse with persons of both sexes, and, more rarely, also sexual vices between women” were considered as sodomy (Klauda 2008, 72). The church descriptions of sodomy were so abominable that many people just could not relate their life reality to it. Friendships, however, even very close and intimate ones, appeared as legitimate. Klauda writes with regard to intimacy between men:

“At the same time the figure of the sodomite in the Christian rhetoric gave out so monstrously, it became abstract to the lived environment like werewolves and witches. Friends could thus kiss, exchange affections, and make each other as ‘bed companions’, without raising even the least suspicion” (Klauda 2008, 79).

Only with the beginning of the 18th century did this change fundamentally. Intense debates about masturbation began, and it was described as dangerous and as a vice. At the same time – for example, in London – societies were formed that explicitly declared war against the ‘vice’ of ‘sodomy’ and denounced thousands of people (cf. Klauda 2008, 82ff). It came to a wave of persecution to an extent hitherto unknown. Finally, in an increasingly medical discourse on same-sex sexual activity, especially among men, the signs with which anal intercourse could be clearly detected were discussed. The initially rather fuzzy offence which was
sodomy became ever-more disambiguated (see Voß 2013). Connected with this increasing problematizing, now even acts of close friendship were put under suspicion. Physical intimacy and affection between men were regarded as suspicious (this was less so for contact among women, because modern discourses largely denied the capacity of women for active sexual activity). In the mid-19th century, terms were finally coined that conceived ‘homosexuality’ in the sense of today’s use, that is, as a clearly outlined constituent of behavior – and, with particular importance for the German Reich and Austria-Hungary – it was defined as a criminal offense (see Klauda 2008, 82ff; Voß 2013).

It is striking that with the advent of the rigid identities ‘homosexuality,’ (and ‘heterosexuality’) an “unprecedented tightening of behaviors” follows, “which is now at the same time constructed and perceived as the expression of a deviant sexual identity” (Klauda 2008, 13). There is a surprising parallel between this tightening in the sexual arena and in the areas of activity of the people. While on the agricultural farm under the feudal order, all members of the family were included in all the different chores, with the transition to the workhouse and the factory, people were increasingly restricted to an activity that was more clearly defined and separated from other activities. The (increasingly uniformed) wage labor occupied almost the whole day; reproductive work was torn out and ensconced into another, non-remunerated domain. This results in a clearly identified division of the domains of daily life, wage labor here, and the remaining activities, including human intimacy, over there (see, for example, Haug 2002; also Opitz [Ayim] 1997 [1986], 24ff).

It is also striking how bourgeois discourses of ‘vice’ and ‘degeneration’ of the 19th century were established as motives of the working population in the factories and mines. The privileged deemed ‘degeneration’ a threat among the miners, for example, which is why the sexes had to be separated from each other, and why women were not allowed to work downhole. Even those who were denouncing the bad working conditions of the proletariat referred to the ‘degenerating’ effects of the former (among others, MEW 2, 464f; Bebel 1950 [1879], 188–196; see also Kuczynski 1963, 112ff). These problematizations provide an indication of how significant discussions about meaningful human proximity and sexual activity were and how clearly they were linked to the reduction of people to workers. In the workhouse and the factory activities were functionalized and even breaks and visits to the toilet were narrowly restricted. Everything which interrupts ceaseless work was to be prohibited. This also applied to sexual acts, for which bourgeois fantasies about the possible behavior of the workers were central.
In the colonized zones, human proximity and sexual activity entered the limelight as goals of colonial rule: already for the time since the 16th century that European colonizers penalized same-sex sexual activities as ‘sodomy’ with executions have been verified. This happened regionally with different consistency (Beemyn 2007 [2006]; Wallace 2007 [2006], 250f). Laws and regulations against same-sex sexual activities mostly date back to the European colonizers, and they were ultimately nationally organized by the European colonial powers and their decrees. Since that time, and intensified since the nineteenth century, the colonizers affirmed their own supposed ‘civilized’ behavior and superiority by demarcating themselves against same-sex sexual acts and the other expressions of human intimacy of their colonial subjects (Walther 2008; Schmidt, 2008).

For the colonizers, the exploitation of labor power was central, whether with enslavement, forced labor, or partially also with ‘free’ wage labor (to the smallest wages which were hardly sufficient for the preservation of life). Even more ruthless than in Europe, it was always about the “unconditional submission,” about “discipline, work performance” and also about the “recognition of a ‘German’ superiority and domination” (Mamozai 1989 [1982], 52). In the process, gender and family relationships were destroyed and replaced by the ideas of the European bourgeoisie: unless enslaved and exploited under direct compulsion, ‘free’ wage laborers were ‘generated’ by expulsion from their lands. As migrant labor spread, women received – if at all – lower wages than men; traditional labor division on the farms became women’s work through the absence of men; separation of wage labor and reproductive labor was carried out, etc. (Mamozai 1989 [1982], 108, 113ff; Joseph 1993, 78f). The “migrant workforce which became common and the houses which were separated by sex in the wake of this work” entailed new ways of life and also “new forms of same-sex relationships” (Wallace 2007 [2006], 260). In the mines or on the plantations, other negotiations for same-sex sexual activities were necessary than those before. These were by no means completely suppressed, but partly channeled by “rules”, in order to ensure “the proper functioning of the work processes” (ibid.).

Particular attention was paid by the German colonizers to reproduction, in order to provide sufficient workforce. Death rates were high (people were heavily mistreated or even killed for resistance by the white colonizers), and suicides piled up. Resistance against the colonizers was omnipresent and the ‘birth strike’ of the oppressed women proved to be especially effective. “With their decision not to give birth to slaves for the colonial power, the women apparently struck the central nerve of the colonists, who were desperately looking for ‘usable working material’” – and they were finally even offered incentives (Mamozai 1989 [1982],
52f; see also: Davis 1982) [1981], 11f). Although the demand for labor did not lead the German colonialists to reduce or even completely refrain from torture and executions of the exploited people, reproduction became a central field of intervention. There was compulsion and incentive; no less significant, however, were the changes of family relations with increasingly separate areas of activities in the life of women and men.

With the enforcement of migrant labor, forced labor and ‘free’ wage labor, family relations and lifestyles also changed. The revaluation of wage labor which was designated as masculine also meant the devaluation of and dependency of women, analogous to the European model. Simultaneously, people had to reach human intimacy otherwise – individually and far from familial structures (cf. Mamozai 1989 [1982], 113ff).

In Europe the functionalization of human beings, connected with increasing urbanization and the division of spheres of life, also showed its effects on same- sex sexual desire. Concrete living conditions go hand in hand with the interest of people who desire same-sex activities to meet at certain defined locations. ‘Free wage labor,’ an allocation and functionalization of the spheres of living and urbanization are accompanied with identitarian self-positioning. As with the passage into the workhouse and the factory, restrictive coercion and violence are only one side of the coin, even if at first they clearly outweigh. But on the one hand, people learn to behave in such a way that they are not exposed to sanctions. On the other hand, living conditions provide the framework for possible behavior.

Taken together and argued with Antonio Gramsci and Michel Foucault, it is not only about restrictive governing by compulsion, but by new forms of governmentality, especially constructed around technologies of the self. With capitalist relations, an interest for a sufficient stock of labor power rose also in Europe and – with the emerging national states – was reinforced by the interest for a population as large as possible in each country.

The reproduction of human beings, and since the end of the 19th century, also some physical and physiological characteristics – men of the proletariat should be particularly suitable for the military – increasingly became targets of government. Intimacy, friendship and sexual acts among men became militarily-sanctioned, and obedience was enforced (cf. Buchterkirchen 2011, 13–21). With the term population politics, following Foucault, the determination of people to wage labor, reproduction and national (especially military) interests is, by now, an important component of sociological and political science analyses (see Foucault 1977 [1975]; Foucault 1983 [1976]; Lemke 2007).
Disciplining, Taming, Extinction – The Role of Biology and Medicine

Against the background of the functionalization of people to labor power, a glance at biology and medicine is indispensable. These sciences are the authorities with which, in the bourgeois-capitalist society, the position of people and their social possibilities were and are determined. These disciplines were central to the racist and classist classification of people. Bourgeois scientists pointed out that people of color and people of the working class differ in their physical characteristics and intellectual abilities from white bourgeois women and men, lagging socially behind them. Their governing and exclusion from political participation and the enslavement of people of color in colonized regions were legitimized on the basis of biological and medical attributions (see Gould 1983 [1981]; AG Gender Killer 2005; AG against Racism 2009).

The ideal of the sciences was the white bourgeois man. Even the privileged bourgeois white woman was conceptualized as inferior to him, and her position, her social participation and her field of activities were circumscribed. Bourgeois women were (initially) thus generally excluded from the production of knowledge (see, for example, Honegger 1991; Schmersahl 1998; Voß 2010) – for people of the working class and for people from colonialized regions, exclusion ensued on the grounds of poverty or skin color.

Biology and medicine played central roles also concerning the problematization of sexual acts and the ‘invention’ of sexual identities. On the basis of these disciplines non-reproductive and especially same-sex sexual acts were problematized; even the corresponding desire gave rise to yet more and more detailed investigation and precautions. The interest of researchers in biology and medicine was aimed at clearly identifying and classifying sexual acts. People were ascribed with a personality structure only on the basis of one same-sex sexual act or the desire for it. The scientists argued about the ‘inherent’ or ‘acquired’ character of such desire and possible precautions. Eventually, numerous biologists and medical professionals speculated since the beginning of the discourse of homosexuality about how ‘homosexuality’ could be ‘prevented’ or the ‘affected’ people could be ‘cured’ or re-educated (see Voß 2013).

But naming and identifying affected not just the ambiguous sexual acts that were then put in clearly separable identities. Rather, a variety of features were concerned, which were not considered to be the norm. People were declared insane, ‘depression’, ‘hysteria’ and other ‘diseases’ now determined certain characteristics of people who strayed (too far) from the ideal of the white bourgeois
man (and the white bourgeois woman). This was significant for sex in relation to its ambiguity. If previously – for example, in the medieval Europe – people who recognizably combined female and male sexual characteristics were perceived as individual phenomena, of which the population and the different authorities were not particularly surprised (cf. Rolker 2013), the scientists of modern biology and medicine strove to classify their characteristics precisely, to discredit them as ‘deviations’ and ‘disturbances’ and to research the causes of their emergence. Here, too, scientists (later understood to include women scientists) pursued and continue to pursue the objective of extinction.

Understanding the processes of development should have allowed the manifestation of only sexual characteristics which corresponded to the bourgeois norm. Only ‘typical female’ or ‘typical male’ development was desired, and what did not correspond to the norm was to be terminated. The people who were born with non-normative genitals should be and are till today corrected with medical force (see, inter alia, Klöppel 2010; Voß 2010, 188ff; Voß 2012).

Thereby the sciences self-evidently proved themselves bound to society. They march in lockstep with the already described increasing of people’s functionalization, whereas reproductive characteristics and productivity were and still are central assessment criteria, by and large. Both direct compulsion by violence and restriction – with which people were first forced in workhouses, or to spin, and with which, for example, the wearing of counter-sexual clothing could be persecuted, as well as the emerging and solidifying bourgeois political and social relations, with their sciences, are all to be considered as variables for the development of norms.

Today, the practice possibilities of biological and medical norms become ever more visible in society. Central and publicly negotiated examples include psychiatry, in which non-conforming people are often simply locked away and sedated. Another example is the possibility of prenatal and pre-implantation diagnostics, with which embryos showing ‘abnormalities’ are selected based on a medical-technical apparatus and pregnant persons are advised, if applicable, to terminate their pregnancies.

Finally, the medical treatment program for the eradication of ambiguous sexual characteristics, which continues to lead to trauma and a need for lifelong medical treatment for the affected people, produced, as a byproduct, techniques with which people can come closer to their ideal biological sex. This trend continues to intensify under the impression of schoolbooks and advertising in which social norms are presented. Thus annually and alone in Germany thousands of cases of labia correction and penis enlargement are performed. Beauty operations,
which were initially used by women with regard to breasts and other body parts, are now directed also to the genitalia and orient themselves in particular to corresponding social norms (see consensus paper 2010; Vardi et al. 2008).

Pluralization of Identities in the Global North and the Orientation toward the Service Economy

In the contemporary global South, the extensive factory-like disciplining and correction of the people, their bodies and (sexual) activities takes place – current examples include the working conditions and the protests of mine workers in South Africa, and the dozens of suicides and protests due to the working conditions of the more than 1.2 million employees at the iPhone and iPad manufacturer Foxconn in China (see Ngai 2010; Ngai 2013). Meanwhile, for some decades it has become apparent that in the North, the persecution and criminalization of sexual activities previously considered problematic has been scaled back. Specifically, since the late 1960s, criminal regulations against the identitarian self-concept ‘homosexuality’ have been mitigated or abolished in parts of the western world. In the Federal Republic of Germany, paragraph 175 of the penal code, which interdicted male-to-male sexual acts, was loosened in 1969, and loosened and abolished in 1994 – aligning unified Germany to GDR law. In different ways it was also established that a proliferation of modes of desire loosened and multiplied identities (see, for example, Sigusch 2005). These developments are again interesting in light of the above descriptions about the functionalization of people. It was already made clear that the following view of Volkmar Sigusch falls too short:

“The free spaces were never so large and varied. The paradox is: the more brutal capitalism got rid of economic security and social justice, and thus produces unfreedom, the bigger the sexual and gender free spaces become. Obviously, it is quite irrelevant for the mechanisms of the profit- and rentier state what the individual is doing so long as they are only concerned with their sexual orientations, their gender habits, let alone with their small life worlds” (Sigusch 2005, 7).

While Sigusch assumes that it is quite irrelevant for capitalism what people do, it was clearly shown above how the functionalization of the spheres of life and of the activities of people had obvious productive effects in the interest of capitalist relations and went along with them. In this sense we should also look for
the rationale of current flexibilitization and individualization of gender and sexual identities and ask why the rulers do not go against them with ordinances and persecutions. The interests are obvious.

The assembly line had increasingly served its time in the capitalist center and has been shifted to the global periphery. Instead, in the capitalist center the ‘orientation to the service economy’ increases, and flexibility and individuality are now in demand. The ‘sexual revolution’ achieved, among other things, that people’s sexuality could increasingly become a commodity in the service of capitalist accumulation. ‘Homosexuality’ could not be managed as a direct goal of commodity production if it had continued to have been considered ‘perverse’ and punishable. Capitalism is all about gaining new profits, that is, incorporating always newer regions of the planet and human spheres of life as objects of commodity production. Nancy Peter Wagenknecht vividly explains profit and the limits of the pluralization of sexual relationships:

“...The restrictive model was replaced by sexual individualization. Since the sixties, new social movements wrested rights and liberties from the old patriarchal model. As a result, numerous new role models, self-concepts and lifestyles were created. Theses changes often had the value of subjective emancipation – they bring about a ‘plus’ in freedom of action – but at the same time they are further regulated by the heterosexual matrix and retrieved from the rise of transnational high-tech capitalism. This mode of production is based, among other things, on individualization of its subjects (to exploit their individual creativity and prevent collective resistances) as well on the transformation of everything and everyone into goods, including human sensuality” (Wagenknecht 2005).

Because the changes remain within the existing pattern and homosexuality continues to be defined as ‘deviation’ from the ‘norm’, they are always quickly reversible. At the same time, as Leo Kofler clearly worked out, the increasing organization of even sexual activity as a commodity means that capitalist relations always encompass areas of human life as commodities, meaning, no longer are areas cast out into the reproductive sphere. (As some of the last areas, even organs and reproductive materials as well as dying are all being capitalistically claimed and made into the form of a commodity with the direct objective of capitalist profit interest.) Even the closest and most intimate experience is for the human being only still tangible in the grid of goods. Therewith not only the accumulation of capital, but also the deep internalization of capitalist relations, is promoted – to the point that they appear as inevitable, as ‘without alternative’: [100]
“[The] presence of class society [stands] in the light of a ‘repressive desublimation’... this means: in the light of a ‘democratic’ apparent freedom, whose essence is, that it promises erotic – primarily sexual – liberties and formally also grants them, but only for the purpose of tying up the individual to the repressive order even more strongly through the psychological processes of internalization and identification, thus enabling the duration of the existing oppression” (Kofler 2008 [1985], 33).

Also at this point, a look at the further, international meaning is recommended: although the factory disciplining and taming of people in the global South happens due to the interest in the global North for ‘reasonably priced’ mobile devices, computers, food products and energy, people in the South stand accused of not living according to the now-emerging western (service) standards. Instead, the development in the North, which only became possible through the over-exploitation of people in the South, is introduced as a sign of its ‘civilized nature’ and turned against the South, on the one hand with stereotypes, on the other, with military means.

**Fight for Change: From Proletarian Movements to Queer Activism**

Improvements in living conditions have always had to be fought for. In this sense, the ideas of Foucault can only be accepted to a limited extent. He stated that already as of the end of the eighteen century a social medicine had emerged, such that entrepreneurs were interested in the preservation of the labor power of the workers in their workhouses (Foucault 2003 [1974], 292; see Voß 2011, 41f). Experience reveals this as incorrect. Although discussions took place also among the privileged bourgeois about the wretched living conditions of the working population, the practice remained nonetheless unaffected. Only through social struggles of the workers’ movement and the proletarian women’s movement were improvements achieved in the reality of working people.

The workers’ movement and the proletarian women’s movements battled especially for the improvement of their living conditions (see for an overview Notz 2011; Hoffrogge 2011). Their demands were to provide sufficient wages for food and housing, to have tolerable working conditions and against conditions in which only a few profit from the work of the many. Looking at actual life conditions, one always comes across distress and misery. The reality of the workers: poor diet, cramped living (a whole family often lived in a small room or was...
homeless), miserable hygienic conditions, common diseases, high child mortality, and a life expectancy of around 30 years. Against this background it is well understood that the proletarian women’s movement was much more concerned in changing these living conditions; it was only secondarily worried about political equality of women and men.

At the same time, sexist prejudices against women were more than visible in the workers’ movement (see Hoffrogge 2011, 90–98). In that sense, the fact that women were represented only to a small extent in the workers’ movements and the unions was not only a result of the Prussian prohibition of political activity of women, which still lasted until the beginning of the twentieth century. Rather, there was a chauvinistic presupposition on the part of men, which imputed the wage difference between women and men as the women’s fault, considering them competitors and ‘wage squeezers’. At the same time, the rights of women – and also of homosexuals – were nevertheless more in focus in the workers’ movement, at least more than in other parties or in the bourgeois social spheres. Think, for example, of August Bebel’s book *Women and Socialism* and his commitment in the Reichstag to abolish paragraph 175, which penalized homosexuality in the German Reich.

Bourgeois women, who had also been shaped by their concrete life circumstances, had other interests (see Notz 2011). For them exclusion from the sciences and from other important, prestigious and lucrative social spheres were more severe. They demanded – as did the workers – the right to vote and especially equal opportunities as bourgeois men in society. Some of them also saw the hardship of the workers and made it a subject of discussion, among others, and in a remarkable way, Bettine von Arnim and Lily Brown.

However, the bourgeois women’s movement did not show noticeable support for the struggles of proletarian women; rather, in the same way as in the context of colonialism and slavery, it essentially adopted the same perspectives of bourgeois men rather than the oppressed. Simone de Beauvoir summarizes: “The bourgeois woman hangs on her chains because she hangs to her class’s privileges... She doesn’t feel solidarity with the women of the working class: she stands much closer to her husband than to the textile workers. She makes his interests her own” (Beauvoir 2008 [1949], 155).

Just as working and upper-class women followed different interests in the first German women’s movement, so too do we find in the second German women’s movement a similar division. While the East German Constitution of 1949 pre-defined the equality of men and women, and in particular women’s economic
independence, from the very beginning there were affronts against women in
the FRG, despite the formal equality defined in the Constitution. Until 1977 a
West German husband could terminate the work relationship of his wife if she
neglected her familial ‘commitments’ (see also Münch, 1976)! Being an unmar-
rried mother or a single parent in the FRG could lead to extreme social exclusion
(illegitimate children were also discriminated against, for example, in the case
of inheritance law). In the year 1969 Der Spiegel criticized and differentiated be-
tween the two German states: “It is true that the state of workers-and-farmers
both ensures its citizens material as well as legal equality and pays, unlike in West
Germany, ‘equal pay for equal work’ (socialist slogan), that it enables married
couples to adopt the maiden name of the bride as a family name, and doesn’t dis-
criminate against children conceived outside of marriage. But even these are no
more than onsets of emancipation ...” (Spiegel 1969).

Towards the end of the 1960s, as resistance was organized, an awareness of
being oppressed and having to fight for one’s rights spread among many women
in West Germany. The two objectives of the feminist engagement were to end
discrimination against women and to fight against the socially-spread (sexual)
violence against women. They demanded equal access to all social spheres for
women and men, as well as the distribution of reproductive labor and its recog-
nition as work (see Notz 2011). The women demanded self-determination of
their own life and body, receiving a boost from Maxi Wander’s publication Good
Morning, My Lovely. Protocols by Tape (1977, GDR), in which – unprecedented
in literature – biographical narratives of women received center stage. 19 women
reported openly about their lives – both in the GDR as well as in the FRG, the
book became a best-seller, encouraging women to document their own lives, and
thereby recognize barriers and turning points in their own biographies.

Thus the cross-references between the German states played an important
role. Until the 1980s they surfaced in various ways, as prominent women de-
scribed how they became political active. In more recent versions of this narrative,
such references are missing, while gender studies are ‘forgotten by history’. Good
Morning, My Lovely had significance, especially in the FRG (including West
Berlin). It also had an effect in the GDR. But the conflicts there were often dif-
ferent, especially in political bodies where women often took up positions and
raised demands. Admittedly women were underrepresented with a share of about
one third of the members of political bodies in the GDR. Also in the Volkskam-
mer (the GDR’s parliament) from 1967 onwards, 30 percent of deputies were
women, while the female proportion in the Bundestag of the FRG remained,
up to 1987, in the single-digit percentage range (cf. for data comparison BRD

to GDR: Federal Ministry of the Interior for Family 2013; also, Trappe 1995). Although women were represented in the highest East German political bodies (Council of State, Council of Ministers and Politburo) to a lesser extent, their position in the democratic employee organizations was especially strong.

The proportion of women and men in the companies (Soviet: combines) and in the unions was equal, and women took leading positions in growing numbers. In the GDR changes were mainly negotiated in the intern committees: in all large companies, yearly reports over the activities for ‘women’s equality’ had to be submitted and targets accomplished – for example the increase in proportion of women in technical professions. Since the 1960s there were also critical evaluations (cf. Hieblinger 1967, 39–74, 130–144; for or a good overview, see also Uhlmann 1968 [1961], especially 580ff; Stern and Boeck 1972; Trappe 1995). Possibilities for reconciling work and family life were promoted with a steady increase of child allowances and spaces in business kindergartens. The economic aspect is significant: it was plausibly easy in the GDR for a married woman to leave her husband in order to escape violence, whereas women in the FRG had to think first whether it would be economically possible.

A closer look at the GDR shows, however, that women were hardly represented in the most prestigious social positions, such as the higher levels of politics or the professorships at universities. Gender stereotypes as well as the (unremunerated) division of the reproductive labor continued to have a disadvantageous effect on women (see Hieblinger 1967 et al., 86ff; Trappe 1995, 20ff). Women's groups were formed also in the GDR, but they didn’t gain a common fighting consciousness to the same extent as in the west (see Kenawi 1995).

It is conspicuous how different the struggles in East and West Germany were for abortion rights. In West Germany, it was primarily the non-parliamentary opposition who led the fight – for example, with the self-outing in the Stern magazine with the title “I had an abortion”. This led finally to a legal regulation which kept abortion as a criminal offense not subject to prosecution. This contrasted with the legal development through negotiations inside the political bodies in the GDR. The intensive involvement of women at the legislative level led not only to the decriminalization of abortion, but also legalized it in the first trimester.

The battle against the criminalization of homosexuality was led since the 1970s with vigor, with clear differences between the GDR and FRG coming to light. In West Germany, the Nazi version of the paragraph 175, which criminalized same-sex sexual acts between men, endured. In the 1950s and 1960s, tens of thousands of men were convicted according to this Nazi version of the law –
making the Adenauer-era a dreadful period for gay men. It was not until 1969 that this paragraph was removed and same-sex sexual acts among male adults (initially over 21 years; from 1973 onwards, above 18 years) were exempted from punishment. There were still several hundred convictions every year under the paragraph, and still a few dozens in 1994, the year it was finally abolished. In the GDR from the start, the criminal code reverted back to the older version of the paragraph from the Weimer republic, according to which, only acts “likening to sexual intercourse” were punishable, and from 1957 the culpability of sexual acts among adult men was abolished (above 18 years). In 1988, the People’s Parliament decided to completely abolish the paragraph against homosexuality for men and women (since the 1968 legal reform, this became Paragraph 151), and they introduced the same protective age limits (16 years) for heterosexual and homosexual sexual acts. Finally, in 1994, the old federal states of the ‘United Germany’ adopted this approach and nullified paragraph 175.

These findings also enable an interesting perspective regarding the political struggles of movements: unlike the struggle to abolish punishment for abortion, a massive engagement of women in the streets and in political bodies took place, there was nothing comparable in relation to paragraph 175; rather, the activities of several individuals were significant. The legal changes in the FRG in 1969 were not achieved by the ‘gay movement’. It established itself only after the easing of the penal law. Michael Holy sums up the difference to the US gay movement, which was associated with riots: “While in Germany ... a reform of the criminal law paved the way for a radicalization of homosexuals, under completely different preconditions in the US, a spontaneous revolt triggered the radicalization of the gay and lesbian movement which already existed since the beginning of the 1960s” (Holy 2012, 43f).

Self-organization and a movement unfolded in West Germany from around 1969–70. The first autonomous gay group of the Federal Republic – the Homosexual Action-Group Bochum (HAG) – was founded in 1970 at the initiative of the lesbian Waltraud Z. (compare Leidinger 2011). Lesbians played a central role also in other gay initiatives, though in popular descriptions of the gay movement they often did not appear, as Christiane Leidinger (2011) has criticized. In addition, leisure groups, other homosexual associations and magazines were all founded (see Holy 2012). In 1971, the Homosexual Action West Berlin (HAW) was founded, which would prove to be of utmost importance for the movement.

Although it did not trigger the activities of the autonomous gay-lesbian movement, Rosa von Praunheim’s film *It Is Not The Homosexual Who Is Perverse, But The Society In Which He Lives* was quite significant. It was premiered at the Berlin
Film Festival in July 1971, followed by controversial discussions in the press. In January 1972, the film was programmed to be televised on the ARD channel: however, after pressure from the Bavarian broadcast association, it was banished to regional programming. Even this relocation led to great media attention and to the establishment of homosexual groups in different cities. The same applies to the screenings in regional cinemas. Where the film was shown, self-organized groups of gay and lesbian people were founded, which often dissolved quickly (39 groups and several magazines disappeared as early as 1974–75 [cf. Holy 2012, 49]). Finally, in 1973, the film was broadcast in the night program of the ARD (see Dennert et al., 2007b).

The respective groups were vigorously discussing emancipatory demands, often without reference to bourgeois law, concentrating more on radical social alternatives to capitalism. Gay pride demonstrations held under the Christopher Street Day name emerged also in West Germany against social discrimination and violence against lesbians, gays and ‘queens’ (See Dennert et al. 2007b; focusing on Berlin-Schöneberg, see: Wolter 2011). Self-organization quickly proved to be necessary, since, during the 1980s in connection with HIV and AIDS, gays became targets of incitement, with some politicians in the FRG even demanding their ghettoization in concentration camps. Through campaigns, but also because of empathetic politicians like the then-Minister of Health, Rita Süssmuth, such populist demands were rejected and instead public awareness campaigns – and AIDS aid organizations – were initiated. The stronger involvement of gay groups with the state also played a significant role, such that, from now on, institutionalized gay groups raised increasingly reformist demands instead of fundamental social criticism (Wolter 2011, 20ff; Raab 2011, 18f, 238f).

Lesbian groups did not benefit from professionalization through the AIDS aid organizations. They evolved more out of the socialist movement and the (socialist) women’s movement. The Council for the Liberation of Women (West Berlin) was founded in the spring of 1968, and among other things it criticized in September of that same year the men in the Socialist German Student Union (SDS) for their chauvinism. At the next delegates’ conference, the Weiberrat (Frankfurt) raised their demands through flyers. The leaflet text ends sharply: “FREE THE SOCIALIST EMINENCES FROM THEIR BOURGIOUS DICKS” (cited in Dennert et al. 2007b, 38, emphasis added in the original).

Some of women came out of the closet in 1972 as lesbians – and so one can assess the Council for the Liberation of Women as a first shot of lesbian self-organization. Also in West Berlin a group of lesbian women organized and joined forces with Homosexual Action West Berlin (HAW). In February 1973, 50 women from
the HAW protested against an anti-lesbian hate campaign of the Bild newspaper, and together with the men of the group they joined the May Day demonstration with banners. The women of the HAW understood themselves as part of the women’s movement and were active independently of gay men. Both the Lesbian Spring Meeting as well as the Lesbian Action Center – which later formed into the Lesbian Counseling Center – trace back to the lesbians of the HAW. In 1974 a group of older lesbian women founded the group L74. In April 1972 there was also a demonstration of gays and lesbians in Münster, which was followed by more events, actions and demonstrations. Partially, the lesbians fought together with heterosexual women and partly with gay men, whereby lesbians were cast to the side more often, hence developing their own forms of action (for a good overview see Dennert et al. 2007 and 2007b).

In the GDR, the legal situation for gays was better, but there was barely any social visibility. The early improvements in the life of homosexuals in the GDR were more organized by the state and linked to traditions in which socialist movements – the SPD and the KPD fought against the legal culpability of homosexual acts. Among the socialist states, these developments were limited to the GDR and the republic of Poland. A fundamental change in society was not achieved with these state initiatives, and discrimination of lesbian and gay people, for example when looking for accommodation, organizing events or even by posting friendships adds in newspapers, stayed continuous even up to the 1980s (Gray 1988, 36).

In one of the interviews Jürgen Lemke conducted at the time, a respondent described: “I moved to this apartment in the early fifties. Before I moved in, the community policeman went from door to door and informed the young men who lived together: First backyard, in the middle, two flights of stairs, on the right, from the first of next month, one of those will move in. Be careful! I could not imagine a better advertisement. It took less then two weeks before I heard that first timid knocking on my door ...” (Lemke 1989, 30f). In addition, brain research was carried out on how to ‘cure’ homosexuality or ‘prevent’ it embryonically, although it wasn’t actually used for treatment in the GDR, unlike the situation in West-Germany, where brain surgery for the ‘healing’ of homosexuality was practiced on people who were institutionalized (Voß 2013, 42ff). But also in the GDR, especially in the 1950s and ‘60s, people were psychiatrically or medically treated so they might forsake their homosexuality – which led to serious mental health damage for those affected by the treatment (see Thinius 2006; Brühl 2006).

Nevertheless, sociological surveys verify that the social acceptance of lesbians
and gays improved. While in 1980, 51 percent of students fully agreed with the statement, “Nobody should be discriminated against because of his homosexual tendencies”, in 1990, 84 percent of those polled answered correspondingly (Starke 2008, 11). As Siegfried Schnabl wrote in the sex education book *Man and Woman Intimately*, a bestseller in the GDR which dealt with the discrimination of mainstream society: “The exemption from punishment, however, remains a formal-legal matter, so long as homosexuals are morally discriminated, despised, whispered over, maliciously laughed at, with warnings issued against them or them being pitied like the sick. We have to respect their intimate sphere, their forms of partnering and their desired living arrangements, as they should respect ours, for they are equal members of society” (Schnabl 1979 [1969], 303).

Since the 1970s several gay and lesbian groups and initiatives in the GDR sprang up – the first were *Homosexual Interest Group Berlin* (HIB) in 1973 and the *Homosexual Self-help Group Leipzig* in 1976 (see Kenawi 1995, 223; Brühl 2006, 108f; Brühl 2013). The HIB developed a wide range of activities and wanted to roll out a sign saying: “We homosexuals of the capital welcome the participants of the Tenth World Youth Festival and support socialism in the GDR” at the closing event of the festival, but it was prevented by the security forces. They also petitioned different institutions, such as the police and the parliament. It was at their initiative that in 1976 Urania (*The Society for the Dissemination of Scientific Knowledge*) held a forum on the topic of homosexuality.

Since 1974 the HIB met in the villa of Charlotte von Mahlsdorf, where the Stasi suspected that conspiratory and subversive meetings took place. Finally, a GDR-wide lesbian meeting which was held there in 1978 was used as a pretext to forbid further meetings in the Mahlsdorf’s house. At first, the HIB fought back – their request to receive the status of an association was rejected, also numerous petitions which eventually led to a discussion in the cabinet did not have the desired result of achieving recognition by the state as a homosexual organization. Discouragement led to the group falling apart with only some parties being organized and some continuing to work on a change in consciousness (see Thinius, 2006; Brühl 2006). Since the late 1970s homosexuality also became a theme in art and literature, and since the 1980s, more groups emerged again (see in detail Brühl 2006, 2013). Partly lesbians and gay men worked together, and partly lesbian groups were founded within the framework of the emerging women’s movement (Kenawi 2008; cf. Kenawi 1995). In addition, since 1983, conferences with scientists and experts in their own cause jointly discussed and debated solutions (see, among others, Günther et al. 1986; Günther and Bach 1989; Hohmann 1991; Kenawi 1995). Jürgen Lemke’s quoted volume, *Gay Voic-
As much as the GDR has been neglected in the study of the German ‘homosexual movement’ – which is why this has been discussed here in greater detail – often the work of women and queers of color is also overlooked. Focusing on lesbians in the GDR, Samirah Kenawi has clearly worked out how essential women were in pushing for change through their persistent engagement (Kenawi 2008). Also in the current studies on West Germany and West Berlin, the role of women in making homosexuality a social issue rarely comes into view, as for example through the controversies with the chauvinism of men in the SDS which led to the emergence of lesbian autonomous organizations (see Dennert et al. 2007, 2007b). The blank space considering the part of queers of color in the newer – white – historiography of the gay movement is at least as equally large. As much as one can trace back the central event for lesbians and gays, Christopher Street battles, initially to people of color (Haritaworn 2005), this also applies to other queer developments. Numerous struggles that eventually brought changes in both German states and from which in particular white gays could gain profit (cf. Wolter 2011; Raab 2011) were led by people who are also (and will be) discriminated against by the latter.

Furthermore, the liberation movement of black people – among others in the US and especially by women – were important stimuli for the fight against racism in German society which also affected queer-feminist struggles. Leading the way was Davis’ book *Women, Race & Class*, in which she describes the history and struggles of black women in the US. First suppressed in slavery, their conditions did not fundamentally change after the hard-won abolition of slavery. Rather, working conditions remained the same, the ‘advancement’ to the white-dominated society remained for blacks mostly impossible, and they continued to be subjected to economic and also sexual exploitation via white people. This conditions till today the different organization and approaches of white women who belong to the dominant part of society, as well as black women. Since the end of the 19th century, racism intensified – whites committed lynch murders against black women and men. These were expressions of the institutionalized racist system. Davis describes the struggles that were necessary and that led to the nowadays self-evident situation in which people of different origin and skin color are formally and equally recognized as US citizens. At least that was achieved even though racism remains a massive problem today. It is also worth noting that
Davis, at the beginning of the 1980s, clearly shows how racism and class domination function together – on the grounds of racism, blacks received bad jobs and often miserable work and life conditions – and particularly affect women and can ultimately be traced to the colonial submission of black people. The possibilities of the people are thus determined by their differentiation along bourgeois patterns of racist, sexist and classist stereotypes (see Davis 1982 [1981]). In the Federal Republic of Germany even this small American matter, of course, that the citizens have different skin and hair colors, different religions and cultures, has not yet caught on with the white majority. Instead people of color in the FRG are still often designated by members of the majority as ‘foreign’, called ‘aliens’ and are asked to declare their country of origin – even by white leftists.

**Racism in Germany – Reflections Provoked by Women of Color**

“Racism is the linking of prejudice with institutional power. Contrary to the (comfortable) popular opinion, ‘dislike for’ or ‘malice against’ people or groups of people is not a precondition for racism. Racism is not a personal or political ‘attitude,’ but an institutionalized system in which social, economic, political and cultural relations operate for the preservation of white supremacy” (Noah Sow, cited in Arndt and Ofuatey-Alazard 2011, 37).

Colonialism, migration and racism are not often considered as historically intrinsic to Germany by many white Germans, who also shape the scientific context (Ha 2012 [2003], 57–63; El-Tayeb 2012 [2003], 130f; Castro Varela and Dhawan 2005, 11; Arndt and Ofuatey-Alazard 2011, 37ff, 121ff). Immigration is described as a feature since the early 1960s, when the Federal Republic of Germany recruited ‘guest workers’ and the GDR ‘contract workers’. As the Berlin-based political scientist Kien Nghi Ha (Ha 2012 [2003]) observes in his research, even in the newer efforts of migration studies, historical references are especially neglected – and a distorted picture of immigration as a phenomena intrinsic to ‘modern’, democratic Germany is drawn. There is, however, little to no talk about immigration in the imperial period, or in the Weimar Republic, nor of völkisch nationalist ideas, the repercussions of German colonialism on Germany, nor of racism – all this, despite there existing clear continuities, both in terms of content as well as at the level of personnel. Thus, Konrad Adenauer, one of the founders of the Colonial Work Group – a consortium of many German colonial companies –
became the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949. Only in 1974 were the approximately twenty remaining German colonial companies liquidated by the German Bundestag (see Ha 2009 [2005], 111).

Even the concept of racism has been and still is avoided in Germany, a denial of the colonial past. Terms such as ‘xenophobia’ are rather used. In so doing, white Germans evade a structural analysis linking racism with the capitalist expansion of Europe – and especially Germany – and how it is founded on the segmentation of people based on biological and culturalist arguments (see, among others, Tesfa 1985, 34f; Opitz [Ayim] 1997 [1986], 23f; Çetin 2012). At the same time, they reject international scientific analyses and answer: ‘hostility to strangers’ thus appears as a feature of small neo-Nazi groups, but not as a phenomenon in society as a whole, like racism.

Those analyses based on the work of Davis about the US should also be applied to Germany. Already in the Kaiserreich a migration policy was developed based on colonialism and biological racism (see especially Ha 2009) which relied on the temporary recruitment of workers especially for the agricultural work in Prussia. Their stay was limited, and workers were forced to leave with a “return order for the winter rest period” (Ha 2012 [2003], 67), marking Germany as a ‘non-immigration country. At the end of the nineteenth century Germany was second in the world only to to the US as an importer of workers (ibid.). This kind of temporary work immigration combined ‘positive effects’: labor power was cheaply purchased; in winter and during crisis, workers could be sent away; and, because there was no need to provide for them, there were no benefits paid.

The immigration policy of the Federal Republic of Germany developed directly from these historical precursors (cf. Tesfa, 1985; Ha 2012 [2003])). This applies not only to the countries with which labor recruitment agreements were signed – the allied states of the first and/or second World Wars, the Ottoman Empire (Turkey), Italy and Spain (El Masrar 2010, 38f). This type of recruitment also built upon on the efforts of the imperial era, when workers were recruited with terminal contracts. Kien Nghi Ha writes,

“Since migrants are conceived as workers of debased rights, they should be the first to lose their precarious jobs and leave in phases of economic regression. On the one hand, the German side wanted to ‘export’ the unemployed, the sick or the old migrants in order to save the usual employers’ obligations at the expense of the foreign employees and their countries of origin. On the other hand, the jobs of the German workforce could be secured through this migrant buffer function” (Ha 2012 [2003], 70, emphasis in original).
Until today the recruitment policy inherently contains lower pay, worse working conditions, and the denial of the usual social benefits in the Federal Republic of Germany. At the same time, the dirtiest, most dangerous and most unpopular work is to be done migrants. The “extreme exploitation of the migrant productive force” (Ha 2012 [2003], 72; see also Gültekin 1985) is the focal interest of the recruitment policy. And even the selection of people is purely based on profitability: “The physical and health conditions of the future young and strong workforce was thoroughly examined in their home countries via a systematic procedure – looked at in the mouth like a young horse and only let into the country when their fitness was beyond doubt” (El Masrar 2010, 37). The inhumane selection procedure of the recruited people becomes obvious from interviews and the description of the situation. Filiz Yüreklik described her own experience:

“It was awful. We had to get undressed down to our briefs and were examined by a German doctor. We stood in a row, and he looked at us like looking at a horse in the mouth, whether the teeth are healthy. After that we had to give blood and urine so they could determine if we were pregnant or diabetic” (cited in Ha 2012 [2003], 79).

In times of crisis, this concept became ‘enshrined’. Already during the recession in the late 1960s and in the 1970s, migrants were much more frequently affected by unemployment than people without a migration background. In the 1974–75 recession, for example, “migrants were dismissed percentage-wise four times (386%) more than Germans” (Ha 2012 [2003], 71). ‘Social peace’ and the legitimation of the capitalist system was to be stabilized in the Federal Republic of Germany, as before in the Kaiserreich and in the Weimar Republic, on the basis of the inclusion and exclusion of migrants. This was also achieved in times of crisis more clearly by depicting migrants as ‘strangers’ and ‘scapegoats’ – even in economically good times migrants were and are willfully put in this position (see Erel 2012 [2003]; Ferreira 2012 [2003]; Çetin 2012).

Excursion 5: “You are only accepted as a work horse or an exotic”

“My name is Inci. I came here to Germany without knowing a word of German. I wanted to study it, but I wasn’t given any opportunity. I had already bound myself in Turkey to working shifts, although I didn’t really know what that meant. Sure, they
translated the contract alright, we were about 100 people in the room and they read it out for us quickly, and we all had to sign it, but afterwards no one understood what we actually signed. After four months I did not feel well at all. I constantly had headaches and stomach pain. I just felt bad.

Then I decided to go back to Turkey. I went to my boss and told him I would very much like to return. He told me that it was impossible because I bound myself to stay here and work for a year. ‘You got a plane ticket, you got a place in the dorm, and if you committed yourself for four years, then you will need to work four years, otherwise you have to pay for everything’. With this the pressure became even stronger. I now had no way out. Then I said, how about if I only work one shift now and then go to school and learn a little German so I can at least understand a little. The language is very important for contacts, and I cannot find any contacts. As an Oriental, you are only accepted as a work horse or an exotic, but not as a human being. Then he said ‘No, you have already bound yourself in Turkey to work double shifts for at least a year,’ and I could not get out of it.

So without having a choice, I worked a double shift for a year, early shift and late shift. You can’t learn German like that. The women sat together during the weekend and learned German for two hours, but that was not at all sufficient.

And when I went to a pub or anywhere else, my experience was always to be asked if I speak German. I could never communicate properly, and when someone talked to me, it was in such a manner that I just wanted to scream ‘Why do you speak such bad German, speak to me in a way that I would at least learn the language correctly!’ That wore me out, and I got stomach pain, kidney pain, I was constantly at the doctor’s. In the first year of my stay here I spent six months in hospital with all sorts of pain. But this wasn’t accepted, and I wasn’t taken seriously. I felt so bad. As a woman, as a sick woman, I was not accepted, not even in hospitals or by doctors. And I had such pain, abdominal pain, pain in the whole body, and I could never explain it right for the doctor. And I was also homesick and had strong mental pain, and the body also responded promptly. Everybody laughed at me, saying, ‘Alas, she probably got her period, every woman has this pain and she is so pain sensitive.’ I wanted to talk to someone about my pains. I was all alone in Germany. Now I want to jump a little.

In 1979 I returned to Germany. I had since had a daughter and was married to a German. I thought to myself, oh, now I can speak quite well, I felt better, because then I could speak German and be accepted as a person. So we went to Berlin. We temporarily had a room in a friend’s flat. When I called then to look for an apartment, the first question was always the same: ‘What is your nationality?’ and when I said I was Turkish the answer was ‘There are no apartments.’ Then I had to say: I am married
to a German! ‘Oh, then your husband should come, or your husband should call us’. I am not human. My husband is a human being because he is a German. And because he is a human being, and we are married maybe I also am … half of human being. And then the constant tensions inside me and between me and my husband. On the street I did not feel comfortable. While looking for an apartment I got dressed with the most elegant clothes, I went with a taxi, trying to show that I am not that kind of Turk or foreigner. How could I do anything like that? People force you here, society compels me to show myself differently. But my body, my mental condition suffered from it. I don’t know. I have had therapy for many years, and I still feel like the black Inci, like a Turk. I used to feel very discriminated against as a woman, in Turkey and also in other countries. As a woman, you are not accepted, but here, as a foreigner as well, this is worse, as a woman and as a foreigner” (quoted in Bargan et al. 1985, 55ff).

The basis for the permanently unequal treatment of migrants is anchored in German citizenship law, which denies citizenship for even second- or third-generation people with a migration background who live in the Federal Republic of Germany, and thus withholds from them basic civil rights and the possibilities of political participation (Erel 2012 [2003]: Ha 2012 [2003]). But here, too, the circle closes: although it was slightly amended though not fundamentally revised in the year 2000, the citizenship law traces back to the law of members of the Reich and the state from the year 1913. It is, therefore, fundamentally shaped by völkisch-nationalistic and racist ideas (see Ha 2012 [2003], 91). People are deeply entrenched as ‘second class,’ are economically exploited, but are prevented from political participation and thus from the possibility to improve their own position.

It thus also clearly shows that the social exclusion of people with migration backgrounds is nothing accidental nor something that simply springs from a resentment-laden population – nor even from a few neo-Nazis. Rather, the position of migrated people and their descendants proves to be explicitly institutional and guided by economic interests. If this context slips away, the important starting point of racist debates, which are particularly strong in times of economic crises, becomes invisible. In times of economic downturn, migrants thus come to be ‘scapegoats’ which ‘flood’ the labor market. Metaphors of ‘flood’ are used to depict migration as something menacing – and to obscure the structural background of the situation of migrated people and their descendants (Ratsch 1985; Kang 1990; Ha 2012 [2003]). At the same time, even here racist patterns with a long colonial tradition come to light, all too often charged with sexual and gender stereotypes (see El-Tayeb 2012 [2003]; Petzen 2011 [2005]; Wolter 2011 [2010]).
Against this background the situation of women appears to be much more difficult. This applies not only to wages, which are 20 percent lower even compared to those of male migrants (see Aufruf 1985). Also significant is the legal residence situation: since numerous women came to the Federal Republic of Germany in the course of family reunifications, they were and are denied an independent residence permit. Since 1981 – at the time still under the coalition of the SPD and FDP – the provisions of the residence law continued to worsen. Women were forced by the Foreigners Authority to stay married, even in cases of domestic violence. In the first years ‘subsequently unified dependents’ did not and do not possess a permanent and independent visa for the Federal Republic of Germany – they are dependent on their working partner, who must also prove that he can sustain the whole family from his employment. As early as 1985 Bargan et al. observed:

“Foreign families live under ever-increasing levels of existential fear. Regulations, ordinances, and aliens acts curtail the chances of survival in the FRG more and more, put people under unbearable pressure and create inescapable situations. The most dangerous and deleterious jobs are being given to foreigners, usually with disrespect of labor protection laws, and then disease is considered as a cause for deportation” (Bargan et al. 1985, 65).

This is why at the First Joint Women’s Congress in Frankfurt (1985) both black and white women demanded:

➢ independent residence and work visas for women regardless of family circumstances, and the abolition of Section 19 of the Employment Promotion Act;
➢ no limitation on the right of entry for spouses and children;
➢ no limitation on the freedom of marriage;
➢ immediate stop of deportations of women on grounds of husband’s return, separation from husband, social welfare, illness, death or imprisonment of the husband;
➢ international treaties for the protection of women and girls against sex-specific persecution and sexist violence (Ratsch 1985, 47).

Instead of improvements, the changing federal governments – beginning with the social democratic (SPD) and liberal (FDP) coalition – worsened the situation with a disingenuously-named “Law to Combat Forced Marriage and to Protect its Victims”. In 2011 the freeze period for an independent stay was even raised
from two to three years, followed by an independent visa of only one year. The same limits apply also in the case of bi-national same-sex partnerships, which exist since 2001. This puts the migrating person in a dependent position which they cannot escape, even if the partner is violent.

The situation of the ‘contract workers’ in the GDR was also not much different, considering the economic interests and the treatment of those recruited.

“Primarily young workers were recruited, because the GDR saw in them in the first place a kind of ‘human capital’ and therefore directly made sure that healthier, young and employable people would enter the country. Migrant workers in the GDR were often deployed in jobs that GDR citizens themselves refused to carry out and therefore were forced in part to do dirty and dangerous jobs” (Knoll 2011, 37).

Contract workers were recruited from the socialist ‘sister countries’: Bulgaria, Angola, Mozambique, Cuba, Mongolia and China. Contracts were signed which restricted their rights in the GDR and stipulated communal domiciles. The contracts were often made for the time of beyond seven years, after which the workers would have to return to their home countries; special provisions threatened deportation before the end of the contract, if for example a contract worker became pregnant (Piesche 2006; Knoll 2011). The GDR contract workers were centrally accommodated in shelters, far from the residential areas of the non-migrated population – also this resembles the situation in the BRD, where the contact between the immigrants and non-migrant population was first established through separate accommodation and employment in different shops (El Masrar 2010; Wolter 2011, 18).

Even the reasoning was similar – in its internal social debate as well as to the outside world, the GDR conventionalized itself as the ‘democratic Germany’, which, in contrast to West Germany, had broken with its Nazi past. The narrative of the FRG, on the other hand, became hegemonic: the FRG appeared as the ‘democratic Germany’ whereas the GDR was monolithic, unfree and undemocratic, and the cause of its racism and the pogroms which happened after 1990 are to be located in its structure (for example, Poutrus et al. 2002; critically, El-Tayeb 2012 [2003], 131ff). Both readings throw a smoke screen over structural racism and deny the Nazi past. How else should the German state with its elites and the German society change in a short time from a murdering horde to adherents of democracy? The division of West and East made it easier to settle for the simplest explanations and prevents till today an effective process of coming
to grips with the Nazi past and the völkisch-nationalistic and colonial character of German society – thus obstructing an effective thematization of racism and the struggle against it (El-Tayeb 2012 [2003], 131f).

Even when the economic exploitability of migrants was central for the FRG, the former Nazi-judge and prime minister of Baden-Württemberg Hans Filbinger delighted over the “import of ... ‘young, fresh’ guest workers” (see Ha 2012 [2003], 70), this system was always oriented toward the return of the migrating workers in economically dire times. In such times companies carried out not ‘only’ a racist dismissal policy from the workplace; media and political discourses stirred up racist resentments as well. In July 1973 the title of Der Spiegel was: “The Turks are Coming – Save yourself if you can!” Since the crises of the 1970s the media has spread openly racist resentment in the FRG. Since 1981 the immigration regulations were aggravated by the socio-liberal (SPD/FDP) coalition. The government program of the Kohl government (CDU/FDP) in the early 1980s proclaimed that half of the migrant population in the Federal Republic of Germany should be expelled (see Ratsch 1985; Kang 1990). In 1990 the debate broke out again, with numerous publications, magazines and books appearing to discredited migrants and spread the image of the ‘flood’ of migrating workers to Germany and Europe (Ha 2012 [2003], 87).

In 1991, the CDU and CSU intensified this debate, all while neo-Nazis were increasingly and visibly occupying public spaces.

It was obvious for the white German majority in the West as in the East, who was ‘threatening’ and who is ‘threatened’. Völkisch nationalist stereotypes with clear conceptions – first physical, then later also increasingly cultural – of what constitutes the ‘German population,’ and who ‘infiltrates’ were preserved, used and fueled (see Ferreira 2012 [2003]; Erel 2012 [2003]; Petzen 2011 [2005], 28ff; explicitly for the GDR cf. Piesche 2006). Following this came a 3000-strong crowd clapping and cheering the neo-Nazis during the pogroms in August 1992 in Rostock-Lichtenhagen, which set ablaze the homes of families of Vietnamese origin. The crowd offered the neo-Nazis protection from the police, who were unable or unwilling to control the violence. Instead of clearly condemning the pogroms and finally understanding racism as a structural German problem and confronting it, the government instrumentalized the riots for their own racist campaigns. Thus, the then-Federal Minister of Interior, Rudolf Seiter, declared: “The attacks have shown that the current law is not sufficient. The main problem of the uncontrollable influx of economic refugees, mainly from Eastern Europe, can only be stopped with a tightening of the law” (Fischer 2007, 312). Seiter was
only one of the voices of German politicians across all the political camps who justified the violence of the neo-Nazis and the racism of the mainstream German population. The government coalition of the CDU and FDP, supported by the SPD, took advantage of the situation to “virtually abolish the right of asylum” in May 1993. The government also pushed through the European Union the Third-State-Regulation, which enabled the deportation of people who entered the FRG through a ‘safe third country’” back to that state. In the same week five women and girls died in a radical right-wing arson attack in Solingen (ibid.).

During the 1980s, with massive deterioration of the living conditions of people with migration backgrounds and people of color, resistance and self-consciousness were important for the foundation of groups of black women/lesbians and women/lesbians of color. Especially important were congresses, in which women/lesbians of color could position themselves and which were partially also open for white women. In July 1983, the first such Women’s Congress took place, in which over 1000 women came, followed by the publication Are We So Strange? Foreign and German Women in Conversation (1985). In 1986 the first publication appeared in which black German women presented together their experiences in Germany from an activist perspective: Confessing Color: Afro-German Women on the Trail of Their History. Not least significant for the self-organization of Afro-German women: the Berlin stay from 1984 to 1992 of the African-American writer and activist Audre Lorde (Gerund 2008; Piesche 2012). Women of color increasingly established groups. In 1984, the lesbian feminist Shabbes Circle was formed, in which Jewish and non-Jewish women dealt with antisemitism in the women’s movement and also grappled with questions of Jewish history (see Jacoby and Magiriba Lwanga 1990; Baader 1993).

Inspired by Audre Lorde, black women and lesbian activists founded in 1986 the group ADEFRA (Black Women in Germany) (see Piesche 2012). In 1992 the first German group of lesbians from Turkey was created in Berlin, in which the women networked and politically thematized racism, sexism and heterosexism (İpekçıoğlu 2007).

The transition years of 1989–1990 and the early 1990s, which were perceived by white Germans as ‘moving’, were life-threatening for black people and people of color. The immensely overheated white and German-nationalist atmosphere is traceable from numerous essays – but it did not enter the hegemonic white view of the transition years at the time. In these accounts there is talk of celebrations. The many attacks and murders against black people and people of color are silenced or ‘trivialized’ as acts of East German neo-Nazis. In their article 183 Death Victims: Extreme Right-Wing and Racist Violence Since 1990 (2013), Aslan Erkol and No-
ra Winter have documented the names of the fatalities and the background of the attacks. The fact that the attacks and murders happened all over the country, that thousands of people applauded these attacks, that after the racist attacks the victims and not the white German perpetrators were blamed, all of this is obliterated from the hegemonic white ‘transition history’. May Ayim, a West German speech therapist of Ghanaian origin and described her experiences in 1990:

“Since 1984 I live and work in West Berlin and I feel in this city more at home than anywhere else. Thanks to my indistinct sense of orientation, I get lost every day in the streets; however, in comparison to other cities in which I have lived and studied until now, Berlin was always a place where I felt quite at home. My skin color is not an extraordinary view in the streetscape; here I do not receive compliments every day for my good German, and I am only rarely in seminars, events or parties in which I am the only black person in the midst of an undefined number of whites. I have to explain myself often, but not constantly. I remember earlier times, in small West German cities, where I often felt under constant observation, always sickened under inquiry and questioning glances ...

In the first days after November 9th, 1989, I hardly noticed any immigrants or Afro-Germans in the streets, at least not the ones with darker skin color. I wondered how many Jewish people were on the street. By chance I came across a few Afro-Germans that I had met the year before in East Berlin, and we were happy to have more opportunities to meet. I was walking alone, wanting to inhale a bit of the general enthusiasm, sense the historical moment and share my reserved joy. Reserved, because of the imminent tightening in the legislation for immigrants and asylum-seekers I have heard of. Just like other black Germans and immigrants, I knew that even a German passport does not constitute an invitation to the East-West celebrations. We sensed that the upcoming inner-German unification will entail an increasing delimitation to the outside, an outside that would include us. We were not invited to join the party. As Chancellor Kohl phrased it, there was no room for everyone in the new ‘We’ in ‘our own country’.

‘Beat it negro, don’t you have a home?’

For the first time since I lived in Berlin, I had to protect myself almost daily, against blunt insults, hostile looks and openly racist defamations. I started again to be on the look-out for the faces of black people while going shopping or using the public transportation. A friend holding her Afro-German daughter on her lap in the urban train was told: “we don’t need people like you here anymore. We are more than enough”. A ten-year-old African boy was pushed out of the full subway to make room for a white German ...” (Ayim 2012, 55f)
These descriptions are missing from the accounts of white people about the transition years. Unsurprisingly there were also very few white people who joined the anti-racist demonstrations in the beginning of the 1990s following the attacks and the tightening of the Aliens Act (Ayim 2012, 59). Thus, from the beginning of the 1990s, there was even more need for self-organization and activism. Women/lesbians built upon the approaches of the 1980s. Especially immigrant congresses formed the basis for new alliances and supported and enabled the further thematization of the situation of blacks and Jewish lesbian women (see Ani et al. 2007, 297). As a result, racism among white women/lesbians could be approached. The women affected by racism confronted white Germans in the women/lesbian movement and made exclusions and racism visible and treatable, so that, there today, racism is at least the subject of discussion. In contrast, reflections upon racism and nationalism in the white, majority German gay male scene have yet to meaningfully occur.

Through the struggle self-organization, racism has been put on the table in several areas of society, enabling the struggle against it. Yet, this activism is still limited to subcultures and does reach the necessary breadth in the white society and white scientific institutions (FeMigra 1994; Kilomba 2009).

So it is unsurprising that central social developments are neither initiated nor even accompanied by white (scientific) institutions. The interventions continue to be made on a voluntary basis and often precariously, for example, by people who organize themselves in NGOs in order to receive some financial support. This imposed fundraising leads to only temporary support and thus to drastic institutional control over these groups. New – and queer – perspectives continue to come especially from self-organizations such as ADEFRA, LeSMigras (Lesbian/bisexual migrant and black lesbians and trans*) and GLADT (Gay and Lesbians from Turkey), and often from trans*.

‘All of It’: Contemporary Political Struggles

Many on the left have arrived at the position that queer anti-capitalist activism is of utmost importance. The different stages of queer history and theory-formation are more than suitable towards this end: queer struggles were directed against violent attacks by state institutions – the police – and were entangled with economic issues. In New York’s Christopher Street, as before in San Francisco, it was especially homeless youth, working class folks, trans*, and drag queens of color who fought with great intensity. Middle-class gays and lesbians, who would lat-
er be integrated into the system, positioned themselves on the other side – that of the police and state power – by forbidding queer homeless youth and Sylvia Rivera entrance to the Lesbian and Gay Center in the winter’s cold. With that, they escalated the verbal. and in part, physical attacks against trans* persons of color, emanating out of the gay and lesbian scene to a new and life-threatening level.

A similar division of interests has been developing for years in Germany. Homelessness, suicide attempts and suicide are particularly common among queer adolescents. 18 percent of lesbian and gay teenagers reported at least one suicide attempt (Senate Administration Berlin [eds.] 1999; see also Council of Europe 2011, 106f). Studies of trans* individuals indicate that more than 30 percent of trans* adolescents attempted suicide (Council of Europe 2011, 106f). Trans* people experience massive mental and physical violations in contemporary society, both by non-state actors such as transphobic people, and directly organized by the state, for instance through the institutional promotion of exclusionary sexual dualism and the pathologization of trans* identities through the medical system (Allex 2012). Whereas predominantly trans* people, drag queens and cis* women were the most active groups fighting for gay liberation in the US, as well as in West and East Germany of the 1970s and 1980s, a massive transition also occurred. Today white middle-class cis* men dominate gay politics and pursue their own interests. Their aim is that white middle class gays could share all the privilege heterosexual white cis* men of the middle-class enjoy in society – poor gays, women, people of color, intersex and gender-nonconforming people all continue to be discriminated against.

This is shown in the actions of the largest German gay association, the LSVD, which has almost exclusively campaigned for the participation of gays (and lesbians) in marital privileges. By contrast, it only rarely addressed sexism, transphobia, and racism in German society – and among gays and lesbians. It even occasionally took racist positions regarding queers of color. The so-called “victim counseling” organization Maneo goes in a similar direction and is a central racist actor, perpetuating colonial clichés. On the one side, the “threatened” white gay man is portrayed, and on the other side and in the colonial tradition, the image of the “other” is presented (see Yilmaz-Günay (ed.) 2011b; Wolter 2011). Maneo tries explicitly to produce the corresponding data – in press releases and at events, the Maneo employee Bastian Finke surmised a particular aggression of people of color against white gays, even though their own database did not provide any evidence for this assumption (nor does it stand up to methodological statistical standards) (see also Ruder 2011 [2007]; Buchterkirchen 2007; Blech 2009).
The production of and adherence to clear identities is pivotal for the functioning of racism through the LSVD and Maneo: white, gay, middle-class is threatened by black, hetero and poor. The racist aggravations going on in Berlin can also be observed in the nationwide magazines of the gay community. Racist covers like “Turks out!” with the subtitle “Coming out in two cultures,” (Siegessäule, November 2003), “Poland is not yet lost ...” (respekt, March 2006), and “HIV infections: black prospects for next year” – with a Black person wearing a Santa Claus hat as ‘cover illustration’ (exit, December 2008), at least raised some critical reactions. Still, on a regular basis, contributions appear which perpetuate the racist and nationalist German grand narrative, in which gays and cis* women from the white and Christian-atheistic mainstream society are supposedly threatened by the “other”, whereby especially Muslims are depicted as dangerous.

This procedure reverses the blame. It distracts from the exclusions in the gay scene in which it is now standard to disallow women into many venues, contrary to the Anti-Discrimination Law. Repeatedly, people of color are denied entry to gay clubs. A report in Siegessäule from July 2010 about the gay club Connection confirmed this, after repeated racist incidents in the gay scene in Berlin Schöneberg: “the developments that Asians are not allowed into certain gay establishments in Schöneberg are not new,” (Siegessäule Online, July 2010). Sexual preferences of the white clientele, which are influenced not least by colonial imputations, are even cited as a legitimate pretext for racial discrimination. An employee of Connection explained the incident in an interview: “Unfortunately many guests don’t come when there are too many Asians in the club. We try to make it right for everyone,” (ibid.). Who are the welcomed “guests” and who is excluded is obvious (Wolter 2010).

In the meantime, discrimination became the basic pillar of gay subculture and is obviously so accepted, that the operators of gay locations are not even making an effort to hide this. A new level of escalation was reached through influential white gays, who supported the participation of the right-wing extremist party Pro Cologne at the Cologne pride parade. Olaf Alp, the publisher of the gay magazines blu, rik, gab, exit, hinnerk and leo as well as operator of the radio show blu.fm and the manager of the influential and popular dating portal for gay men gayromeo.com, argued for the participation of the right-wing extremist group and expressed racist and, in particular, anti-Muslim resentment (Blech 2013). Another exclusion should be named: poor people often have no chance to enter locations because of the admission fee, except when they possess certain characteristics particularly attractive for the ‘guests’ and club operators, such as youth or desirable masculine or feminine features.
Some white German gays are currently aiming to be recognized by mainstream society. Their homosexuality should no longer be regarded as a flaw; rather, they want to stand on the winners’ side in the hegemonic discourses. This interest expresses itself graphically when the cover of the gay magazine *binnerk* shows a big map of Germany in the national colors with the title “Top 100 homosexuals who move Germany” (*binnerk* May 2006) or when during the foundation of a Magnus Hirschfeld Institute of the Berlin initiative *Queer Nations* expresses its desire “that in a few years the Federal President will inaugurate this institution. The signal would then be clear: Germany is a liberal country, one that values homosexuality and protects lesbians and gays” (Initiative Queer Nations 2013 [2006]).

That only a few people are meant by this, while queers of color, trans* people and homeless queers continue to be discriminated against and refugees are not protected but threatened by a restrictive asylum legislation and racism in Germany – all of this is not only ignored but even partly supported. In the political groups of gay, trans* and drag queens of the 1970s and 1980s the activists did not want to be represented or legitimated by the institutions of German statehood. They instead opposed repressive statehood and opposed capitalism and its state institutions and demanded a just social order.

There are different causes as to how positions previously not linked to emancipatory struggles have become dominant, addressed especially in works of the women/lesbian movement. Referring to the ‘gay movement’, an important point is that after the most dangerous struggles were over, the activism became much more attractive for white bourgeois gay men, who could now dominate the further battles and demands. The dangerous and infringing struggles were mainly led by people for whom living conditions were intolerable, a situation which existed especially for people who were affected by several factors of social exclusion, such as class, sexism and gender-dualist norms and racism. Their demands were adequately far-reaching and aimed at new, just social relationships. They formulated radical positions attacking the state, nationalism and the restrictive gender model. With increasing recognition, however, the people who took a more dominant role where the ones asking to be fully a part of the state and to remove disadvantages, which denied the participation in lucrative and prestigious positions in bourgeois society. Consequently, the demands since then have been significantly confined to ‘marriage’ and tax and inheritance benefits.

In the women/lesbian movement, the turn in its activism was already thoroughly discussed.

Here again, especially since the 1980s, a shift away from radical demands on
the state, its institutions and categories were visible and instead positions were asserted favoring an integration of the demands of the women/lesbian movement to hegemonic state policy.

Also in this case, some were increasingly concerned with participation in lucrative and prestigious positions, and a few even expressed the perspective that participation of women in the military constitutes emancipation. Ilona Bubeck sums up the developments in her essay ‘A new bourgeois women’s movement?’ (Bubeck 1993) She discerns dependencies of women’s organizations, which would eventually also influence their demands and inner structure, and encouraged them to address class issues more forcefully. Bubeck writes:

“This corresponds to the tendency to found or expand women’s organizations, for which the state provides money and paid positions. The political motivation and social necessity of a women’s organization play in the consideration of a subordinate role. The new motto is: jobs at any price! Did the state not partly achieve thereby what it wanted – that women’s organizations are created, which it is willing to support (and with which it can also cast a friendly image for itself) rather than, vice versa, women’s political organizations would assert their funding? Was it not about outfoxing the state instead of obeying it? But some women seem to profit from obeying, and organizations fell exactly into this trap. Some better paid persons took their place, with the result that the policy and structure of the organizations completely change ... Today, posts in women’s organizations are nothing more than a job serving as a necessary step or even a springboard for the development of personal careers. This would not be objectionable if this attitude wouldn’t totally change the policy and function of these organizations and serve for the exclusion or lesser payment of poorer and less qualified women ... The discussions in the seventies about the dangers that an integration of women’s organizations (and leftist alternative projects) entail seem to have been forgotten” (ibid.).

Exactly this seems to be a central point for activist struggles: oppositional activities and organizations are legalized and integrated by the state if they become strong enough. Financial resources and posts, which initially promise more opportunities for the organization, alternate within a few years into institutional pressure, preventing an overly critical positioning. Finally, numerous projects censor themselves to avoid conflicts with institutions – also with regard to the effects on the employees. Political activists are divided because discussions about ‘realpolitik’ are always taking place within the limits imposed by funding on the one side and radical criticism on the other, which must be negotiated.
This integration effort by state institutions came on display in the history of the squatters’ movements of the 1990s in Erfurt (East Germany): whereas ‘unregistered’ squatting actions had to deal with massive police operations, the aim of later legalizations of squats by the authorities was the integration of the ‘delinquents’ into the legal order, in particular the maintenance of the right to property, and in addition dividing and marginalizing the most radical people (Meyerbeer and Späth 2012). To autonomously occupy empty houses and thus selectively putting into question the central basis of capitalist society – the right to property – obviously roused massive resistance from the state.

Queer activism is from the beginning – since the battles of Sylvia Rivera, Marsha P. Johnson, of trans* persons of color, people of the working class, homeless youth – centrally linked with the fight against capitalist property rights, repressive state power and racism. Currently, this becomes obvious through the involvement of queers of color in the battles against gentrification in Berlin, New York or Istanbul. Exactly when people do not let themselves be divided into groups or identities, but instead when many people with different backgrounds are active together, it becomes clear that demonstrations, strikes, blockades of house evictions, etc. with thousands of participants are possible.

Joint political actions are not possible without conflict within the movements, since racist and antisemitic divisions of human beings continue to have an effect also within activist groups and alliances. It is more dangerous for some people than for others to struggle in such movements, often resulting in injuries. Also in these movements dominant and exclusive – white – positions must be repeatedly addressed. The privileged must reflect their presuppositions and work to dismantle them. On the other hand, as Haritaworn has said, the “demand, which is usually put on unruly minoritized people, to ally with majoritized people of all political positions” is problematic because it “denies the pain, the risk and the danger that is associated with approaching your oppressors only to be pushed back again, to be patronized or demonized” (2005, 32).

Coalition is therefore a constant challenge: especially for minoritized people. And left-wing white activists should be aware that in many cases they have internalized colonial, racist, anti-Semitic and sexist positions. They – and this also includes the authors of this book – must work to recognize these positions in order to overcome them. This can begin with an interest in the perspectives of minoritized people. In that sense we have to acknowledge the work of queers of colors and the black women’s movement for the positions presented in this book. From our perspective, it is not enough just to recognize that one is speaking from
a privileged position. It is about listening, reading and constantly positioning yourself in solidarity with P.o.C, their organizations and respecting their right to define the situation.

With this book we would like to encourage this process, after noticing that also among white queers the positions and essays of minoritized people are hardly known. We ourselves present here the outcome of a discussion process, which came into being through the recommendations, suggestions, critique and conversations with/from acquaintances and good friends who shared their insights about the functioning of capitalism through the segmentation of people. We would like to thank especially Christopher Sweetapple, Koray Yılmaz-Günay, Ralf Bucherkirchen and Zülfükar Çetin. Heinz-Jürgen was especially helped by the many good discussions in seminars and after lectures. Nonetheless, only we authors (i.e. Salih Alexander Wolter and Heinz-Jürgen Voß) are responsible for the present essays, and any criticism should be directed at us alone.

We were partially surprised by the intensity of violence and the forcible omission of important protagonists of queer struggles from white queer historiography, even though we were somehow prepared, knowing of racist and transphobic incidents in lesbian, gay and queer subcultures. We did not expect, for example, the levels of ‘whitewashing’ and clear gender identity of the gay liberation movement and the concrete psychologically and physically violent and ultimately even life-threatening impact on the protagonists – including Sylvia Rivera and Marsha P. Johnson.

Here it is the responsibility of critical queer activism to keep on naming the actual events of queer history – in order to prevent ‘whitewashing’ and the disciplining of gender identity. Some recent developments make us optimistic that today’s fights for a just society might be successful. Beside the increasingly deep analysis of the functioning of (neoliberal) capitalist conditions, in particular actions undertaken in many places unfold and often connect a local action level with international exchange.

The fights of trans* and inter* bring together concrete local protests with international cooperation. The cross-border cooperation has made it possible for the regulation of ‘coerced sterilization’ of transsexuals in Sweden to be reversed. In Germany, the critique of the violent and traumatizing sex-assignment procedures on intersexed minors could at least become visible at the institutional level through the interventions of international organizations which were called in by inter* self-organizations. Locally, internationally and in a non-institutional manner, the fight against the pathologization of trans* and inter* shows many successes.
This is where “modern” society is touched to the core: medicine and biology, their definitional power with their ever so extensive effect on the division of people, being fundamentally attacked. This critique could be sustained and furthered if it were to not only deal with sexual assignments but also, from an understanding of the functioning of capitalism, were it to criticize how the division of people occurs along racist lines, to reveal the attacks on classes and bodies and to name the sorting and selection of people according to their exploitability. That this understanding characterizes protests is made clear from overreaching coalitions in the political actions against gentrification and the global battles against the social effects of the crises of capitalism and evermore repressive state violence.

While people who come from economically secured conditions can often and usually without risk return to a bourgeois-secure existence when the struggles are unsuccessful, this is not the case for many people of the working class, trans* and queers of color. They have no such possibilities of retreat, and the struggles usually are a necessity for them due to an existentially intolerable situation. In the struggles, and even more so when they are unsuccessful, they are the first victims of repressive state measures. Not only because the economically precarious often fight in the front row, but in particular because of these uncertain starting points, they thus must substantially determine the direction of the fighting. Following Spivak, Davis and Crenshaw – if developed in such a way, political struggles for a just, non-discriminatory and thus necessarily non-capitalist society could be successful.

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This bibliography is the translation of the bibliography of the entire Queer and (Anti-)Capitalism, that is, both part one (Wolter) and part two (Voß).


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Gleissner-Bonetti, Lucia. "Missionarsstellung ist nicht sexy. Von den Verbindungen zwischen


Haritaworn, Jin. “Der Menschheit treu: Rassenverrat und Multi-Themenpolitik im derzeitigen


**Author**

Heinz-Jürgen Voß, a biologist as well as a social scientist, completed his PhD on *Making Sex Revisited. Deconstruction of Sex from a Biological-Medical Perspective (Making Sex Revisited. Dekonstruktion des Geschlechts aus biologisch-medizinischer Perspektive, 2010)* and is currently holding a professorship in sexology and sexual education at Merseburg University of Applied Sciences while also leading the research project Protection of Children and Adolescents from Sexual Trauma (funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education Research) and the EU project TRASE (Training in Sexual Education for People with Disabilities). His/her publications include *Biological Sex: Against Naturelness (Geschlecht: Wider die Natürlichkeit, 2011)* and the edited volume *To Musicalize the Idea of Homosexuality. On the Topicality of Guy Hocquenghem (Die Idee der Homosexualität musikalisieren. Zur Aktualität von Guy Hocquenghem, 2018)*.

**Translators**

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Yossi Bartal was born and raised in Jerusalem, where he was active in queer organizing and campaigns against the Israeli occupation. After moving to Berlin in 2006, he studied Gender Studies and Musicology at the Humboldt University and finished his MA in Musicology with a thesis on rebellious forms of Flamenco culture. He has written extensively in Hebrew, German and English publications on various cultural and political themes. Currently he spends his time between translation and editing jobs, literature projects, being a tour guide, and political activism.
“An encounter between Muslims and homosexuals in a mosque was cancelled,” begins a report in the *taz*\(^2\), in order to scandalize the supposedly failed attempt at a meeting between LGBTI* representatives and spokespersons of the Berlin Şehitlik mosque (cf. Wierth 2014). Beyond such scandalizing reports, this chapter takes a retrospective look at homonationalist tendencies and their accompanying processes of transformation in urban district politics in German cities, taking Berlin as a representative case. Along the lines of the concept of a “dominant culture” developed by Birgit Rommelspacher (1945–2015) (cf. Rommelspacher 1995), I will attempt to examine and explicate the concept of homonationalism, even as no claim to the perfect translatability of either concept will be made.

Rommelspacher begins from the premise of the co-constitution and reciprocal interplay of racist, heterosexist and class-specific relations of dominance in society. According to her, social analysis should look at “different dimensions of power” as structured “in terms of an interwoven network of dominance” (Rommelspacher 2006, 3). Racism, heteronormativity, and class dominance mutually influence and condition one another and are strengthened through the practice of exclusions and inclusions in social spaces, such as living and work spaces or

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1 Translated from the German by Smaran Dayal.

2 *taz*, an abbreviation of the name *Die Tageszeitung*, is a left-wing German daily newspaper.
the institutions of the state and the city council. Even in so-called civil society, which plays a part in social policy and thereby necessarily influences it, one is confronted by the interwoven nature of the aforementioned dimensions of power.

In her longtime work in social analysis, Rommelspacher looks into the causes of social inequalities. In order to illuminate the effects of the dominant culture, she questions the West’s universalizing claim to equality and deconstructs it using the example of white feminist emancipation discourse. This discourse assumes the oppression of non-white women in a (constructed) Muslim world, while simultaneously imagining white European women as their contrastive opposite. In this discourse, the West is ascribed a “superior, civilized status,” while the “rest of the world” is declared to be “uncivilized,” “backward” (cf. Attia 2009; Hall 1992; Erdem 2009; Prasad 2014; Shooman 2014). Parallel to white feminist emancipation discourse on the theme of “oppressed migrant Muslim women,” a discourse about “gay Muslims persecuted and discriminated against by their own communities” continues to be cultivated. In both cases, what is at stake is the constructed invisibility of ‘Muslim’ migrant women and gay ‘Muslims’.

What is made invisible in this discourse of emancipation are the contradictions of white feminism, which, although it speaks out against the oppression of Muslim women (or those marked as Muslim), not only reproduces racism against Muslim men, but also against women, who, on the basis of their (alleged) religious and cultural belonging, are turned into passive, non-agential, child-bearing figures, waiting to be liberated. A further contradiction of white feminism is manifested in the elision (in the frame of this discourse) of white, educated, and professional women’s experiences of sexism as well, who have to endure them in their intimate relationships, working conditions, and other societal areas. In its discourse of emancipation, white feminism also fails to recognize the racism experienced by those Muslim women constructed as non-emancipated. According to Rommelspacher, the concept of emancipation points towards further incongruities in connection with its political claim:

“On the one hand, it overturns the hierarchization between women, and on the other, through the blending out of other relations of power, such as [...] the ethnic hierarchy, it advances an illusion of emancipation, which avoids the question of redistribution [of wealth] in gender relations. [...] For women who belong to the majority society, not only does it secure their own advancement, but it also relieves the pressure from their own gender relations, in that those conflicts are outsourced to a certain extent” (Rommelspacher 2009a, 4).
It is in this context that Rommelspacher demonstrates the enmeshment of different relations of dominance in societal structures which are postcolonial, and defined by patriarchy, class dominance, and racism. In these relations of dominance, as will be illustrated in the following text, civil society, the state, scientific inquiry, and the media are interlocked, in the sense of forming alliances for the continuation and enforcement of an emancipation mandate. In order to fulfill this mandate, migration, gender, and sexual politics that are shaped by racism are put into practice.

Critical feminist scholars such as Nivedita Prasad and Esra Erdem take up these discourses in relation to the political situation of those women who are marked as Muslims or migrants, and they come to the conclusion that the white feminist emancipation discourse in Germany is not only cultivated through the media, but also simultaneously influences social work, as well as social policy and research. They demonstrate in their scholarly work the alarming (immigration-related) legal consequences that the white feminist emancipation discourse leads to (cf. Prasad 2014; Erdem 2009). Rommelspacher also establishes in her research that, since the “headscarf ruling” in 2003\(^3\), the debate about the emancipation of Muslim women has escalated and become even more fundamental. Issues such as “forced marriages, honor killings and male violence” ever more frequently provided occasion to ask the question, whether Islam – rendered in the singular as “\textit{der} Islam,” and understood as one monolithic entity – was at all reconcilable with Western democracies, and it became – and continues to be – ever more pressing to warn people about the influence of Islamists on Western societies (Rommelspacher 2009a, 1). For example, in 2007, the Residence Act (\textit{Aufenthaltsgesetz}), among other regulations, was tightened, and migrants from so-called third countries moving to Germany as a result of their marriage to a German citizen now had to prove their knowledge of the German language before entering the country. In the frame of this change of law, the minimum age for so-called marriage migrants

\(^3\) Editor’s Note (CS): In 2003, the Federal Supreme Court of Germany declared unconstitutional Baden-Württemberg state legislation prohibiting women wearing headscarves to work as teachers in public schools (while, for instance, Christian nuns in their traditional habits were allowed). Following this ruling, the city of Berlin passed a law, still in force today, banning all people exhibiting any sign of religious affiliation (like headscarves, kippahs or little crosses) from working in “exposed positions” of the public service. For a full account and trustworthy analysis of these legal controversies about headscarves in Germany, see Beverley Weber’s \textit{Violence and Gender in the New Europe: Islam in German Culture} (2013).
(Heiratsmigrant_innen) was increased in order to prevent alleged forced marriages (cf. Prasad 2014, 97). This tightening of the law, moreover, corresponded to the demands of the “hegemonic-feminist representatives of civil society” (ibid., 97). In particular, the study Zwangsverheiratung in Deutschland – Anzahl und Analyse von Beratungsfällen, which was carried out in 2007 by the Federal Ministry of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth in collaboration with the white-feminist organization Terre des Femmes (ibid., 97), was mobilized to justify the new regulations and fostered culturalist, racist and gender-specific discussions about integration, civilization or modernity in Germany. In the course of these discussions, white feminism was transformed into a hegemonic feminism, which held German society, on the basis of its (post-)Christian-Western values, to be enlightened, advanced and humanitarian, and imagined it as threatened by Muslim migrants (cf. Çetin and Taş 2014; Prasad 2014).

Parallel to the white-feminist emancipation discourse, which, in spite of its contradictions, asserts a universalist claim to representation for all women and thereby elevates the “liberal-democratic” values of white European societies to the level of a norm, since at least the 2000s, an anti-Muslim and racist homophobia-discourse has also developed alongside it (cf. Çetin 2012, 73).

In my study, Homophobie und Islamophobie (cf. ibid.), using biographical-narrative interviews with binational gay couples, I showed how the entanglement of racism and heteronormativity could be demonstrated, bearing in mind the preponderant anti-discrimination politics in Europe. In order to analyze this multi-dimensional discrimination, interviewees were chosen whose multiple belongings, for example gay, Muslim, migrant, and unemployed, furthered these forms of discrimination. One of the central problematics of the study was directed towards debates about situations and contexts within which heteronormativity, racism, and class dominance overlap, defining the lives and circumstances of the interviewees to a considerable degree. A conclusion reached by the study was that the interviewees experienced discrimination on the basis of racist ascriptions, imputed religious belonging, institutional racism, homophobia, as well as social status (cf. ibid.). The study was able to testify to the fact that discrimination is socially and historically conditioned and very strongly influences the contemporary situation of a society such as Germany, one which migration can no longer be ignored. My study also illus-
trated the forms of legitimation of, first and foremost, racist discrimination, as well as the inadequacy of an anti-discrimination politics in combatting institutional and everyday forms of (multi-dimensional) discrimination in Germany. With those anti-discrimination policies of the 2000s, “the rights of (heterosexual) women and (male) homosexuals” were now jointly negotiated over and against non-Christian and non-Western sections of the population (Yılmaz-Günay 2014, 8). The media, political, and academic discussions about “women’s and gay rights” were aimed at securing one’s own access to social privileges, and at excluding certain groups regarded as contrastive to “Christian-Western” norms from symbolic and material resources (cf. Rommelspacher 2009b, 25).

A fundamental problem in the emancipation debate, Rommelspacher observes, is

“that even the demand for human rights can serve the legitimation of relations of dominance – namely, in those cases, where a specific form of their application, above and beyond all societal structures and social contexts, is declared binding for all. In contrast to such an understanding, it seems more sensible to more closely observe the possibilities and limits of freedom and self-determination in light of social and cultural contexts, as well as to see the chances and risks which, for example, a strategy of gender difference, as well as one of gender equality, holds within it” (Rommelspacher 2009a, 15).

Considering the universalist reach of human rights discourse, and especially this white-feminist emancipation discourse, it seems at this stage appropriate to understand homonationalism as an expression of a discursive hegemony, or for that matter the dominant culture, and to subject it to critique, insofar as it is shown in this chapter to be parallel with white-feminist emancipation and equality discourses.

**Homonationalism as a New Migration and Sexual Politics**

The concept of homonationalism was established by Jasbir Puar in 2007, who in doing so related it to Lisa Duggan’s term ‘homonormativity’ (cf. Duggan 2002). In her book *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times*, Puar problematizes a “new homonormative” sexual politics in the USA, which she describes as homonormative nationalism, or homonationalism. According to Puar,
homonationalism serves and reproduces heteronormative, nationalist, racist and
class relations (cf. Puar 2007) and is based on the increasing acceptance of gays
and lesbians in Western states as an expression of ‘civilizational superiority,’ par-
ticularly vis-à-vis Muslim societies, which, in contrast to the West, are seen as less

Puar mentions the support given by white gay and lesbian organizations to
the American War on Terror as a prime example of homonationalism; organi-
izations which, on the one hand, see their rights as homosexuals threatened by
putatively homophobic Muslim societies, and which, on the other, argue in sup-
port of the emancipation of Iraqi homosexuals (cf. Puar 2013; Böhmelt et al.
2012).

This concept of American homonationalism and the analysis of its mode of
operation have been successfully carried over and applied to the German con-
text by Jin Haritaworn and others, who at the latest by the early 2000s were
problematizing the character of the prevailing debate around homophobia as
culturalizing, racializing, ethnicizing, and classing (cf. Haritaworn 2009). In an
essay co-written with other feminists, Haritaworn discusses this ‘new’ European
sexual politics:

“Ethnicizing gender and sexuality discourses now play a central role in the New
Europe’s ‘security and value debate’. The constructs of ‘Muslim sexism’ and ‘Muslim
homophobia’ legitimate repressive anti-terrorism measures, the radical reversal of
hard-won citizenship, immigration, and residency rights and the tearing down of
social rights and civil freedoms. Alongside terrorism, gender and sexuality are the
new principles upon which Islamophobic struggles are championed both at home
and abroad” (Haritaworn et al. 2007, 8).

German Homonationalism and its Patterns of Argumentation

The following section will address the history of the origins of German homona-
tionalism, against the backdrop of the quoted explanatory approach. Subsequent-
ly, the concurrence of racist and class-determined processes of transformation and
gentrification will be highlighted on the basis of concrete examples from urban
district politics in Berlin. The arguments in this chapter are based primarily on
the observations, analyses, and activities of activists, scholars, writers, and groups
who find themselves in these processes and simultaneously critically intervene in
them through their work (cf. Çetin 2015b, 35).
German Homonationalism and Gentrification

Even though the discussion about homonationalism in Germany has only been taking place since the end of the 2000s, one can take an earlier genesis of this phenomenon as a starting point. With the AIDS crisis in the 1980s, the gay ‘community’ in West Germany also found itself to be the focus of ‘preventive’ health policies of the state and non-governmental organizations (cf. Bänziger 2014, 180f). The policies were designed to be both repressive as well as providing for liberal preventative strategies against the spread of AIDS. Through the crisis, conservative circles brought the promiscuity of gay men, among other things, to the fore, and wanted to force upon them a sexually abstinent lifestyle. In this way, they furthered moralizing and marginalizing processes in Germany, as a result of which, and in opposition to which, AIDS-Hilfe (English: AIDS-help) groups were founded and anti-AIDS campaigns launched. Through the anti-AIDS campaigns of individual organizations and AIDS-Hilfe groups, as well as through state-sponsored prevention strategies, the 1990s saw the normalization of AIDS (cf. ibid.). In the course of anti-AIDS politics in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the possibility of ‘gay marriage’ began to be discussed with increased fervor in Germany. Despite these being controversial positions, the Greens, who conceived of their ‘gay and lesbian politics’ as a civil rights issue, were able to raise the topic of ‘gay marriage’ in the Bundestag in 1987 (cf. Raab 2009, 235f). The Greens’ discussions and struggles for gay marriage lasted until the end of the 1990s. These political efforts strengthened the establishment and institutionalization of, above all, a gay identity politics, and consequently the civil partnership law (Lebenspartnerschaftsgesetz) for same sex couples was passed in 2001 (cf. Voß 2013c). During its passing, the civil partnership law was explicitly criticized for its patriarchal and heteronormative character, in particular by representatives of the group Lesbenring e. V. (ibid.).

The Institutionalization of Gay Identity Politics and the Contemporary State of Homonationalism

A precise chronology of German homonationalism would go beyond the scope of this contribution. Nevertheless, it is important here to be reminded of a few socio-political facts, which bring to the fore the entanglements of homonationalism with migration and citizenship politics, with urban district politics, as well as with journalistic and academic information politics.
In the context of a post-9/11 integration discourse in Germany and the attack\(^5\) by a (non-‘Muslim’!) animal rights activist on the gay Dutch right-wing populist Pim Fortuyn (1948–2002), who mobilized the issue of ‘homophobia and Muslims’ for his election campaign, Muslims – or those marked or perceived as ‘Muslims’ – at least those in Western societies, began to be subjected to racialized ascriptions wound up with, among other things, sexual and security politics.

These and similar events were and are routinely declared by the media and in the political sphere as attacks on ‘democratic coexistence’ in Western societies. This occurs through the uninterrupted construction of oppositions between an ‘Us’ and a ‘Them’, whereby the lines of demarcation are drawn along the issues of democracy and integration. On the basis of the construction of a democratic, tolerant, civilized ‘Us’, we hear repeated the necessity of protecting the ‘oppressed, unemancipated and veiled Muslim’ woman, on the one hand, and the ‘Muslim’ gay man, on the other. The forced visibilization of the veiled woman and the hidden gay man has consummated itself in an alliance of state, scientific inquiry, civil society, and the media of the dominant society, which, through studies, news reports, campaigns, and social work, manifests a ‘clash of cultures’ in the name of the ‘liberal-democratic constitutional order’ of Germany. It is in this tenor that the so-called ‘Muslim test’ was introduced in 2005/2006 by the government of the German state of Baden-Württemberg. The test required people in possession of a passport from ‘Muslim countries’ looking to naturalize in Germany to undergo a moral exam and answer questions related to terrorism, antisemitism, their religious outlooks, their ideas about femininity and masculinity, as well as about the acceptance of homosexuals (Migration & Bevölkerung 2006). In connection with these events, the young ‘Muslim’ man – in the context of ‘civilization’ – was transformed into the embodiment of an Islamist terrorist, an oppressor of women, and a violent homophobe, and simultaneously classified as a threat to the West and its democratic societal structures (cf. GLADT 2009).

Until today, a diversity of ‘Others’ are produced in media, political and schol-

\(^5\) During the course of the investigation into Fortuyn’s murder, the “ethnic” and religious affiliations of the perpetrator were speculated about for months on end. In the mainstream, the attack was assumed to have been radical-Islamist in nature, because Fortuyn, living as an “openly” gay man, regularly made Muslims and their relation to homosexuality a topic of his political career. Even though the perpetrator was identified as an apolitical and non-Muslim (white) animal rights activist six months after the attack, until today, Fortuyn’s murder is thematized in connection with the murder of the filmmaker Theo van Gogh (1957–2004), and both cases are associated with the supposed barbarism, misanthropy and homophobia of Muslims.
early discourses; ‘Others’ who thereby become the objects of studies, education projects or news reports, whereby their exclusion from education and work, as well as inner-city spaces, is supposed to be justified. Since 2001, the image of the ‘homophobic, misogynist, antisemitic, violence-prone, integration-averse’ migrant has been ‘scientifically’ researched through a series of studies, and cultivated in the media. Alongside the aforementioned study on the number of forced marriages in Germany, innumerable other studies – partly in parallel and partly in succession – have been carried out in a similar fashion by the Lesbian and Gay Federation in Germany (LSVD), by the Berlin homophobic assault helpline MANEO, and by the Lower Saxony Criminological Research Institute (cf. Çetin & Taş 2014). These and other, comparable studies, which deal predominantly with the alleged homophobic attitudes, actions, and world-views of ‘migrants’, exhibit grave methodological and ethical shortcomings (cf. ibid.), bespeak culturalizing and biologizing forms of racism, which, among other things, propagate a new (homo-)sexual politics in the name of the ‘new German nation’. While, at the same time, people living in Germany are polarized as gay-friendly, on the one hand, and homophobic, on the other, discussions about one’s own homophobia cease to be had. In connection with this anti-Muslim homophobia debate, a Berlin-based queer of color activist group, following Puar, defined the term homonationalism for the German context,”

“in order to describe this (not always successful) attempt at assimilation, and the accompanying invention of a ‘gay-friendly’ nation. This occurs at the expense of those whose belonging, in the context of war, the tightening of borders, and increasing criminalization, becomes ever more precarious: old and new immigrants, as well as their children and grandchildren – most of all those who are identified as Muslim – Roma and Sinti, as well as other people of color. It also includes those, whose real or fantasized sexual and gender identities (too many children, too little money, not monogamous, married too early, too patriarchal, too oppressed) appear increasingly not to fit into the national norm. Queer, trans* and homosexual or bisexual people, who cannot pass as respectable citizens on the basis of their class-affiliation, whiteness, or their normative masculinity or femininity also fall by the wayside” (SUSPECT 2010a).

In the following section, a few concrete examples will illustrate the homonationalist tendencies which emanate from some white German gay ‘activists’, who are well-known in the gay mainstream. They regard Islam as a religion, which ostensibly promotes violence, murder, and discrimination towards lesbians, gays and
(heterosexual) women, and they see the ‘civilized’ West as threatened by the presence of people who feel themselves attached to Islam.

**Example I: Daniel Krause**

Daniel Krause (born 1980), who completed his teaching degree and a Ph.D. in Sociology in Münster, thematizes in his publications the alleged incompatibility of Western and Muslim societies in reference to the relation between homosexuals and those people, who according to him, belong to Islam. In his publications and talks he defines the West as, above all, an alliance that is neither Muslim nor Islamic: the United States of America, Israel, and Europe are the places in the Western world whose civilizational and liberal values are said to be endangered by the terroristic homophobia of (almost all) Islamic countries.

Alongside this right-wing populist point-of-view, Krause depicts himself, in a scandalizing, polarizing, and hierarchizing manner, as a left-wing gay victim who

“[can] no longer be silent. As hundreds of Salafists were congregating, he spontaneously held a counter-speech. Three minutes against violence, misogyny, and homophobia. Three minutes, during which he put his life on the line. Islamists and left-radicals insulted him as a ‘Nazi’ and began hounding him. For his own protection, [he] had to be released from his position. His rousing book exposed the contradictoriness of left-liberal Germany, which abdicates its most hard-fought achievements to its worst enemies” (Krause 2013).

Thus reads the blurb of his book *A Leftist Against Islamism: A Gay Teacher Shows Courage*. In this text, women and gays are portrayed as threatened by Salafists or Salafis⁷, who, at the same time, are used as a symbol for terrorists.

According to data by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, approximately 7,500 Salafists or Salafis live in Germany today (cf. BfV 2015). Krause’s 2013 book appeared a year after the public debate, shaped by anti-Muslim sentiment, about Salafism and its implications for

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⁶ Meanwhile Krause’s doctorate has since been withdrawn by the University of Münster.

⁷ “In recent years, the descriptor ‘Salafist’ has established itself, whereas into the 2000s the term ‘Salafi’ was dominant. The suffix -ist produces associations to other negatively loaded terms, such as ‘terrorist’, ‘extremist’ and ‘Islamist’” (Friedrich and Schultes 2012, 1).
Germany’s security policies. The catalyst for this debate was the distribution of free copies of the Quran in large German cities. At the time, in 2012, this debate contributed to the de-thematizing of the self-exposed NSU [National Socialist Underground] terror group, in the course of whose crimes nine non-majority-German men and one majority-German police-man were murdered (cf. Güleç 2015). With his book, Krause intends to give his reader the impression that a minority, who he generalizes as Islamist terrorists, existentially threatens another (constructed) minority. In his book, he presents himself as the mouthpiece for women and men, young people and old, homo- and heterosexuals, who have supposedly evinced their solidarity with him (Krause 2013, 8). In the space of a few lines, he classifies this constructed (not simply by him) Islamism as the third largest totalitarian movement after Nationalism Socialism and Communism. His book profits from right-wing populist and anti-Muslim propaganda, while he, for his part, attended demonstrations against Muslims organized by the extreme-right.

In his next published book from 2014, he sharpens his position even further. He titled it *Allah's Unloved Children: Lesbian and Gays in Islam* (*Allahs ungeliebte Kinder – Lesben und Schwule im Islam*). In this publication, Krause becomes more explicit and does not hold back from using the designation ‘Allah’ polemically, as if Allah is supposed to only represent the God of Muslims (and is not simply the Arabic word for God). By presenting gays and lesbians as unloved children of the ‘God of the Muslims’, he once again constructs them in opposition to Muslims, whose attitudes towards homosexuality purportedly do not accord with that of the West’s. The book’s introduction puts it in the following way:

“Equality for lesbians and gays has developed into a characteristic of modern, Western societies: gay marriage, adoption rights, and anti-discrimination laws are increasingly a given here. In Western politics as well as in the Western media, lesbians and gays are muscling in at the very top. In contrast, in Muslim cultures, an opposing trend is identifiable. Not emancipation, but rather the discrimination, persecution, and murder of homosexuals is on the rise. Across the world, lesbians and gays find themselves in desperate straits as a result of life-threatening Islamization. Alongside Islamically-governed states, Muslim parallel-worlds in the midst of Western countries are also affected. Families commit religious ‘honor killings’ of their lesbian daughters. Islamic street gangs attack gays in broad daylight. Salafists threaten homosexuals with a worldwide ‘Holocaust’” (Krause 2014, 9).
At this point, further commentary on these and similar lines that emanate from and are disseminated by Krause is rendered superfluous. What is relevant, however, is that he is not alone in his anti-Muslim position, in which he describes himself as a left-wing Islamkritiker (English: critic of Islam). Another well-known gay figure in the media, David Berger (born 1968), the erstwhile chief editor of the gay magazine Männer, did not simply express his solidarity with Krause, but also supported his public appearances, in which these right-wing populist ideas were propagated (cf. Queer.de 2014). Since then, Berger has insistently positioned himself “against Muslims, against all left-wingers, against ‘old-time gays activists with a veteran’s sentimentality (German: Homo-Altbewegte in Veteranensentimentalität),’ even against the friendliest critics, against the ‘compulsion to be faggy (German: tuntig)’ and the diversity-campaigns of the DAH, Deutsche AIDS-Hilfe, certainly against queer.de and blu, as well as against feminists and ‘gender-mania (German: Gender-Wahn)’” (Schulze 2014).

Example II: Jan Feddersen
Daniel Krause and David Berger represent an extreme form of homonationalism which constructs, on the one hand, a homophobic nation, and on the other, a gay-friendly one, presenting this construction as the truth via political, academic, and journalistic arguments. In this presentation, the term ‘nation’ is not necessarily used in the sense of a political community which exists within the territory of a particular state. It is much more about political demarcations between various (putatively) divided values and norms, which are supposedly irreconcilable with one another. According to this view, similarly to that expressed by the white-feminist emancipation discourse, societies whose cultural heritage is based in Christianity, the (colonialist) Enlightenment and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights belong to the ‘West’. These societies are not simply ascribed both humanitarianism and a respect for women, but also a self-evident acceptance for gay and trans* people. In opposition to the West, it is not an ‘East’ that is spoken of, but rather an ‘Orient’, which symbolizes barbarism, misanthropy, misogyny, homophobia, and is simultaneously declared a hostile threat for the ‘West’ in different (international) political contexts.

Jan Feddersen (born 1957), a taz journalist who by his own account has been active in gay politics since the 1970s, can be named as a further
example of the representatives of homonationalism. His article, published in 2003, “What are you looking at? Are you gay?” begins with a claim (one that is represented time and again by the white gay community):

“A high percentage of the violence against gay people is carried out by people from the Islamic cultural sphere. The problem is tabooed, its thematization is politically incorrect. Instead, one asks: were those attacked too open with their sexual identity?” (Feddersen 2003)

Feddersen’s pattern of argumentation conforms to the operations of racism and the instrumentalization of homophobia towards the legitimation of his claims. The fact that the journalist counterposes gay people and the so-called Islamic ‘cultural sphere’ and declares them to be enemies shows, first and foremost, the polarizing character of his ordinary racism. Even the instrumentalization of homophobia, which putatively emanates from the Islamic ‘cultural sphere’, can be understood as an attempt by the writer to hierarchize two groups according to the frequency with which they experience violence and discrimination. Whereas (white) gays are presented as the victims of ‘Islamic’ violence, in the course of the article, they are also ascribed a (physical) inferiority in opposition to young Muslim men, who are imagined as hyper-masculine. According to Feddersen, there is more homophobia than racism in Germany, even as the latter is tabooed. The tabooization mentioned in the article is supposed to polemically substantiate the inferiority and victim-status of white gay men. Feddersen’s article is to be considered as a reproach to or sharp criticism of the non-Islamic (majority-)society, which does not care to protect the gay minority, afflicted by violence from orientalized homophobes: “The other passengers watched the appalling actions almost passively ... The three young men sat dazed in their seat, wordless, shocked, impotent even, because no one had helped them. They couldn’t even feel angry” (ibid.). Feddersen refers to data from Bastian Finke, director of MANEO, the Berlin-based violence counseling service for gay and bisexual men: “The public danger for gay men emanates to an extreme degree from young men of Turkish or, more generally, Islamic conditioning (German: Prägung)” (ibid.).

Feddersen’s reporting in this subject area is not limited to the article cited above. In a review of a publication by the Lesbian and Gay Federation in Germany (LSVD), Muslims Under the Rainbow, he congratulates the editors because (their) volume
“breaks with the taboo. It is true and evident that the Western, capitalist world hardly persecutes gays and lesbians any longer. Even in the USA, the Supreme Court recently put an end to all state-level legislation which forbade “sodomite’ or “homosexual’ [acts], or indeed made them a punishable offense. All non-heterosexuals were exposed to lethal, or at least life-threatening repression, in those places where socialist totalitarianism ruled – or are today, harsher than before, where Islam sets the political agenda” (Feddersen 2004).

In the introduction to his review, Feddersen, as shown above, makes a distinction between the gay-friendly West and the hostile Rest (Muslims). He stands as an exemplary representative of an ‘enlightened’ Western gay man and speaks, on the one hand, to other Western gay men, who possibly don’t have access to a media platform. On the other, he addresses other Western people who in no way have a positive relation to either Islam or Muslims, and therefore, however, are supposedly ‘threatened’ by the latter. In this review, Feddersen carries his anti-Muslim rhetoric forward and accentuates his thesis, quoted above, through the assumption that the ‘conflicts’ staged in Muslims Under the Rainbow “find their continuation in the midst of the Western world – namely, in those districts in which Muslim-influenced immigrant groups shape everyday life in Christian-secular majority societies. That is to say, even in Germany, in its metropolises” (Feddersen 2004).

The cases presented thus far (Krause, Berger and Feddersen) can only exemplarily highlight a white gay journalistic homonationalism, whose legitimation, however, is to be found in a continuous interworking of the state, scientific inquiry, and civil society.

Homonationalism through the State, Scientific Inquiry and Civil Society

In discourses around antisemitism, terrorism, societal violence, and the violation of women’s and LGBTI* rights, Muslims and those marked as Muslims are constructed as the cause of these problems. In this discursive (anti-Muslim) racism, they are portrayed as being incompatible with ‘one’s own’ Christian-Western values and norms. Indeed, in these propagandistic anti-Muslim discourses, the ‘occidental’ contradiction is de-thematized through the suppression of colonial history and the invisibilization of post-colonial racist practices, such as those in refugee, border-regime, and migration policies. This contradiction reveals itself most of all in the perpetrator-victim-reversal and victimization in relation to
discriminatory acts, which, among other things, are constitutive of racism, homophobia, and class dominance.

The homonationalist interplay of scientific inquiry, civil society, and the state manifests itself in the (re-)production of anti-Muslim racism in the context of an incessant anti-Muslim homophobia discourse (cf. Çetin and Saadat-Lendle 2014). The claim that gay and bisexual men are said to be most severely threatened by young Muslim men has been legitimated by numerous studies, such as the MANEO-surveys between 2006 and 2008, the Simon study in 2007, or even the Pfeiffer study in 2011. Notwithstanding their methodological deficiency, the undertakers of these studies disseminated the results of these and other studies that were just as polemical as they were polarizing. This occurred at the expense of a group that was ascribed a migration background (German: Migrationshintergrund) and a Muslim religious belonging (for an analysis of these studies, see Çetin & Taş 2014; Çetin and Saadat-Lendle 2014).

On the Visibility of Victims and Perpetrators

The aforementioned studies were carried out with public funds in cooperation with universities and gay and lesbian organizations. They aimed primarily to bring about a discussion about two supposedly conflicting groups, and to hierarchize the discrimination experienced by these two groups against each other. Whereas gays are presumed to be a minority that is most discriminated against, Muslims, whose religion supposedly forbids homosexuality, are imputed to belong to the heterosexual majority across-the-board. Along with heteronormativity, Muslims were credited with further misanthropic ‘isms’, such as sexism, antisemitism, and terrorism, as a consequence of which the West’s ‘hard-fought’ and enlightened universal human rights and civilization is represented as threatened. As Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodriguez points out,

“Racism and its variant, ethnicization, can only be thought in relation with nationalism or with new forms of the reproduction of a hegemonic “West” in the name of Europe or the “Western alliance”. The “West” and Western nation-states imagine their “national or transnational lines of belonging” in relation to a “parallel society,” which is imagined as “pre-modern, under-developed, and involved in particular ethnic and religious community-forming rituals and struggles”. It is in this context that a discourse about “ethnicized communities” is medially, politically and socially produced” (Gutiérrez Rodriguez 2006).
Between 2006 and 2008 the gay anti-violence project MANEO carried out two surveys in Berlin on the subject of violence experienced by gay and bisexual men in Germany. The second survey was funded by the German lottery foundation (Stiftung Deutsche Klassenlotterie) and conducted by academics at the Humboldt University, the Evangelische Hochschule Berlin (Protestant University of Applied Sciences Berlin), and the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (MANEO 2009, 4). The study “is located within the [...] problematic of trivialization and would like to shine a light on those areas within which homophobic acts of violence are downplayed and not registered and perceived as such” (ibid., 10).

The questionnaire encompassed, among other things, questions “about experiences of violence [...] and risk assessments,” as well as about an incident which had impacted the respondents the most in the 12 months preceding the study.

The following is established about the perpetrators of homophobic violence (cf. ibid., 27): 86 percent of the perpetrators are male; 78 percent are young (18 to 35 years old); 40 percent have a migration background.

To ascertain a perpetrator profile, MANEO included the per se problematic ascription “migration background” as one of the possible answer-categories. In this way, the study and its public presentation aimed at depicting young white German gay men as victims of young, migrant men who were marked as heterosexual (cf. ibid., 19), and to migrantize the perpetrators of homophobic violence. As a result, men who were young and marked as migrant (Muslim) were rendered visible with the characteristic of being “violence-prone” (German: Gewaltbereitschaft) and foregrounded in the homophobia debate. In this act of making the young, migrant perpetrator visible politically and in the media, one can easily recognize a mix of biologizing and naturalizing racism. Thus, for example, they are not only rendered as Others on the basis of their putative migration background, but are additionally ascribed criminality and (homophobic) patriarchy.

In parallel with the MANEO surveys, Bernd Simon carried out a study commissioned by the LSVD at the University of Kiel in 2006 on the attitudes of young people with and without a “migration background” towards homosexuality. The Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth as well as the Berlin Senate Administration for Education, Youth and Sports financed the study. Its goal was to investigate the homophobic attitudes of “Turkish, Russian and German” youths between the ages of 14 and 20 and to compare their attitudes towards homosexuality with each other.

Simon proposed the thesis “that in groups with a migration background the perception of group-based discrimination was positively associated with homophobic attitudes, in the sense of a competition of minorities and/or that of a
scapegoat-function of the homosexual minority” (Simon 2008, 8). Departing from this thesis, his study aims at the following research results:

“1) Youth with a migration background [...] register a more homophobic attitude than youth without a migration background [...] 2) Religiosity and the acceptance of traditional norms of masculinity are generally positive correlates of a homophobic attitude. 3) Personal contacts with homosexuals are generally a negative correlate of a homophobic attitude. 4) The association of religiosity and a homophobic attitude is [...] especially strongly pronounced among youth with a Turkish migration background. 5) Perceptions of discrimination of youth with a migration background [...] are a positive correlate of a homophobic attitude, and the extent of these youths’ integration into German society is a negative correlate” (ibid., 9).

Simon deploys questionable claims that are not further scrutinized: Thus with the adoption of the civil partnership law in 2001, an improved climate was apparently created for lesbians and gays in Germany, and a tacit societal acceptance (for homosexuality) is said to obtain; however, one which is threatened by certain members of the “migrant society” (ibid., 4f). The youths, who are constructed in accordance with certain, imagined ancestries in line with the blood-and-soil (German: Blut und Boden) principle, are counterposed to other youths without a “migration background, who apparently represent a value system that is constructed as European and is held to be markedly less homophobic. The polarization of all interviewed high schoolers (German: Gymnasiast_innen) took place during the course of the study at the level of discursive cultural racism: youths constructed as Turkish are defined as Muslims, and Islam is explained as the cause of their homophobia (ibid., 24). With this thesis, homophobia is placed in opposition to racism. And in this way, youths constructed as Russian and Turkish are ascribed the feelings and perception of racial discrimination, as if this type of discrimination wasn’t a social phenomenon and was instead the result of individual sensitivities. Simon states it in the following way: the more the respondents felt discriminated on the basis of their ancestry, the more homophobic they supposedly were. He claims that the Turkish and Russian youths saw themselves as members of a minority in competition with homosexual minorities and therefore judged the latter negatively (cf. ibid., 7).

The racializing and culturalizing presentation of the study in the media and at various events lead to its being heavily criticized, in particular, by queer and non-queer academics, activists and journalists of color.

The study “The Living Conditions of Lesbians and Gays with and without 4 The Dynamics of Queer Politics and Gentrification in Berlin

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“a ‘migration background’ be precisely researched, since they are ‘directly affected by the split between different cultural sub-groups with irreconcilable value systems and [are] possibly endangered. Secondly, the observation of lifestyles that succeed under these circumstances ought to be fruitful for general research into stress and identity”” (ibid., 9).

The following findings emerged from this study: in contrast to lesbians and gays without a “migration background,” there are reportedly more (migrant) lesbians and gays who have not come out (of the closet). Coming out is thereby taken to be a phenomenon without a “migration background”. This situation is rationalized on the basis of the reactions of the respondents’ families. Whereas the families of the “German respondents” would respond positively to the coming-out of their lesbian and gay children, families with a “migration background” are supposedly negatively predisposed to homosexuality. Homosexuality would supposedly offend the religious and moral values of these parents, which is why they would react negatively to the coming-out of their children (Steffens 2010, 2).

Special attention is paid in this study to the question of “integration”. In this way, it is established that the (lesbian and gay) respondents with a so-called “migration background” would feel comfortable and thereby integrated in society with majority-Germans, because they would offer a greater acceptance for homosexuals than other societies.

An interesting result about the life-satisfaction of the respondents with and without a “migration background” reveals a major contradiction. Whereas, according to the study, the respondents with a “migration background” have had negative experiences with their parents as a result of their coming-out, they experience a higher life-satisfaction as a result of stronger social support compared to majority-German lesbians and gays. However, this finding about life-satisfaction
is seen as jeopardized by the act of coming out. While integration is posited as a prerequisite for the life-satisfaction of non-white lesbians and gays, the invented category of “migration background” is retained as a risk-factor for the respondents’ health and life-satisfaction.

In the conclusion of the study, the experiences of discrimination of respondents with a “migration background” are analyzed and established. According to this, lesbians and gays with a “migration background” have more experiences of homophobic discrimination than racist discrimination. Therefore, the study encourages migrantized lesbians and gays to talk more about homophobia than about racism.

In the end, the LSVD study, under the direction of Melanie Steffens, draws the following, highly problematic conclusion:

“Migration background is a risk factor for low life-satisfaction, worse health, a less positive self-image, and the availability of social support for lesbians and gays, if they come from countries with strong repressive measures against homosexuals, and if their parents are less integrated in Germany” (ibid., 5).

What results from the studies by Simon and Steffens is that an image of Germany as a gay-friendly country is foregrounded, while the imagined countries of origin of gays and lesbians with a so-called “migration background” are declared to be fundamentally homophobic. One can also observe the construction of an opposition in Steffens’ study, namely that of a gay-friendly West and a homophobic Rest.

Gay-Kisses-are-German-Leitkultur

Puar uses the term “homonationalism” to describe the invention of a “gay-friendly” nation. In an interview with the Berlin-based writer Deniz Utlu, she explains that

“homonationalism is not only about racist or privileged queers. Even if the term is often used this way. What is important is the tension between the perception of an increasing visibility and an increasing social acceptance of gays and lesbians [...] What it is about for me, above all, is how this recognition is won at the expense of particular subjects, who do not fit into the image of desirable homosexual subject – racialized subjects, impoverished subjects, and even subjects who are not homosexual, but whose sexuality is perceived as perverse” (Leben nach Migration 2014 [2010], 152).
Alongside the analysis of the aforementioned studies, publications, and other articles in the media, as well as the dominant discourses on topics around homophobia in the immigration-shaped society of Germany, German homonationalism can be identified on the basis of a new definition of homophobia. According to this new definition, homophobia is a migration-specific phenomenon which has anchored itself in Western societies and is primarily directed against white lesbians and gays.

Even homophobic actors are described in a manner that situates them (abroad) in a culturalizing and racializing manner. People who have a “migration background,” who are young and possibly Muslim, and come from “educationally disadvantaged”, economically underprivileged families are supposed to exhibit more homophobic tendencies and practices than others who distance themselves from this pattern. In contrast, the victims of homophobia are supposedly, for the most part, white German gays. German homonationalism is distinguished by the fact that it continuously culturalizes, racializes, classes, and genders the phenomenon of homophobia.

In opposition to these negative generalizations, today there is talk about the recurrent question of a “new German national identity” and a “German Leitkultur”. The most recent debate about a “German Leitkultur,” which has become important once again in the course of the movement of refugees out of Syria since the summer of 2015 at the latest, reveals the complicity of many representatives of the established political parties. For instance, on the 18th of November 2015, the General Secretary of the CDU, Peter Tauber, wrote the following in the well-known German-language magazine Cicero: “Because when more people from other countries come to us and stay, our country will change. We must explain to these new fellow citizens those values that shape our homeland (German: Heimat), and how co-existence here works” (Tauber 2015).

The discussion about “integration” is once again on the agenda of the political parties. Society is once again moving towards the right, and, moreover, not just since the 1990s. The functioning co-existence in Germany is now supposed to be taught to refugees on the basis of an explanation by a white German Leitkultur.

In his short article in Cicero, Tauber continues:

“The basis of our Leitkultur is naturally the Grundgesetz (English: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, colloquially, the German Constitution). But there is a lot more to it than that: the readiness to engage in volunteer work in society; the idea that everyone who works hard and makes an effort can advance; that religious freedom means being free to change one’s religion; that equality means that...
women increasingly take on leadership positions. And tolerance and equal treatment [mean] that two men can, as a matter of course, kiss in the street; that families with many children receive support from all, and are not put down as asocial; but also the commitment to Black-Red-Gold as the colors of freedom, pride in Germany, the singing of our national anthem – not simply during football, but also gladly, a little louder and more joyously, on our national holiday. All of this is not in the Grundgesetz, but in my opinion, it would be a beautiful and important component of a new German Leitkultur” (ibid. 2015).

The topic “refugees and migration” from Syria re-mobilized urban panics in the large and small cities of European countries. Queers and migration were re-thematized in these re-mobilized urban panics. Refugees were represented as a hetero-masculinist threat coming out of Syria to the Western majority society. They would supposedly not only bring with them homophobia and misogyny, but also terroristic Islamism, and would thereby put the “Occident” (German: Abendland) in danger. The director of the Center for Migrants, Lesbian and Gays (Zentrum für Migranten, Lesben und Schwule) suggested in an interview that queer refugees in the collective shelters were threatened by IS-supporters, an assumption by the spokesperson that is not provable and is based in anti-Muslim speculation. The following excerpt from an interview clearly illuminates this urban panic:

“– What are the problems with which they come to you? – At the moment, the accommodation of queer refugees is the biggest problem. We receive daily complaints that the situation in emergency shelters is catastrophic. For example, some refugees are housed with 14 men in one room, some of whom are homophobic or even ISIS-supporters. That is, as you can imagine, no easy co-existence. – There are ISIS-supporters in the refugee shelters? – That is what a client recently told us. Evidently, it is not, as a matter of fact, all that rare. Recently, an ISIS-supporter was even caught and deported” (Heywinkel 2015).

The City of Gays and the Invention of a New “Nation”?

The Gay Neighborhood: Schöneberg

The fact that Klaus Wowereit was elected the mayor of Berlin in 2001 with the phrase “I’m gay – and that’s a good thing!” encouraged Berlin gay identity
and neighborhood visibility politics, as a result of which a type of “queer nation building” (cf. Wolter 2014 [2011]) was established in Berlin-Schöneberg. Salih Alexander Wolter describes the historical processes of transformation in the district of Schöneberg and illustrates, with the help of literary examples, the way in which an “Anatolian” neighborhood was transformed into a “Western” gay neighborhood:

“In contrast, the more recent question in Schöneberg is: ‘European or Anatolian side?’ It implies the solution to a problem which became urgent after 1989/90 in this half of Berlin, where the reality becoming apparent was that of an ‘economic-geographic concept of Germany,’ [...] which made the decades-long debate about a systemically staged ‘Us’ palpable: How might a continuing sense of belonging be rooted in a ‘community of values,’ ‘which, in spite of the end of East-West conflict, could be redefined as “the West”’? The answer – ‘There needs to be new blocks which, in a convincing way, stand in opposition to one another’ – connects up [...] with the social advancement of a particular part of the German gay scene. For them, ‘Schöneberg’ is equally a cipher as it is a coveted address – whereby, everything that is associated with it is located in the ‘West’ [...] It was here, in front of the city hall [...] that a Green Party mayor in 1996, for the first time, raised the rainbow flag on Christopher Street Day, and since August 1st, 2001, one has been able to stylishly enter into a civil partnership in the building’s Golden Hall. A little further north, alongside ‘gay’ flower shops, the neighborhood around Nollendorfplatz and Motzstraße offers a well-assorted nightlife, including bars in which young men from Romania sell their services, and clubs which specialize in the most varied fetishes [...] Even the ‘Lesbian and Gay Federation in Germany’ (LSVD) has been based here since a few years – in a characteristic Altbau suite, whose rent is paid for by the district. From there, it would be a comfortable walk into the East, along Bülowstraße, to the ‘Bosphorous’. However, after 9/11, influential gay publicists would not tire of attesting to the danger of this proximity” (ibid., 17).

In the area around Nollendorfplatz and Motzstraße, which today counts as the “rainbow neighborhood,” and where one can find innumerable pubs and bars with darkrooms, since 1989 homosexuals who were persecuted and murdered in Nazi Germany have been commemorated with a plaque at the Nollendorfplatz U-Bahn station. In this way, the increasing, and later dominant, existence of a gay population was historicized8 in numerous scholarly volumes, both through

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8 For a critique of such a ‘commemorative culture’, see Yılmaz-Günay & Wolter 2013.
an urban-political commemorative culture and the romanticizing and dramatizing historiography of a gay movement. Since a few decades, the visibility of a “gay population” has been on the rise, and a gay recreation sector as well as a “colorful” urban district politics have come to be established, one which campaigns for the realization of a commercial Gay Pride. Simultaneously, the existence and history of immigrant workers and other residents of North Schöneberg who continue to be marked as (Muslim) immigrants is often made invisible. An example of such identity and urban district politics that is affected by historical amnesia, one can name the disappearance of the migrant rights and anti-racist activism by the former Schöneberg association *Ausländerkomitee Berlin (West)* e.V. from the collective consciousness. The association cooperated with migrant and non-migrant initiatives and groups. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the association initiated campaigns for the implementation of municipal (German: *kommunal*) voting rights, against immigration barriers, and campaigns concerning the cultural identity of immigrants. The association was located in Langenscheidtstraße in Schöneberg, and it was the target of numerous arson attacks, which have now been wiped out of our collective memories (cf. *Ausländerkomitee Berlin [West]* e.V. 1981). In fact, Schöneberg is regarded today as the center of the second German gay movement and the contemporary gay nightlife scene, which dominates a not-infinitesimal part of the district with the colors of the rainbow and has become the trademark of a gay neighborhood.

An examination of the question of visibilities and invisibilities of desirable and undesirable ‘population groups’ can help one better understand the racist exclusionary capacities of homonationalism. Since the gay movement achieved its goals to a “large” extent – and since Germany, after passing the civil partnership law in 2001 and the General Equal Treatment Act in 2006, more consciously understands itself to be enlightened, tolerant, and progressive – Muslim migrants have been made, both through the aforementioned studies as well as through projects and news reports, into hyper-visible and incongruous “Others”. This occurs through the way “they” are discussed as a threat and a danger to peaceful gay life in “our” society, and the corresponding manner in which one acts on such talk (see the remarks on Andrea Mubi Brighenti’s “thresholds of visibility” in the first chapter of Voß and Çetin 2016).

Gay Pride, celebrated annually across the world, has also taken place in Berlin since 1979 as *Christopher Street Day* (CSD). The gay movement had concerned

9 German: *Lebenspartnerschaftsgesetz*
10 German: *Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz*
itself until then, first and foremost, with the demand for the complete repeal of §175 of the criminal code, which made male-male sexual relationships criminally punishable. Gay activists of the time were shaped by key objectives such as sexual freedom and the acceptance of (non-heterosexual) sexual orientation(s), by which was meant primarily a gay male identity.

“Gay Pride” has so far been organized by white-dominated gay(-lesbian) organizations. At this event, which was originally conceived of as emancipatory, the participation of queers of color is “often” done without. Moreover, previous CSDs have masked racist campaigns or openly and knowingly reproduced racist exclusions, which was why Judith Butler in 2010 declined to accept the Civil Courage Prize of the official CSD organization (cf. SUSPECT 2010b).

In the week of CSD, the established media regularly reports on homophobic and anti-gay incidents and contribute to the public awareness of the large-scale event, whose organizers are convinced of the necessity of a “political” mega-party:

“In fact, year after year, the taz brings out articles at the time of the Berlin CSD with a global-strategic perspective on local events. On the eve before the 2010 parade, for instance, the paper reminds us – in light of presumably increasing attacks by young men ‘with migration background’ of visitors to the gay party district in the Schöneberg neighborhood – about the fate of a different ‘minority’” (Yılmaz-Günay & Wolter 2013, 60f).

Such news reports not only encourage the circulation of anti-Muslim racism, which in this case emanates from a white gay organization, but they also strengthen the construction of a supposed opposition between gays and Muslims, who are taken to stand in an extrinsic and hostile relation to one another.

Even though the organizers of the CSD express their openness to a pluralist society online (see the Internet presence of the CSD association), they do not manage to actually put this into practice. At least since Judith Butler’s public refusal of the Civil Courage Prize, the criticism of the CSD organizers has grown louder: the demand to be anti-racist and to face up to one’s privileges as members of the white-German (majority) society were nevertheless rejected with the argument that (even white) gays belong to a minority which is subjected to homophobic discrimination.

Further criticisms were centered on the invariably commercial character of an originally political movement, one which invokes as its genesis the New York Stonewall uprising of 1969, which was carried out by victims of not only homo-
phobic, but also racist, transphobic and class-specific discrimination (cf. Voß & Wolter 2013, 28–32). Since the aims and contents of the Berlin CSD diverged more and more from the political aim of the Stonewall protests, and the large-scale event in June of each year transformed itself into a pink-commercial party, the criticisms and demands of numerous queer organizations occupied center stage. According to them, the CSD ought to take up political issues once again. The CSD-organizers picked up these critiques and decided in 2014 to rename the “CSD party” “Stonewall”. The desired political aim, however, could not be achieved through the name-change. The event remained not only a pure mega-party, but extended its delimiting and exclusionary practices: Black and queer of color groups no longer participated in the organization of the “party”. The anti-violence project LesMigraS of the Berliner Lesbenberatung e.V. (the Berlin lesbian counseling association) put out a public statement problematizing not the renaming of CSD, but rather the exclusionary structures which remained unchanged in the preparation and realization of the new Berlin Stonewall. It was made clear in this statement that politics is about more than a name and that therefore power structures ought to also be changed with the renaming. Thus, LesMigraS reminded the CSD organizers about the original

“[Stonewall] uprising against racist, trans*discriminatory, classist and homophobic police violence. It was primarily trans* people, drag queens, LGBTI people of color and sex workers who took part in Stonewall. Stonewall was a street battle, which was not simply about the recognition of equal rights, but also a radical making-a-stand against everyday violence. Stonewall was about multiple belongings and manifold experiences of discrimination. Anyone who appropriates the term Stonewall must take up this history. In order to bear the name “Stonewall,” the Berlin CSD, in our opinion, must grapple with its own racist, classist and trans*discriminatory exclusions, must campaign against police violence, concern itself with multiple discriminations, and be ready to take to the streets – on more than one day in the year. A commitment [to fight] against homophobia and trans*discrimination is superfluous without an anti-racist and anti-classist perspective and practice. If the Berlin CSD renames itself as the Stonewall Parade without relating to these political struggles, then Stonewall will once again be appropriated to mark the birth of the lesbian and gay movement” (LesMigraS 2015).

In this statement, LesMigraS – a project for and by lesbian, trans* and bisexual migrants and by Black lesbian and bisexual women – makes clear the invisibilization politics of the Berlin CSD association: this politics is thus characterized not
only by the appropriation of histories of resistance of those affected by racist, trans-discriminatory, and class-specific power relations, but also by the erasure of these (resistance) histories in the contemporary commemorative culture that has established itself in former CSD parades. A further central criticism is that those affected by multi-dimensional discrimination do not occupy center stage in the (new) Stonewall Parade, but rather others who, on the contrary, are privileged, are the ones formulating and implementing policies, information, discourses, and (new) definitions.

One example of how certain areas of Schöneberg have become the gay- or rainbow-neighborhood is the lesbian and gay street festival, which is organized annually by the *Regenbogenfonds der schwulen Wirte e.V.* and carries (above all) gay visibility to the extreme. Every year, scores of associations, institutions, and unions take part in the Motzstraße fest in order to collectively lay down the marker against homophobia. Another aim of the city festival is the representation of all oppressed LGBTIQ* people, who are supposed to present and represent themselves at the city festival and assert their legal, societal and political interests. However, the history of the city festival clearly shows that, in spite of good will, this ideal is not realized. Thus, Queer.de reported on May 31st 2015 “that [it has] taken 23 years for the gay and lesbian city festival in Berlin to display a female subject on a poster for the first time” (Queer.de 2015).

This first step to also publicly represent lesbian identity and to set an example against racism was initially welcomed by numerous LGBTIQ* organizations, as the poster depicts a female couple kissing. What was criticized, however, was that the couple, intended to be perceived as lesbian, was depicted with culturalist and racist markings. The Berlin-Brandenburg Migration Council (*Migrationsrat Berlin-Brandenburg*, or MRBB), in its statement, held the intentions of the organizers to be good, because, with this poster and the slogan “Equal Rights for Unequals,” they wanted to champion a “diverse” city. What was culturalizing, however, was primarily the depiction of one of the two women, who was fitted with a headscarf so that viewers could perceive her as “Muslim”. The poster also conveyed the (imagined) religious belonging of the headscarf-wearing lesbian through the Arabic translation of the slogan, for the reason that the Arabic script can quickly produce an association to the Arab and/or Muslim world. Therefore, in its public statement, the Berlin-Brandenburg Migration Council brings into question the image and representational politics of the organizers of the city festival. Thus, the *Regenbogenfonds e.V.* cannot through its (poster-)campaigns represent those people that were not included in the organization and preparation of these campaigns:
“We assume that the Regenbogenfond’s intention, through the putatively more diverse representation of people on the poster, was to reach people and communities who so far were not – or only minimally – represented at the city festival. Had the aforementioned autonomous migrant organizations, groups and associations truly and meaningfully been able to participate in the planning (e.g. of the poster), the city festival might have actually, where possible, gained access to other communities” (MRBB 2015).
Kreuzberg and the End of Trans*genialen

Much as in North Schöneberg, where the LSVD and the gay assault helpline MANEO carry out their civil society campaigns and projects – largely at the expense of the “Muslim” migrants projected as homophobic – similar homonationalist developments have occurred in Berlin-Kreuzberg, which Haritaworn describes in one of their essays as a “sexual spectacle of neighborhood and nation” (cf. Haritaworn 2009, 41ff).

When a group of drag kings was attacked in June 2008 during a festival by an allegedly “Turkish” group of people, the (anti-Muslim) assumptions by LSVD and the assault helpline MANEO were updated and spread by Kreuzberg-based queer groups as well. After this incident, white queer groups “felt” threatened by Turkish youth in Kreuzberg. A single day after the violence against the drag kings, they were able to mobilize thousands of people against “migrant” homophobia and fly the rainbow flag in the “migrant” neighborhood under the slogan, “Smash Homophobia!” Haritaworn problematizes both the lesbian and gay reactions as well as the left-wing press coverage about this incident by arguing that, once again, what was fostered was a discourse about the homophobia of the “others” – and this time not only with the help of studies by the LSVD or MANEO, but also through a “left-queer” moral panic and warnings about violent “migrant” homophobia (ibid., 45).

In view of urban district politics, which involves not just the city council, but also associations, organizations, housing cooperatives, and political parties, the would-be “anti-homophobia demonstration” in Kreuzberg sent a clear signal against the “migrant” residents of the neighborhood, who, for generations, have been living in Kreuzberg alongside different marginalized groups and are simultaneously vilified with racist ascriptions. This demonstration, too, can be understood as an expression of a homonationalist dominant society. In their observations and analysis, Haritaworn highlights the way in which, analogously to the white-feminist emancipation discourse, white-left “queer” groups’ claim to representation is constituted (ibid., 60). In this context, Gabriele Dietze also speaks of an ethnicization and orientalization of homophobia in white-left queer groups in city spaces such as Berlin-Kreuzberg (Dietze 2009, 44). In view of this demonstration and earlier campaigns by lesbian and gay organizations, one can translate the “struggle against homophobia” as a “struggle” against “migrant” populations, who, in the name of the “liberal-democratic” constitutional order, are incessantly confronted with the demand to either come out as gay-friendly and to publicly distance themselves from homophobic incidents or to face the consequences of their “oriental” homophobia.
An argument against the generalizing claim of “oriental” homophobia is that Kreuzberg is demonstrably one of the few places in Germany where people of different sexual, gender, and socio-cultural identities actually live together. At the former Transgenialen Christopher Street Day (TCSD), which was held annually in Kreuzberg between 1997 and 2013, the participants and organizers protested together with the residents of the SO36 Kreuzberg neighborhood, which is known across Europe, against all forms of racist, transphobic, and homophobic discrimination. They criticized the ever more commercial large-scale CSD celebrations, at which all social and sexual identities are not represented, but instead is only an “über-normalization” of a white gay visibility that is aspired after. Even though TCSD no longer takes place, the causes for its dissolution can, in fact, be traced back to the discussion of a new racism within the organization team.

The south-east of Kreuzberg is, since at least the early 1980s, a place where numerous pubs and bars that cater, first and foremost, to all queers are run, but which are also open to other people of the neighborhood and the city. As a concrete example of such places, one can name the nightclub SO36 in Oranienstraße. Every month, the event Gayhane aka House of Halay, a party for queers of color and their friends, takes place. Their Internet presence describes it as follows:

“GAYHANE has long been known beyond the borders of Berlin and already has imitators in many large cities. Since almost 8 years now, lesbians, gays, trans* people and their friends meet one another on the HomoOriental dance floor, which the DJs Ipek, mikki_p, Khandan and Ceto fashion with Turkish and Arabic, but also Greek and Hebrew, pop music. In a mix of oriental and occidental sounds and temperaments, an atmospheric party very quickly develops, one whose flair is accentuated by the fantastical transformation of the event space into an oriental festival tent” (Gayhane 2016).

A further example for the places for and by queers of color and their friends is the café Südblock at Kottbusser Tor, which still counts as a social problem area (German: sozialer Brennpunkt) among the middle-class majority population and, due to the presence of other marginalized scenes, such as that of “junkies,” still provides cause for scandalizing reports in the mainstream press. The café Südblock, which is located almost at the center of the marginalized, continually holds events on themes related to racism, trans* discrimination, homophobia and socio-economic inequalities, and calls not only on its guests, but also on its neighbors to set an example against the polarization of Kreuzbergers in the form of “queers vs. migrants”. The café is located, moreover, next to the activist group Kotti &
Co – the tenants’ union of Kotbusser Tor in Berlin Kreuzberg, which since 2011 has been campaigning against rent increases and displacement, and for the retention of affordable apartments. The relationship between Kotti & Co and Südblock is characterized by neighborly solidarity, in that the café provides a venue and publicity for the protest events and other activities of the activist group. The group is comprised of members who don’t necessarily see themselves as a homogenous collective, but nonetheless pursue a common goal. It is not only migrants, the migrantized, queers or white leftists who feel addressed by Kotti & Co, but also other residents who are fighting for affordable living spaces and join forces with disadvantaged groups. Even houseless people find a sympathetic ear and a space in which they feel welcomed and are not made into (superfluous) others.

In public discussions about homophobia in the migrant society of Germany, these demographic givens are either ignored or denied, because they do not serve the legitimation of dominant anti-migrant and racist (gay) identity politics discourses.

This part of Kreuzberg, which is also known as “küçük İstanbul,” i.e. Little Istanbul, is often problematized as a “no-go area” for gays and lesbians and made the subject of the “oriental” homophobia-discourse.

The Kiss Kiss Berlin campaign by MANEO, which has taken place regularly since 2006, is a good example through which to understand the sponsors of such public debates. According to the organizers, Kiss Kiss Berlin is supposed to set an example against homophobia in the “symbolic” areas of the capital city, such as Neukölln, Kreuzberg and Wedding – the homophobia by which, according to MANEO, the majority (white) gays are affected. The date of this campaign, the May 17th, has meanwhile become known as the day on which the General Assembly of the World Health Organization (WHO) in 1990 removed homosexuality from the list of mental disorders. The removal of homosexuality as a disorder is celebrated, among other such annual events, by the aforementioned Berlin campaign. According to the organization, their goal is, additionally, to push through the “tolerance” and acceptance of gay visibility in certain neighborhoods – those declared to be homophobic – with the support of numerous non-governmental organizations and politicians represented in parliament.

The studies carried out in past years, which attempt to demonstrate the homophobia of the selected “symbolic,” “Anatolianized and orientalized” places,

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11 Translator’s (SD) note: This usage (i.e. houseless, rather than the conventional homeless) is intentional. The current generation of houseless activists prefer this term to the dehumanizing label “homeless”.

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along with the collaboration of white-gay dominated businesses, organizations and prominent political personalities, produces a majority opinion which rapidly becomes the general knowledge of the majority white German society.

“With the support of members of the Berlin ‘Tolerance Alliance,’” comprised of 130 companies, events and institutions, we organize numerous campaigns in Berlin during this period every year; in the past year they already numbered at 30. Together, as the “Gay-Straight-Alliance,” we set conspicuous examples, advocate for a colorful and cosmopolitan Berlin, for societal tolerance and diversity, and position ourselves against racism, homophobia, transphobia – against every form of group-based enmity. With our campaigns, we hope to reach people, spark their interest, and bring them along” (MANEO 2015).

Even if MANEO has in recent years been making an effort to also articulate the word racism in its advertising texts, posters, and campaigns, the project still fails, however, to conduct its campaigns against homophobia and trans* discrimination in an anti-racist manner. The 2015 Kiss Kiss Berlin campaign repeated the ignorance of gay visibility politics and attempted once again to orientalize homophobia. The selected places at which the campaign was held were, in the organizers’ opinion, supposed to symbolize places of homophobia and trans* discrimination. The Berlin districts and neighborhoods, such as Kreuzberg, Neukölln, and Wedding, which were described by the organizers as “representative” places, are shaped by the history of labor migration and the present-day lives of the children and grandchildren of migrant workers. The answer to the question of who or which groups are represented here remains cryptic in the campaign’s advertisement texts. The issue is also about the categorization of homophobia and trans* discrimination using the example of migrant workers and their descendants, who are not only orientalized, but also constituted as a “class”. Even the organizations by and for queers of color, such as GLADT e. V. as well as MRBB, felt blindsided by this campaign. In their statement on Kiss Kiss Berlin, published on May 17th, 2015, GLADT e. V. criticized MANEO for its ignorant approach:

“Quite simply, this campaign makes us queasy, and this for multiple reasons. First of all, in Kreuzberg, where so many different communities and scenes flow together and thereby create a very diverse and specific social space, the MANEO campaign appears downright grotesque: a white, cis-male-dominated gay organization launches a lifebuoy for a better world, without pausing to think that local activists here
have been carrying out community-based anti-discrimination work for years. These activists weren’t invited on even one occasion. This is not only arrogant; it is most of all disrespectful! We criticize MANEO’s actions! We live in a society that is racist, discriminatory, homophobic and trans*phobic, and we utterly condemn violence and discrimination.

We perceive it as a slap in the face that MANEO concentrates on attacks in places where we have achieved so much in recent years through establishing contacts, listening, answering questions, posing questions, empathizing, laughing on occasion and fighting on occasion. We live in Kreuzberg and Wedding, this isn’t a short-term platform for MANEO’s staging of a colorful cosmopolitanism. On the contrary, the MANEO campaign jeopardizes the relationship-building with our neighbors and puts it to the test” (GLADT 2015).

Gay dominance asserts itself not only in Schöneberg and Kreuzberg, as thus far depicted, but also in the the north of Neukölln, which is known as one of the largest social problem areas of the Republic. The history of North Neukölln is not only shaped by labor migration, but also through unequal access to living spaces, employment, and schools, as well as to public places where discussions about successes and failures and about those willing to integrate and those refusing to are continuously conducted. These discussions, which prevailed in Neukölln, aimed at a clear dichotomization of society into “Muslims and Germans,” “Muslims and homosexuals,” etc. The contribution of gay visibility politics in Neukölln to this polarization has had an outstanding impact on the neighborhood that finds itself in the midst of a rapid process of gentrification since the early 2010s.

Neukölln: From an “oriental neighborhood” to a “gay neighborhood”

What the Kreuzberg and Schöneberg examples demonstrate about gentrification and the transformation of these districts from “oriental Anatolia to an occidental gay neighborhood” can also be observed in the Berlin district of North Neukölln in the 2010s, which is distinct to South Neukölln with regard to demographic structures. In contrast to the north, the south of Neukölln can be described as petty-bourgeois, middle-class, white, familial and heteronormative (Loy 2013). Instead of apartment buildings, this part of the district is dominated by private terraced houses. The number of voters in the parliamentary and municipal elections in South Neukölln is significantly higher than in the North. North Neukölln was known as a district of “the unemployed, alcoholics, junkies,
criminals and migrants,” mostly from Arab countries and Turkey. The term “social problem area” was used as a synonym for North Neukölln. It is not only the migrant population associated with this area, but also “asociality or parasitism”. In contrast to the North, in the southern regions like Rudow, Buchow and Britz live mostly inhabited by employed, working, tax-paying, majority Germans who, “naturally,” use their voting rights to determine the lives of those in North Neukölln.

At the very latest, following the closure of the Tempelhof airport and the re-branding of the airport field in 2010 as “Tempelhof Freedom” in 2010, this erstwhile “social problem area” in Berlin became an attractive place for students, artists, knowledge producers and left-wing groups. The visible and palpable demographic and architectonic changes could be observed in the appearance of new groups of people, the emergence of art spaces and safe spaces for and by ‘queers,’ as well as new bars, galleries, and discos for – especially – gay people. When the old SchwulenZentrum12 (SchwuZ) announced its relocation from Kreuzberg to Neukölln, this became an issue of much concern in the Berlin print media and online news portals. A report in the Berliner Morgenpost about the relocation deemed that “the issue has, as it were, only one catch” (Kittle 2013):

“The former Kindl brewery is located in a neighborhood about which, as recently as two years ago, newspapers printed this headline: ‘Living Where Nobody Wants to Live’ – even though that was an article about a successful case of integration. The reason being that precisely this neighborhood around Hermann-, Karl-Marx-, Flughafen-, and Rollbergstraße is not known for integration projects, but rather for high rates of illiteracy, for parents who would rather invest their social welfare payments in alcohol than the education of their children, and for social tensions between different migrant groups” (ibid.).

Even though the representatives of SchwuZ distanced themselves from the assumptions of the press and politics – in short, from the reigning opinion that Neukölln was particularly homophobic – the media still warned of the dangers for homosexuals in the neighborhood. In connection with this relocation, and through the construction of the ‘violent homophobia’ of ‘migrant’ youth, an ‘urban panic’ (cf. Tsianos 2013, 2014) was stoked. In order to justify this urban panic, the reporter Sören Kittel of the Berliner Morgenpost interviewed Gilles Duhem of

12 SchwuZ was founded in 1977 by the group “Homosexual Action West Berlin” as a meeting point for activist gays in Schöneberg. See: http://www.schwuz.de/de/schwuz/Geschichte.html
the Rollbergkiez\textsuperscript{13} youth education project, and on the basis of this interview, reported on the possible ‘homophobic’ conflicts in the neighborhood:

“It is not hard to imagine that one might also see violence in the neighborhood. If that should happen, Gilles Duhem hopes that a counter-reaction immediately takes effect: ‘Police, the filing of charges, convictions, prison – then they will see that their behavior does not work in Berlin.’ However, Duhem is a little worried about SchwuZ patrons: ‘When in doubt, they can also hit back, they aren’t few in number’” (Kittle 2013).

In the period running up to and after the relocation of SchwuZ various events dealing with the situation of homosexuals in Neukölln were held in the aforementioned new spaces for and by ‘queers’. In summer 2012, the local association of the Die Linke (Left Party) in Neukölln organized a panel discussion with Neuköllners on the following question: “Is Neukölln more homophobic than Schöneberg?” The aim of the event was to openly discuss homophobia in migrant Neukölln and to find ‘possible solutions’ in order to live ‘together’ (cf. Die Linke 2012). A further, similar event was held in a queer bar close to Rathaus Neukölln, asking the question: “How queer is Neukölln?” The event text included the following: “Together with you, we want to discuss how we can actively effect a positive development of the neighborhood and a respectful coexistence” (cf. Bündnis 90, 2013).

Both the interview with Gilles Duhem and the news coverage of SchwuZ’s relocation, as well as these and other, similar events about the conditions for ‘queer’ people and neighborhood development politics in Neukölln attest to, for one, the polarization of society in ‘Us’ (the ‘gay-friendly’ nation) vs. ‘Them’ (the ‘homophobic’ migrants). For another, social inequalities (too many children, too much alcohol, too many unemployed people, etc.) are so inverted that socially disadvantaged groups appear to be blocking their own access to a better life and standard of living, which is why they would, among other things, become ‘homophobic’.

**Mosque: only for heteros?**

In November 2014 the association Leadership Berlin tried to organize a visit of a group of lesbians and gays to one of the most famous Berlin mosques in North

\textsuperscript{13} Rollbergkiez is a neighborhood in the district of Neukölln that became infamous in the mid-2000s for the alleged lack of integration of pupils in its local school and for its high percentage of immigrant and poor families.
Neukölln. The event was to happen as part of the tolerance and acceptance project meet2respect in cooperation with the Şehitlik Mosque, the Völklinger Kreis – professional association of gay executives – and the LSVD. The Şehitlik Mosque usually hosts tours of medium-sized groups in which the mosque and its history are presented and possible questions about Islam and the Qur'an answered. At first, the mosque representatives accepted the request of the group and wished to coordinate an appointment. However, as the interested meet2respect and LSVD representatives requested and then insisted that their invitation be extended to include a discussion round in the prayer rooms, the mosque representatives rejected this “wish” with a understandable argument: the mosque cannot be considered as a venue for events because it is used at different times of the day as a prayer room, and this use takes precedence over any discussion session. The refusal of the mosque referred only to the space of the discussion – a meeting with the interested parties was neither ruled out nor problematized. The mosque representatives were in favor of the discussion event in another venue where prayers are not carried out. Despite the alternative proposals, the LSVD scandalized the “cancellation” by the mosque in the media without mentioning the background discussions among the participants. The scandal of this “rejection” lead, yet again, in the mainstream media to a polarization of people into “homosexuals” and “Muslims”. The division of humanity in this form raises the ironic question of whether Muslims have any sexual orientation, or whether all homosexuals are non-Muslim. For example, in the year 2008, there was a joint declaration against homophobia and discrimination against all people from the Muslim umbrella organization DITIB, which also includes the Şehitlik mosque and other Muslim organizations (see GLADT, 2009).

Due to the scandalous reports issued by the LSVD, the Şehitlik Mosque published a press release on November 20th 2014, in which it made clear that the mosque representatives do not reject a dialogue with all other parties, including homosexuals, who are interested in Islam and in the mosque. Not only because of the scandalization, but also on grounds of the LSVD trying to make a name for itself at the expense of the mosque and its (heterosexually living) Muslims, the mosque decided against a meeting with the LSVD, but not against one with interested homosexuals:

“On November 24th, 2011, the national association DITIB Berlin will participate in a meet2respect discussion meeting that will be held in the conference room of the Jerusalem Church. This event will replace the planned mosque tour and subsequent discussion originally organized by Leadership Berlin as part of its project meet2respect. The Lesbian and Gay Federation of Germany (LSVD) refuses to par-
participate in this discussion and continues to insist on an event inside the mosque. Contrary to other statements, no concrete plans or appointments were made for a mosque tour. However, we are happy to continue the dialogue as part of meet2respect. In order for our openness not to be misused for self-aggrandizement, we have not said “yes” to any binding appointment. We cannot understand why the LSVD wishes to self-aggrandize itself at the cost of our mosque and to politically exploit an encounter which is so important for us. That’s why we want to refrain from further talks with the LSVD and have no further comment on their media conduct.”

Muslims versus Homosexuals

To return to the quote in the introduction, I would like to once again point to the polarization of society into ‘Muslims vs. Homosexuals’. As long as two groups are spoken of as being in opposition to one another, it is not possible for a society to consider itself progressive. The quote clearly demonstrates the white-hegemonic opinion that there are either no homosexuals among the Muslim community or that, if they do exist, they are, as a matter of principle, not accepted among them. This mode of speaking and acting by white-hegemonic gay organizations, politics, the media and (large) parts of society must be problematized in this and other scholarly and education-policy work in order to make the exclusions and inequalities in a plural society visible, audible and criticizable. Interventions in political, academic and civil society debates have as their goal the reduction of discrimination.

Specifically, we need to criticize the scholarship that, in Germany, has so far been hardly influenced by intersectional approaches and which does not take multidimensional discrimination seriously – not just for methodical reasons, but also from the perspective of one-dimensional identity politics, “Here the gays, there the Muslims”.

Civil society should be called upon, in the light of their lobbying at the expense of the “Others” who they construct, to deal with multidimensional discrimination and to work in favor of, or at least not against, the people who suffer from multidimensional discrimination.

It should also be noted that the hierarchization of victimhood should not be made the main starting point for the lobbying of civil society organizations. Such one-dimensional work may further contribute to making a group increasingly targeted by a form of discrimination, such as anti-Muslim racism. In this situation, the other group, constructed as a greater victim of discrimination, is able to more
strongly promote this form of anti-Muslim racism in the way that it reproduces
the arguments for contrived contrasts.

From the point of view of intersectional research, it is necessary and benefi-
cial when non-governmental organizations work in cooperation with scientific
institutions and universities, in order to legitimize the former’s concerns and their
socio-political investigations. Justifiable interests and concerns, for example, for
more funding for the infrastructure of the organizations can ideally be supported
by the state or other sponsoring institutions. The studies analyzed here differen-
tiate discriminated groups initially from a white-gay-and-lesbian perspective as
competitors on the question of discrimination. Such a method of politics and
lobby work can ultimately help and (further) privilege a group that is presented
as the victim of another discriminated group. The establishment of the construc-
tion of perpetrators as above all heterosexual, young, male and immigrant can, in
the worst case, lead to racism by governmental measures (strict integration mea-
sures), police interventions (racial profiling) or simply as a result of the anxiety
of (white) citizens, racism which is either relativized or completely omitted in
the fight against homophobia, sexism and antisemitism. This too occurs in the
collaboration between the state, civil society and scientific inquiry.

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Zülfukar Çetin completed his PhD work on *Homophobia and Islamophobia. Intersectional Discriminations against Binational Gay Couples in Berlin (Homophobie und Islamophobie. Intersektionale Diskriminierungen am Beispiel binationaler schwuler Paare in Berlin, 2012)*. He is currently working at the University of Basel/Switzerland in a research project on HIV/AIDS activism and politics in Turkey and simultaneously teaches social work at the Alice Salomon University of Applied Sciences in Berlin. His publications include the anthology *Conversations about Racism. Perspectives and Resistance (Gespräche über Rassismus. Perspektiven und Widerstände, 2015)*, published together with Savaş Taş, and *The Dynamics of the Queer Movement in Turkey before and during the Conservative AKP Government* (2015), the latter being his concluding paper as a Mercator-IPC Fellow at the Science and Politics Foundation.

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The Party and the Holocaust

Like most everywhere in the “Western” world, Gay Pride is also celebrated in Berlin each June. The “official” Christopher Street Day (CSD) is the big event for the gay-lesbian community in the German capital, with participation by local and national political figures, and lately even ambassadors from the USA and Great Britain. In 2012, when the parade passed by the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe on its way to the Brandenburg Gate, the disco trucks briefly turned off their music out of respect for the victims of the German genocide of European Jews. Although “the mood during the parade and the closing rally” was supposed to have been “great,” the queer Berlin magazine Siegessäule later also recorded “sporadic criticism,” citing a certain Konstanze as a representative of the crowd of “around 700,000 participants,” who thought: “It makes sense to have a moment of silence, but it did kill the party a bit” (Sauer 2012). A few hours after the event, someone using the nickname “Actually22” had a different view, posted on the website of the taz: “People started grumbling: ‘Goddamn Jews! Death to the Jews! It was only three million anyway!’ (It was more, but that’s what they were shouting)” (Wösch 2012).

1 Translated from the German by Daniel Hendrickson.

This article first appeared in German as “Pink Washing Germany? Der deutsche Homonationalismus und die ‘jüdische Karte’” in the edited volume Wer MACHT Demo kratie? Kritische Beiträge zu Migration und Machtverhältnissen, edited by Duygu Gürsel, Zülfukar Çetin and Allmende e. V., published by Edition Assemblage, Münster, in 2013. The copyright is held by Koray Yılmaz-Günay and Salih Alexander Wolter.
For lack of another option, the user comment had been posted to an interview published the morning of the parade in which a functionary from the Lesbian and Gay Federation in Germany (LSVD) reported on the current persecution of homosexuals in Iran. She herself had left that country in 1977, before the proclamation of the “Islamic Republic,” but even in Berlin she had already been “berated and spit on” by “people with Muslim origins” (ibid.). The description by “Actually 22” below it began almost apologetically: “I don’t know where I should bring this up, since you don’t actually report on the CSD in any traditional form. But I’d still like to publish what I experienced today in some form” (ibid.).

In fact, year after year, the *taz* brings out articles at the time of the Berlin CSD with a global-strategic perspective on local events. On the eve before the 2010 parade, for instance, the paper reminds us – in light of presumably increasing attacks by young men “with migration background” of visitors to the gay party district in the Schöneberg neighborhood – about the fate of a different “minority,” which “had always understood to seek out niches – in the end, however, it became the victim. Its self-empowerment bears the name Israel” (Reichert 2010). The defensive posture of the Jewish state in the otherwise Muslim Near East is quite clearly recommended as a model for the local gay neighborhood: “They have atomic bombs, and since then, this minority can no longer expect sympathy. But they also no longer need any bland pity” (ibid.). Neither the acknowledged “hostility toward Turks, which can no longer be argued away” (ibid.) among white Schöneberg gays, nor the “empowerment” of the expatriation of all German Jews to Israel seem all that troubling from such a viewpoint.

When persistent facts seem not to comply at all with one’s image of the world, they have to be brushed aside as fringe events or, better yet, delegated to the “other side”. Accordingly, the rest of the *taz* thread turned to the Iran story, in which, by the way, no one cast any doubt on the report from “Actually 22”. Following appeasing platitudes (“Gays are also people after all”), the comments quickly shifted to the smaller leftist alternative to the official parade, the Transgenialer CSD (TCSD), which ended, as always, with a rally in Oranienstraße in Berlin-Kreuzberg. “If there is any constant to the Transgenialer CSD, […] it is its decided anti-Zionism. And then the Turkish/Arab/Kurdish dust catchers are happy to spill out of the courtyards and into O-Strasse,” agitated one user, wondering why “Judith Butler […] was not invited by the Kreuzberg group, so she could once again downplay Hamas and Hezbollah as a ‘social, revolutionary’ movement” (Wösch 2012).
The US American philosopher, who declined the Civil Courage Award at the Berlin CSD in 2010, in part in protest against “complicity with anti-Muslim racism” (Butler 2010) among the predominant gay organizations in the city, had received Frankfurt’s Theodor W. Adorno Prize earlier that year, which was met with widespread rejection well in advance in Germany among newspaper and blog commentators. One self-described journalist “in solidarity with Israel,” for instance, accused the world-renowned philosopher – who, regarding the Middle East conflict, once professed that she had to “speak out as a Jew […] against injustice and to advocate for the endangered lives of Jews as well as non-Jews” (Finger 2008) – of advocating for “the incorporation of a variety of Islamist anti-Semitic squads into the global left” (Osten-Sacken 2012).

That year certain print and online media made a workshop offered by two Jewish-Israeli queer activists living in Berlin as part of the TCSD 2012 a cause for concern. Under the title “Pinkwashing Israel” they explained how their country’s government used their hard-won gay rights for the country’s international public image, as a means of legitimizing racist domestic and occupation policies. Presumably not to deceive anyone into thinking that such analyses were “the latest gimmick of anti-Israeli propaganda,” the weekly Jungle World, which was particularly critical of the event, consistently declined to mention the origins of the speakers (Ströhlein 2012).

More than any other topic, the relation to the state of Israel – regardless of any “pro-” or “anti-Zionist” self-image on the part of the discussants – has become the measuring stick for internal German debates about nation and belonging. The question of how “the” homosexuals in Israel are doing is increasingly among the core issues of both the “pinkwashing” as well as the opposing “pink watching” movement. The degree to which “the figure of the Jews” gets instrumentalized for quite different battles has recently become clear in German debates about circumcision, where, due to vociferous conflicts about “universalism” vs. “cultural relativism,” real people leading their private lives, beyond their function in the public non-Jewish German collective, have been pushed to the background.  

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2 On this the Cologne-based Orientalist and writer Navid Kermani: “And I still can’t quite believe that not even 70 years after the Shoah traditional Jewish life in Germany is once again being criminalized and therefore ultimately being pushed into illegality. This offends me as a German citizen almost more than it alarms me as a Muslim” (Frank 2012). On the so-called circumcision debate in 2012, cf. Çetin and Wolter 2013, as well as Çetin, Voß and Wolter 2012.
It has become a commonplace in “enlightened” German national discourse to name homophobia and anti-Semitism in the same breath, the common reference being the persecution during the Nazi period. “Much as it was with the Jews, albeit on a smaller scale and with less effect on the public, the SS targeted homosexuals,” wrote Eugen Kogon in his standard work, first published in 1946, on the system of the German concentration camps. Indeed, “possibly because homosexuality was originally widespread in Prussian military circles, the SA, and the SS itself, so that it was supposed to be ruthlessly outlawed and exterminated” (Kogon 2004, 284). They placed, for instance, the camp prisoners classified as homosexual in Buchenwald among those to be transported to death “in the highest percentage in relation to their numbers”; also, the human experiments by SS physicians to “eliminate homosexuality” were addressed by Christian anti-fascists (ibid., 284f). But while these facts – unlike the number of victims – are undisputed in international research, Burkhard Jellonek and Rüdiger Lautmann, in their introduction to the 2002 collection National Socialist Terror against Homosexuals, highlight the fact that most foreign scholars counter the claim, made by many German authors, that the persecution of homosexuals in the Third Reich took on “a special character, as exhibited by the so-called Final Solution to the Jewish question in comparison to common anti-Semitism” (Jellonek and Lautmann 2002, 12).

The background for the “strategic usage of the parallel holocaust/holocaust [...] as a tactic by the national gay movement” (ibid., 13) is the legal situation after liberation from fascism. Paragraph 175, which had been taken over from Prussian law after the founding of the German Reich, criminalized homosexuality between men, and was intensified by the Nazis in 1935. In the GDR the original paragraph had initially returned, and then in 1957 an act to alter the criminal

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3 Here and in the following this term always refers exclusively to men. On the persecution history of lesbian women, on the national debate about the lesbian victims of the Nazis and their representation in the Memorial to Homosexuals Persecuted under Nazism, and indications of the sparse research materials on the topic, cf. a statement by Lesbenberatung Berlin/LesMigraS (2010). Persecution was often additionally targeted at gender non-conforming persons, regardless of sexual orientation or any self-designations such as “lesbian” or “gay”.

4 The scholarly literature gives very different numbers. Based on recent studies, Günter Grau estimates that about 6,000 men were taken to concentration camps as “homosexuals,” only half of whom survived the camps (2011, 317).
code went into effect that entailed a virtual suspension of the criminal liability of homosexuality between adult men. In West Germany, the National Socialist version was maintained, and in 1957 it was confirmed by the Federal Constitutional Court as fundamental to the moral outlook of the people – thus deeming it to be a law that was not specifically influenced by National Socialism. Some 50,000 of the total of around 100,000 cases opened in the West against the so-called 175ers ended in conviction (see Bluhm 2012). The convicted also often continued to be exposed to barbaric medical interventions (see Voß 2013). In order to argue against the continuing anti-gay violence of the state, “the” gays were represented as the forgotten sufferers of German fascism (cf. Bochow 2011, 85). A book title by Harry Wilde from 1969 read *The Fate of the Alienated: The Persecution of Homosexuals in the “Third Reich” and Their Position in Society Today*, and even as late as 1981 Hans-Georg Stümke and Rudi Finkler were attempting to position gays as a whole as close as possible to Jews as the acknowledged victims of Nazi racial fanaticism with their book *Pink Triangle, Pink Lists: Homosexuals and “Healthy Public Sentiment” from Auschwitz to Today*.

Nonetheless, John C. Fout, who discerned the continuing existence of gays bars in several German cities up to the end of fascism, and, incidentally, found that in Hamburg 50 percent of those persecuted as “homosexual” were members of the Nazi Party, proved that in comparison to the Shoah, “despite the concentration camps, despite the murder of gays during the Nazi period,” there was “never a total excision of homosexuality and no systematic persecution of gays” (Jellonk and Lautmann 2002, 169). As for ideological principles, Voß notes that in Nazi Germany “it was not widely assumed that homosexuality was hereditary, as might have been expected in the context of discussions being carried out there about ‘races’ and ‘degeneration’” (Voß 2013; cf. Grau 2011). Rather, as James D. Steakley summarizes, the Nazi persecution of homosexuals – who had not been “completely rounded up, but only selectively arrested” – was more about “re-educating heterosexuality or at least sexual abstinence”. This would distinguish them “fundamentally from the Nazi persecution of Jews, which was meant to be carried out to the last man, the last woman, the last child” (Jellonk and Lautmann 2002, 66). The behavioral aspect is also underscored by the name of the agency responsible for this persecution: “Reich Headquarters for the Control of Homosexuality and Abortion”.

For Steakley it is a dangerous political myth when “gay opinion makers” sometimes let homosexual men even appear “as the primary target group of the National Socialist eradication campaign,” since in doing so they “played down fascist racial fanaticism, situating homophobia as the decisive motif of the Nazi
movement” (Jellonek and Lautmann 2002, 63). We must therefore differentiate – not between victims of Nazi terror, but between non-Jewish German gays. The majority of them belonged “exactly like other German men and women to the most willing subordinates and beneficiaries of the Nazi state” (ibid., 65).

The Art of Appropriation

In the new gay movement that formed in the Federal Republic after legal liberalization in 1969, there were indeed attempts to differentiate the view of history. Some began to engage critically with the activists from earlier generations, discovering that there were racializing/antisemitic tendencies among them (cf. Nieden 2005). Manfred Herzer, one of the founders of the Berlin Gay* Museum, summarized the state of this critique as follows on the occasion of the large West Berlin exhibition “Eldorado” from 1984:

“As correct as it no doubt is to view the Nazi era as a period of the most extreme persecution and repression of homosexuals, it is still wrong to sit back with this knowledge as the presumed complete truth. The complexity of the relationship between Hitlerian fascism and homosexuality is not nearly well enough researched at this point to be able to explain it comprehensibly” (Herzer 1992, 47).

Meanwhile, precisely for the leftist mainstream gay and lesbians, the “pink triangle” of the camp inmates classified as homosexual became a symbol of general gay self-awareness (cf. Bochow 2012, 87).

In contrast, nothing was or is said in gay circles seeking recognition about the groups that fell victim to “hereditary health” policies, or about Roma and Sinti, about Slavs, about “asocials” and deserters, about trade unionists, socialists, nor communists. It is also shockingly rare that Jewish lesbians and gays – who necessarily must have represented the numerically largest group of victims among homosexuals – are ever mentioned. “Identity politics madness treated being homosexual and being Jewish as completely antagonistic” (Stedefeldt 2007, 5), criticized the publicist Eike Stedefeldt in 2007 during the planning stages of the Berlin Memorial to Homosexuals Persecuted under Nazism, which was to be inaugurated the following year. A piece of “appropriation art,” it stands above all for the political arrogation of the gay-lesbian initiators, who had polemicized against the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe because it had neglected “their” victims. The solitary chunk in the center of Berlin deliberately seems to
have been cast out of the arrangement of the 2,711 blocks that memorialize the victims of the Shoah just diagonally opposite the street. “Completely left out of the debate was the idea that the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe could commemorate more homosexuals than any gay memorial site, since it is safe to estimate that among the six million murdered Jews, 300,000 were homosexual” (ibid.). The idea was clear, if unspoken: “homosexual victims” are those who had been classified as “Aryan” and who therefore presumably should have been granted complete participation in society.

Incorporation into the National Collective

It was first an academic work, considered a milestone on the path toward memorializing the self-image of German homosexual men, that “solved” the problem. Alexander Zinn, later spokesman for the Berlin LSVD, positioned himself from the beginning as an opponent of the self-doubting tendency in the gay movement. Even if it had been the case, as Manfred Herzer

“no longer wanted to rule out, that German homosexuals in 1933 ‘entered the Nazi movement in droves, so to speak, where they were not ranked behind their heterosexual compatriots’ – does this not show precisely the insignificance of their estimation for their relation toward National Socialism?” (Zinn 2007, 13)

The propaganda of antifascist emigration would then be to blame for the fact that something that Zinn considers not to “have any relevance, from the perspective of a historian of the period, for the repeated claim of a connection between homosexuality and National Socialism – why should German homosexuals have been any cleverer than the rest of the population” – could become the “stereotype” of the homosexual National Socialists (ibid., 112).

Zinn’s book fits into a barely questioned historical revisionism that has taken place since the end of the power bloc confrontation. Homophobia is expressly represented as a leftist phenomenon – contrafactually, since the work which in this regard is unassailable in its scholarship shows that in Germany only the political left advocated for the abolition of Paragraph 175. Nonetheless, the communists and socialists, “with the homophobia that they cultivated” obstructed “the possibility of a differentiated way of looking” at the Nazi movement (ibid., 85). For example, they were not prepared to appreciate that in the case of the SA director Ernst Röhm, who at the time of the Weimar Republic was a member of
the gay rights oriented Bund für Menschenrecht, “his battle [Kampf in the original!] applied to ‘a social order, that in place of a healthy recognition of natural operations and knowledge, prescribed hypocrisy, lies, displacement, prudery, and uncalled-for indignation’” (ibid., 81).

In their isolation, the exiled antifascists supposedly no longer understood the Germans. The reasons for their exile get as little attention from Zinn as the practical activity of the gay Nazi Röhm. According to Zinn, there is much to indicate “that the Gestapo’s persecution of homosexuals was generally less accepted by the German population, but also by the public abroad” than there would be for “antisemitic excesses” (ibid., 139f). And he himself seems to share this assessment, at least as concerns the Germans, when he considers it plausible, for instance, that the referendum of 1935 on the future of the Saar Territory was 90.76 percent in favor of reintegration into Germany because the population, according to Zinn, had rejected the “instrumentalization of homosexuality” being carried out by leftist emigrants “on behalf of the campaign to maintain the status quo” (ibid., 163).

Zinn, in looking back at the incorporation of homosexuals into the circle of the national community, thus also smooths their path, at least for those who were not persecuted for racist reasons. Not only are long past generations adapted to fit the image of today’s “gay” identity, which results in a seamless historiography, the likes of which are otherwise only written for territories and ethnic groups established by the state. The quasi-ethnicity of homosexuals – purged of any non-”Aryan”, gender non-conforming, “heritage damaged”, leftist, etc. elements – likewise counts as a reputable part of the nation all along.

A “Community of Fate”?

When it was still a matter of memorializing the “forgotten homosexual victims,” this had to happen above all in competition with the victims of the Shoah, since the debate about the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe was being carried out at the same time. Udo Badelt and Eike Stedefeldt documented a part of the polemics in gay newspapers, where a presumed “privileging” of Jewish victims was then being imagined (Badelt and Stedefeldt 1999). Jan Feddersen even went so far as to write in the taz of November 20th, 1997, that in truth homosexuals had it worse than the Jews. Using a term from Hannah Arendt, the article switches to a different topic for two paragraphs, which is meant to lend weight by reflecting on the family:

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“Anyone who speaks of a renaissance of the family should not be silent about homosexuality, about gay and lesbian children. They are, plainly seen, the pariahs of the heterosexual family. Homosexuals have a lot in common with Jews in their collective psychic constitution. Members of both groups know early on, long before they have found a term for the desire for their own sex, long before they are concretely confronted with antisemitic behavior, that they are different from the others. There is a difference between the two minorities, and this is central: Jews know that they are protected as Jews by the family, gays or lesbians do not” (Feddersen 1997, 15).

In turn, the German-Jewish philosopher is conscripted to add a borrowed heft to the argument:

“When the future political scientist Hannah Arendt moved with her family to another city, her mother impressed upon her before her first day at the new school: If anyone should disparagingly call her a Jew, she should kindly return home at once; she, that is, the mother, would immediately complain – which in fact also happened. There is nothing comparable for homosexuals. What young boy, who isn’t interested in shop class and would rather learn how to knit a sweater, would dare to express this wish? What family is modern enough to want to and be able to renounce the traditional images of masculinity and femininity? Or to put it another way: What young man in puberty would dare to refuse the sexual order in public? For around ten years surveys have indicated a shift in mentality in the German population. No, gays should no longer be gassed [!], they say. The liberal credo ‘live and let live’ no longer excludes homos” (ibid.).

Such impropriety no longer seems necessary today from the viewpoint of the gay mainstream. For instance, Jörg Steinert from the Berlin LSVD, in an interview from May 15, 2012 on the 20-year existence of his organization, answers the question: “Are lesbians and gays a fringe group?”, once again without any concrete provocation, with a comparison full of implications: “They are a minority. And they always have conflicts with majorities – it’s no different for the Jewish community in Berlin” (Reichert 2012). What may seem completely sensible against the backdrop of an identity politics that above all has to worry about getting grants to work with victims of discrimination and violence, must nonetheless be astonishing at least in view of its political nonchalance. While in fact no one has to pass through a metal detector to get into a lesbian bookshop, a gay sauna, or to the “ecumenical” CSD religious service, and while there are no police officers posted in front of any gay establishment in Germany, the equation of antisemitism and
homophobia obviously works quite well from a gay perspective today. The one form of “discrimination” can be understood, discussed, and addressed by analogy with the other. Ideas of consistent, self-coherent identities provide the impulse to keep statistics about violence against the group’s members or to call for diversity measures. That this idea also includes having common “enemies” has been clear since 2006, when LSVD Berlin-Brandenburg called for introducing the “Muslim test” from Baden-Württemberg in Berlin and Brandenburg as well. The questionnaire, which was often called “attitude snooping” and was not abolished until 2011, included not only queries about terrorism, but above all questions on antisemitism and on the sexual self-determination of (heterosexual) women and gay men (cf. Migration und Bevölkerung 2006).

The horizontal understanding of discrimination, which assumes the individual victim, reaches its limits when forced to leave this individual framework: historically, structurally, institutionally. For in fact it is not about majorities and minorities, but about relations of dominance that have become historical, that have nothing to do with the number or even the existence of “victims”. Neither antisemitism nor homophobia can be reduced to verbal and/or physical violence in public spaces, even if these are often the cases that get reported in the newspapers. Often enough people are taken for “gay” or “Jewish,” or they know to avoid certain pieces of jewelry or clothing, behaviors, or speech patterns precisely in order not to be recognized. The question of what kind of social phenomena homophobia and antisemitism are, and who gets to define them and for what reason, is not considered to be of any great significance. In contrast, against this backdrop, it is at the very least dubious to speak of an increase or decrease in homophobia or antisemitism.

Historically the two phenomena took hold in the second half of the nineteenth century. With the Industrial Revolution the entire society experienced a fundamental transformation (urbanization, mass organizations and media, the formation of the German nation-state, partial secularization, etc.). Modern capitalism quickly supplanted traditional modes of labor and economics, having a direct influence on the relations between the sexes in the lower and middle classes. The new definition and fixed positions of femininity and masculinity not only involved differences between bourgeois and proletarian identities, as the

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5 On the history, which goes back to the Spain of the Reconquista, cf. Çetin 2012, 28f.
6 While proletarian women had to pursue industrial work alongside reproduction activities to a much greater degree, women from the bourgeois classes were urged to be wives and mothers first and foremost.
phenomenon “homosexuality” was also defined for the first time (cf. Hirschfeld 1914, 10).

Around the same time arose the phenomenon of modern antisemitism. Unlike anti-Judaism, which was based primarily on Christian religious arguments, the new phenomenon no longer provided an escape from discrimination and violence through Christian baptism. Modern antisemitism emerges, as befits its time, as biological racism, which presumes even assimilated Jews, Christian converts, and/or Jews who are not otherwise “conspicuous” to be foreign, backward, and dangerous by blood. In times of profound social, cultural, economic, and political upheavals and crises it offers a way to explain ever more complex processes by forming identity, which was voluntarily taken up by millions of people. It is sometimes argued to this day that Jews have above-average intelligence or that a shadowy Jewish superiority lies behind national and international politics, economics, and media, etc. Like all forms of racism, the exclusion of “others” simultaneously regulates the inclusion of those who may belong – only that the “we” group is constructed as the victim that the Jews are far superior to. While in other forms of racism – even when attributing presumably positive characteristics (such as physical strength, endurance, and diligence, sensitivity or inclination to musicality and sports) – it is above all a matter of ascribing to the “other” a disposition that is closer to nature, less based in reason, in order to legitimate exploitation, domination, and power, antisemitism also gets the function of providing an outlet for experiences of powerlessness.7

It is certainly justified to say that modern German national identity, as it was first created in the middle of the nineteenth century, was not only modeled on the background of colonialism and the transnational construction of “modernity” and “civilization,” but also and precisely in delimitation from Jews. The fact that the German Reich only acquired its colonies in the 1880s, losing them again during the First World War, does not in any way mean that it could have stood outside negotiating “Europe” and whiteness.

The idea of an unchanging, self-contained, globally operating, superior group distinguished, then as now, the antisemitic resentment from homophobic atti-

7 Cf. Gernot Jochheim: “Antisemitism could thus essentially be used to cast blame in a wide variety of contexts only because there were in fact no causalities between Jews and exactly that problem the explanation proposed to deliver […] [It] exclusively served the goals of self-definition and identity-formation on the part of its protagonists” (Jochheim 1999, 25f). This is of course not the place to discuss more involved questions of comparing or contrasting antisemitism and other forms of racism.
tudes, which are above all aimed against the individual and “correctable” behaviors of lesbians and gay men. The efforts by gays to create a historical “community of fate” with Jews must therefore not only first fabricate a collective identity “of our own,” but then must also deliberately disregard the differences between the groups (and above all the hostilities against them).

**Gay Reason of State**

Jasbir Puar coined the term “homonationalism” to describe a tendency in North American and European mainstream discourses that does not (any more) fundamentally question the conventional ideal of a white, gender unambiguous, heterosexual middle class, but on the contrary supports it, since other new opportunities for belonging arise through othering (Puar 2007). A quote from the Berlin-based group SUSPECT might clarify that the academic version of the term – in the American as well as the German context – corresponds to activism by migrants and people of color.

“Jasbir Puar uses the term ‘homonationalism’ to describe the attempt of this (not always successful) assimilation and the accompanying invention of a ‘gay friendly’ nation. This happens at the costs of those whose status of belonging is becoming ever more precarious in the context of war, the tightening of borders, and growing criminalization: old and new migrants as well as their children and grandchildren – above all those identified as Muslim, Roma and Sinti, as well as other people of color. There are also those whose real or fantasized sexual and gender identities (too many children, too little money, non-monogamous, married too young, too patriarchal, too oppressed) seem less and less to fit the national standard. Those who fall by the wayside also include people who identify as queer, transsexual, homosexual, or bisexual, those who are unable to pass as upstanding (honorary) citizens due to social class, whiteness, or compliant masculinity or femininity” (SUSPECT 2010, 3).

The right to such oblivious belonging seems above all to be achievable by not only condoning a hierarchy between different population groups, but by actively supporting it; the emancipation of society as a whole has to take a back seat whenever the particular interest of gays sees a chance to be implemented. It is no accident that the histories of the gay deaths and survivors of the concentration camps are not compared with those of the Sinti and Roma, with whom there
would potentially be many more similarities, for example the lack of knowledge about the victims of the Nazis and the further persecution of the survivors in postwar Germany, but also the absence of compensation payments or the invisibility within the culture of memory as it is taught in schools. This shows how strategically the reference to the Shoah and its survivors is utilized. For in fact the parallels, which are made in an attempt to “climb up” the social hierarchy of victims, are in no way admissible.

For a gay emancipation in the national collective, however, such identification proves in fact to be completely functional. The Berlin Republic did not accept any attempts to relativize the Shoah. On the contrary, the motto “We have learned from Auschwitz” is a formula meant to restore validity to the growing meaning of the nation, both at home and abroad. Not only was the war against Yugoslavia carried out explicitly with German history in mind, but foreign policy has been marked since then by referring to the lessons of the past. “Human rights” are now meant to take center stage – whether in trade relations, the EU accession process, or the granting of honorary titles. The fact that the figure of a refined Germany is in blatant contradiction to weapons exports into crisis zones, deportations of Roma, murders by German soldiers, or unresolved rehabilitation of (also gay) Nazi victims does not disturb the hegemonic self-image.

Gay opinion makers have played an important role in displacing homophobia as well as antisemitism onto those identified as migrant and/or Muslim since the 1990s. The Central Council of Jews in Germany never tires of pointing out the dangers of anti-Muslim racism and common interests, for instance in the debates about the headscarf or the circumcision of boys. In contrast, the “community” makes use of a rhetoric of common suffering with “the” Jews in order to confirm a structurally racist and antisemitic dominant society in its foundations. By referring positively to a “refined Germany,” it contributes – intentionally or not – above all to German-washing the gay scenes.

Aside from the banter on the taz website, civil society, so often evoked, has also not dealt with the accusation that at the festivities of the gay Berlin mainstream, in the presence of notable German politicians, including guests from the diplomatic corps and not least numerous representatives of the press, an antise-
mitic affront was said to have occurred. A couple of streamers for gay-friendly Tel Aviv will have to suffice.

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“More and more young refugees in Berlin are earning money by having sex with older men. According to human rights organizations, Tiergarten\(^2\) has become a regular scene for this – including with minors”.

So begins an article published in April 2017 on the website of the radio broadcaster \textit{Rundfunk Berlin-Brandenburg}. According to this article, there is now a large number of young adult, or even minor, refugees from Afghanistan and Pakistan offering sexual services for payment – to older, white German gay men. The report attracted a great deal of attention in media, the political realm, and wider society, presumably due to its alarmist and moralistic tone. The author quotes an employee of \textit{Moabit hilft}, an action group that provides aid to refugees: “Many of them seem helpless, like small children. When you take them in your arms, they often break into tears”.

The fact that any of this is news is astounding, since Germany has a long history of male sex work. What is in fact new, however, is that at least since the New Year’s Eve events in Cologne\(^3\), a great deal of attention has been paid to the sexuality of male refugees. Stories about refugees are dominated by one of two ideas: that of the hypersexualized refugee, who harasses \textit{white} women, and that

\begin{enumerate}
  \item Translated from the German by Daniel Hendrickson.
  This article based on a lecture given at the international art exhibition Documenta 14 in 2017. The copyright is held by Zülfükar Çetin and Daniel Hendrickson.
  \item Editor’s note (CS): Tiergarten here refers not to the central city district but instead to the huge park at the center of the city. Homosexual cruising in this park is a tradition going back to the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century.
  \item Editor’s note (CS): See my introduction to this volume for a brief explanation of the New Year’s Eve events in Cologne which the authors are here referring to.
\end{enumerate}
of the “forced prostitute” or “hustler of necessity,” who is exploited by older gay men. What these seemingly so divergent narratives have in common is that they are both based on sexualized fantasies. They show a willingness by the German public to speculate endlessly about the sex of “Others.”

Our concern here is not so much the lack of facts, vague sources, nor the numerous obvious contradictions in the media reports. These have already been extensively pointed out and critiqued by a large number of online comments. We are much more interested in the larger narrative that not only makes these fictions believable, but also contributes to their easy dissemination.

Here in Germany there is a generally prevalent idea that only gay men practice gay sex. If one of the sex partners turns out to be non-homosexual, his sexual identity is called into question. In the current debate, the young hustler is then often represented as non-homosexual, following the assumption that there are not very many homosexuals in the “Orient.” His sexual act with a real homosexual is thus reduced to a purely economic transaction. The hustler and his sex work are thus presented in a moralistic manner, as he does not represent a real homosexual in the western sense. He seems too “Muslim,” too young, too uneducated, and too poor and must therefore have been compelled to go into sex work as a survival strategy.

Despite the heterogeneity of refugees and male sex workers, these hustlers are usually abstracted as “Arab” or “Muslim”. This marking of actual or constructed belonging to a religion means to Orientalize or racialize them as “other,” denying them real homosexuality. While on the one hand the hustler is thus heterosexualized, on the other hand, parts of the media cite the sanctions and proscription of homosexuality in their presumed countries of origin as a reason for their leaving. Consequently, the refugee hustler is contradictorily imagined as heterosexual “here” and as homosexual “there”. Reasons for fleeing, such as war, political persecution, the search for new opportunities and a better life, are all ignored in his case.

Over the course of these debates the question has arisen: Are young/minor refugees allowed to even have sex(uality), that is, are these refugees meant to remain sexless? This question is accompanied by further anti-homosexual attitudes. While the hustler is generalized as young (minor), Muslim (thus, not gay), poor, and a refugee, the john only ever appears as old, white, German, gay, settled, obese, and able to pay. Latent accusations of pedophilia can be read between the lines.

Sex work by refugees is thus only depicted as forced sex work, sometimes even amplified by unsubstantiated reference to underage activity. The ordinary econ-
omy of sex work is no longer the primary issue. The hustler’s body is not viewed here as a resource in the sex industry, but is fantasized as “under threat” by old, white German homosexuals. It is also further “othered” by turning it into a potential “AIDS body” due to unprotected sex with johns.

And so old racist and homophobic moral panics return to take on a new life. Politics and civil society are mobilized, while racially-charged integration policies regarding refugees are definitively declared a failure. While the hustler is de-individualized with regard to his sexual self-determination, the old, white, gay mam – who the media otherwise often feature as the gay victim of young Muslim men – is demonized as a “sex monster”. Stigma and discrimination face the marginalized bodies of the refugee hustler and the old homosexual, each in its own contradictory way.

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The emergence of *ressentiment* that turns into support of authoritarianism is one of the most worrying developments of recent times. A harsh grammar and its corresponding registers of accusation and suspicion, of ostracism and defamation, are increasingly shaping the public code of conduct. Not least thanks to (anti-)social media, disrespect, hate speech, and threats of violence have become an integral part of civil coexistence.

The aggressive and intentionally hurtful debates over the rights of gender, sexual and other minorities, or the fair and equitable organization of gender in our society in general, or Gender Studies in particular, contributed significantly to this situation.

Debates internal to left, queer-feminist and anti-racist movements have not been completely spared from the epidemic spread of this “crude bourgeois attitude” (Wilhelm Heitmeyer, orig.: *rohe Bürgerlichkeit*) – a development that undoubtedly needs urgent reflection and criticism. It is therefore not without a certain tragedy that some writers who claim to be committed to critical reflection have latched onto precisely that coarse cultural formation and its own grammar of harsh words.

An example of this can be found in the edited volume *Beißreflexe*, published in the spring of 2017 by the Berlin-based gay-lesbian publisher Querverlag, as well as in a dossier written by some of the authors of that volume in the July 2017 issue of the feminist journal, *Emma*, the oldest feminist journal in Germany, edit-
ed by Alice Schwarzer. Under the guise of ruthless criticism, they participated with pleasure and prejudice, and without any reliable evidence for their views, in bashing Gender and Queer Studies. For the sake of a cheap, but ultimately costly triumph, they are willing to accept the possibility of alliance between themselves and those forces campaigning against the legitimacy of Gender Studies who are in most cases not interested in open, critical dialogue.

Apparently, anything can now be said, especially if it is untrue, provocative, and stokes a sheer delight in destruction. For instance, Vojin Saša Vukadinović’s essay in *Emma*, “Nails in the Coffin of Feminism?” seeks to debunk the alleged theoretical errors and thematic aberrations of Gender Studies with unchecked fury and malice. He alleges that within Gender Studies censorship is widely practiced, that it supports bans on speech that he considers detrimental to an open discourse. He thus vilifies particular representative authors of Gender and Queer Studies, including the authors of this rejoinder.

Unequivocally, “Gender Studies” is presented as a monolithic entity that maintains a hidden sympathy with terrorism and barbarism, and we would apparently all be better off were it wiped off the face of the earth, returning us to something called feminism or women’s emancipation (that is somehow conceived as an alternative rather than a regular part of courses and books on the topic).

An explanation of what this feminism is or should be remains vague, despite some occasional hints. Feminism, unlike Gender Studies, would be apparently objective and would seek to grasp empirical facts as they are, such as the worldwide degradation and deprivation of women’s rights and the abuse of women. Unlike Gender Studies and its representatives, this other feminism would be willing to condemn jihadist- and Islamist forms of terror. (Gender Studies, the monolith, is outrageously figured as amoral on such question.) Whether feminism should also now take on the form of vitriolic polemic which delegitimizes a complex field of inquiry, as the *Emma* dossier does, remains unclear. The question would also be whether the author himself proceeds in the objective fashion he perceives as missing in Gender Studies. Does he provide empirical evidence for his conclusions, or does he rather traffic in accelerating modes of toxic caricature and denunciation? If it is the case that the author advocates for more objective and empirically founded research, as well as well-grounded moral judgments on contemporary forms of violence, then what the article calls for, and what it actually performs, are in clear contradiction with one another.

But perhaps contradiction and innuendo are now in vogue, part of the new grammar and the new toxic cultural ethos. It would seem that the article faults
contemporary German Gender Studies for failing to produce path-breaking ideas and insights, and yet the article itself fails to suggest an alternative path or a new idea. If the wish is for an original theory that gains international attention, perhaps the author is asking that Gender Studies hold itself accountable to market values. Once again, however, the myth of an entourage of deluded “Butlerians” who supposedly dominate the entire field of Gender Studies is propagated, instead of tracing or even hinting at the field’s varied and complex intellectual movements and empirical research agendas.

In actuality, there are those who work within this field with “Butler” and those who do not. There are those who seek to shift the discussion of gender to sociology and economics; importantly, there is a trans* critique of Queer Theory. Furthermore, there are those who, from a natural science perspective, critically engage with Butler’s reflections on the relationship between sex and gender. Indeed, feminist work in Science Studies has complicated the relation between sex and gender in the aftermath of reductive causal models, and biology is now a field that has become an important one for feminists who work with the notion of gender. Decades of this work have concluded not that there is no biological sex, but rather that sex does not causally determine gender. There is an ongoing debate about whether or not “Butler” abandoned materialism and what she contributes to questions of global inequality, the militarization of worldwide conflicts, epidemic sexualized violence, the precarization of human existence, and more. And yet none of this turns up in the Emma article; instead we encounter, for the purpose of sensational effect, trite populist discourses and sleazy offensive rhetoric.

It is claimed that Gender and Queer Studies engage in forms of censorship, speech regulation, and the thwarting of expression. If this were true, it would undoubtedly be crucial to reflect upon, wherever it happens. But is the idea that free speech is the same as radically disinhibited speech? Should we, as feminists, engage in vitriol and caricature, give voice to every hateful thing we might feel, refusing all forms of scholarly accountability and reflection, and so follow the mode of the author of this Emma diatribe?

Doesn’t this essay model reckless and damaging speech that has no regard for the truth, despite its claims that feminism should become more “objective” and presumably more true? Worryingly, isn’t this a form of Trumpism installed into the field of feminism? Say whatever you want, insult or injure anyone you please, and do not worry whether what you say is true or whether it brings more damage into the world.

If this model of feminist freedom favored by Emma indicates the direction feminist critique should take, then we indeed have every reason to be worried.
For the feminism we know has, since Simone de Beauvoir, embodied a more considerate, contemplative and affirmative idea of freedom, one that is linked with a commitment to make a more equal, just, and free world. If to be “free” means to lose all accountability, to be free of the need to know or demonstrate the truth, then how will any of us responsibly take on the task of making the world more, just, equal, and free?

**A Stance that Turns toward the World**

Perhaps it is now the time to remember the basis of feminist thought and practice, one that instructed us to work persistently to realize in how many ways patriarchal relationships and obstacles materialize in the lives of individuals – and to resist these forces of reckless destruction no matter from which political direction they come. Undoubtedly, the author of the *Emma* diatribe is free to write his essay as he sees fit. But let us not mistake that form of freedom for the one that guides feminist struggles throughout the world since the call for freedom made by Simone de Beauvoir.

The 19th century feminist thinker Hedwig Dohm coined the term *Versämtlichung*, which names a way of conforming to negative attributions in the course of social subordination. This is, we argue, one of the basic rules of the harsh grammar now thoroughly adopted by some authors of the volume *Beißreflexe*. It is a mechanism aimed at eliminating internal differences and empirical complexity, pushing for homogeneity, abstraction, and indifference to difference itself. This is a violent form of thinking, abstracting from the complexity of a lived situation, that is neither about formulating a precise understanding of an issue nor taking a critical view of the limitations of one’s own perspective. It disregards the individual person and the circumstances in which they live, reducing the whole person to a set of conjectured traits, thereby consolidating forms of social prejudice for the purpose of rising morally above those whom it seeks to demonize and hold responsible for the ills of society. In order to flaunt their own self-appointed moral superiority, these authors use a strategy that contributes to processes of desolidarization, with fatal consequences for social cohesion on the left. By favoring righteous indignation over the exploration of the aporias of solidarity, they engage in the very business of repressive domination that they purportedly set out to denounce.

The truth is: we do not have time for dirty fights and fake shows of critique such as these. It may not come as good news at all, but the fact is, feminism is...
confronted with several serious quandaries at the present moment. For example, the attacks against women on New Year’s night in Cologne (2015–2016), which had to be denounced in unequivocal terms, provided an opportunity to mobilize concepts such as gender, sexuality and a certain notion of women’s emancipation to justify racist or anti-Muslim policies of exclusion. So the question becomes: how to provide a framework in which both racism and violence against women can be co-articulated. Or: how to conduct a non-racist, anti-sexist discourse that is also a non-sexist, anti-racist discourse? The magazine *Emma* seems here to suggest that we should engage in the condemnation of non-Western, Muslim migrants as a group, since concerns about the increase in racism distract from the only actual events of interest to women – that is, the sexualized violence against women by migrant men. It does not seemingly matter whether we find violence against women in traditional German households or that a vast number of migrant men do not engage in violent acts of this kind. There is no room to study actual reality when the diatribe is so urgent and apparently so exciting. This ‘feminism’ thus abandons the vital intellectual labor needed to understand the reasons that women give for wearing a hijab, or the vocabulary that human rights organizations use to speak about African women and genital cutting, substituting understanding for blanket condemnation, thereby elevating uninterrogated Western values in shrill and unapologetic ways.

So whatever feminism *Emma* has in mind, it seems to be a feminism that has no problem with racism or is not ready to condemn racist, imperialist forms and practices of power. This is a rather narrow feminism that assumes white privilege, one that does not seek to expand its understanding of axes of inequality nor bonds of solidarity. To the degree that it operates through slur and ungrounded denunciation, it hardly offers a path-breaking vision for the future.

Therefore, what is urgently needed, and what the texts of the *Beißreflexe* volume and the *Emma* Dossier fail to provide, is the cultivation of an ethical and political stance that turns to the world and relinquishes epistemological and moral arrogance. A stance that, unlike the steadily increasing din of bogus media debates which undermine the conditions of democratic deliberation, relies rather on the virtues of diversity and the de-escalation of hostility. A stance which deals critically and with reserve sweeping generalizations and selects terminology that facilitates the expression of ambivalences. A stance which rejects totalizing and overgeneralizing (versämtlichen) perspectives that call upon us to conform to empty rhetoric, enabling rather a thinking with the world rather than only thinking about it from a spectatorial distance. A stance that knows the difference between empirical certainties and normative judgments, and in which slow
and cautious analysis is more important in the end than the production of an ephemeral scandal that sells a few copies.

It is one of the most pressing tasks of our world at present to find opportunities to live with others and share the world without wiping out the otherness of others, but also without denying the undoubtedly persisting quandaries that have and will emerge along the way. Precisely for this reason, we have no choice but to provincialize our own position and explore possibilities of solidarity across difference. That path is very different from cultivating excited forms of self-righteousness that seek the buzz, the scandal, the outrage, whatever the cost to truth, to life, and to the future of society. The real tragedy of Emma and Beißreflexe is that they succumbed to these ultimately narcissistic preoccupations, missing the chance to engage a world that demands our best thinking at this time. Unbridled and unknowing condemnation can be exhilarating, for sure. But as Theodor W. Adorno already knew, “the true injustice is always located at the place from which one blindly posits oneself as just and the other as unjust”.

Authors


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These books have also been published in German by Psychosozial-Verlag:

Zülfukar Çetin, Heinz-Jürgen Voß
Gay Visibility – Gay Identity
Critical Perspectives

In the 19th century »gays« themselves pushed forward the concept of gay identity. Until today »visibility« and »identity« count as key terms in the homosexuals’ fights for recognition and respect. Recently it has become increasingly clear, however, that these concepts support a regime of order based on gender norms, whiteness, bourgeois ideals and the predominance of the couple, thus marginalizing, among others, queers of color and queers with alternative lifestyles.

The authors of the book question the existence of a single gay identity from different perspectives: the history of the gay movement, the philosophy of science, and the analysis of current social controversies about homo-nationalism and racist gentrification.

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Living self-determinedly takes more than overcoming external coercive forces or simply the absence of coercion. It takes a positive consciousness of one’s actions, with a possible range from conformation to escape. Gender self-determination includes difference, change and sovereignty over the interpretation of physical sexual characteristics.

The anthology looks at »self-determination« from academic as well as activist points of view. The texts examine aspects of inter- and transsexuality, asexuality, sexuality under the condition of detention, in the context of disabilities, as well as sexuality outside heterosexual couples. In their variety, the texts are witnesses of the present, provide an outlook to the future and help to overcome trite thought patterns.

Guy Hocquenghem’s essay »Homosexual Desire« »may well be the first example of what we now call queer theory,« wrote Douglas Crimp on the back-cover blurb of a new US edition of this book. The French activist and theorist, journalist and novelist lived from 1946 to 1988 and helped shape the history of the radical gay movement in the 1970s and 1980s, not only of his country, but also of the old Federal Republic.

While the interest in Hocquenghem is growing again in France and the US, he is largely ignored today in the German-speaking world. But reading him is worthwhile, because he offers perspectives for thinking about sexual orientation not as something rigid but »open« and in process – something »musical«, that is: A sound also occurs only when it exhausts its entire amplitude. In 2018, fifty years after the so-called sexual revolution and on the thirtieth anniversary of the death of Guy Hocquenghem, the authors of the present volume undertake to bring current queer critiques of identity and racism to an exchange with this thinker.

With contributions by Guy Hocquenghem (translated by Salih Alexander Wolter), Rüdiger Lautmann, Norbert Reck and Heinz-Jürgen Voß
The authors of this book deal with the subject of trans* and intersexuality in children and young adults from an interdisciplinary and multidimensional perspective. The contributions are especially intended to aid pedagogical and psychological specialists in dealing with intersexual and transgender children and adolescents, helping to better understand their specific needs, interests and feelings.

Representatives from the fields of psychology, sociology, biology and legal science provide information on current processes of change and research results from this area. They all strive for a differentiated knowledgeability of the readers, in order to further promote the appreciative treatment of trans* and intersexual persons.

With contributions by Ulrich Klocke, Emily Laing, Alexander Naß, Eike Richter, Kurt Seikowski, Heinz-Jürgen Voß and Simon Zobel
Anti-racist and queer politics have tentatively converged in the activist agendas, organizing strategies and political discourses of the radical left all over the world. Pejoratively dismissed as »identity politics«, the significance of this cross pollination of theorizing and political solidarities has yet to be fully countenanced. Even less well understood coalitions of anti-racist and queer activisms in western Europe have fashioned durable organizations and creative interventions to combat regnant anti-Muslim and anti-migrant racism within mainstream gay and lesbian culture and institutions, just as the latter consolidates and capitalizes on their uneven inclusions into national and international orders. The essays in this volume represent a small snapshot of writers working at this point of convergence between anti-racist and queer politics and scholarship from the context of Germany. Translated for the first time into English, these four writers and texts provide a compelling introduction to what the introductory essay calls »a Berlin chapter of the Queer Intersectional«, that is, an international justice movement conducted in the key of academic analysis and political speech which takes inspiration from and seeks to synthesize the fruitful concoction of anti-racist, queer, feminist and anti-capitalist traditions, movements and theories.

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