

ANALYSEN UND BERICHTE

What Went Wrong with Africa? On the Etiology of Sustaining Disarticulation of the African Nation-States

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"... the actual and present condition of Africa is one of deep trouble, sometimes of a deeper trouble than the worst imposed during the colonial years ... harsh governments and dictatorships rule over peoples who distrust them to a point of hatred and usually for good and sufficient reasons; and all too often one dismal tyranny gives way to worse one. Despair rots civil society, the state becomes an enemy, bandits flourish."¹

"The central challenge of African politicians and decision makers is how to create and enhance state capacity in the continent. African states are weak and not a few are in danger of becoming failed or collapsing states. The implication for the international community of having a few more Somalia's, Sudan's, Sierra Leone's, Liberia's, and Rwandan scale of bloodletting challenge friends and leaders of Africa to compel a return to the drawing board."²

Premise

From all indications, there are signs that the international system is undergoing a major transformation that is characterised by the collapse of nation-state; a development more often associated with Africa. The term 'Nation-State' aptly denotes the 'uncomfortable' marriage of the hitherto separate ethnic nationalities (Nations) and the 'State' being the

¹ *Basil Davidson*, *The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State*. London, James Currey, 1992.

² *Ojo Maduekwe*, "Africa: The Challenge of State Building", Being the text of a paper presented at the *Justice Chukwudifu Oputa* Inaugural Lecture on Governance in Africa, held at Osgood Hall Law School, York University, Ontario, Canada on Friday 5 November 2004, appeared in: *This Day Newspaper* (Lagos), 21 November 2004, p. 16-17.

main source of political authority³. It is glaring from the post-1989 international system that nation-states are under serious threats from both endogenous and exogenous forces. The collapse of nation-state has witnessed a tremendous and simultaneous upsurge in the number of international and supranational institutions at the sub-regional, regional and global levels. These institutions are now being driven by economic logic dictated by global realities. Apart from the exogenous threats, the state's authority is being challenged by the sub-state actors within its own borders where groups found solace in ethnicity/ethnic identities, religions, etc as rallying points to change the *status quo ante* as the situations in Liberia, Sudan, Cote d'Ivoire, Burundi, Rwanda prove⁴. Obviously, this scenario is a source of apprehension not only to Africans but also the international community as a whole. It is in line with the above position that the famous historian, Basil Davidson, is to a very large extent, correct regarding his afore-quoted analysis of the augean and volatile situations in Africa. Based on this, the questions that preoccupy the minds of Africa's research community and Africanist scholars are copious and some of these are: what are the real challenges to the African nation-state project?; Can State, being the dominant actor of the international system going by the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648⁵ and the state-centric conception of international relations, maintains its domineering status in the face of the new global realities and challenges exemplified by both the collapsed of the Soviet behemoth and the end of the East-West Cold War coupled with the new found status of the United States of America as policeman of this present unipolar world?; Can Africa survive the threats posed by globalisation, regionalism and the present technological advancement?; What actually explains the failed project called nation-state/nation-building in Africa?. Differently put, how are African governments dealing with the challenges of state building, good governance, democratisation, market reforms, development, globalisation, regionalism, environment, etc? These questions can, at best, be addressed by first elucidating the meaning of the 'Nation-State' project.

Explaining the African Nation-State Project

To start with, the contemporary nation-state is the outcome of a range of socio-political crises linked to the capitalist territorial expansion that rocked Europe during the industrial

³ C. Taylor, "Why Do Nations Have to Become States", in: G. Laforest (eds.), *Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism*. Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queens University Press, 1993; Toulmin Stephen, *Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity*. Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1992.

⁴ *The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), States of Disarray: The Social Effects of Globalisation*. Geneva, UNRISD, 1995.

⁵ The Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 ended the 30 years war in Europe and recognised the State as the sole actor of International Relations.

revolution between eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. From the outset, let it be clearly understood that before this period, agrarian European societies were completely satisfied with their immediate environment as they were self sufficient in food production and supply, and other basic necessities of life. Apparently in these kind of in-ward looking and contented societies, the state, for the majority of the peasantry, "was an institution looked at for protection in return for taxation and the delivery of men for warfare"⁶. But the modern nation-state in a well developed and industrialised society is diversified along the lines of division of labour, social mobility, and universal education. The birth of a relationship which industrial society and the modern nation-state share is the root of a nation premised on meeting the needs of the people⁷. Central to the debate on the evolution of modern nation-state project is the tight linkage between the nation and the state where each nation-state is seen as a territorial entity encompassing people with common language and culture. Paradoxically however, the real features of modern European nation-state contradict the myopic claims of its architects. Modern European nation-state features a conglomeration of people with diverse backgrounds--language, culture, religion, etc. In a nutshell, modern nation-states are not only multi-cultural but equally multi-lingual and multi-religious in nature. This development, more often than not, created a lot of acrimonies between both the 'major' cultures and the 'minor' ones. This is because "as various nations had to be sacrificed, the nation-state project went hand in hand with repression, especially directed at local cultures and minority groups as attempts were made to eliminate linguistic or cultural diversity and create one 'official' national identity"⁸ whereby the 'major' culture will be the official national culture.

In the African context, nation-state is the result of European colonialism that started from the late nineteenth centuries. Following the scrambling of the African territories during the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, the colonial powers, forced by the economic motive, bequeathed largely multi-ethnic nation-states to the various African countries. The consequences of this malignant act on the indigenous people was severe as ethnic nationalities which, during the pre-colonial years, were at loggerhead in the bid to preserve their identity and culture found themselves merged with one another under the same geo-political entity called nation-state. This arbitrary and artificial creation of Africa's nation-state took little or no account of the complex sociological realities that were on ground and most importantly the existing socio-political and economic relationship that existed between and among different ethnic groups and, hence little wonder that the adhesive that bound different

⁶ Erik Franckx et al, "Rethinking the Nation-State in Central Africa", Research Project of the Brussels Centre of African Studies. Brussels, Vrije Universiteit, 2000, p. 10.

⁷ E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1983; also see, B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. New York, Verso, 1991.

⁸ Erik Franckx et al, 2000. Op. cit, p. 11

ethnic nationalities started showing signs of wear and tears as different components of the so-called nation-state started questioning the basis of the 'social contract' shortly after independence that greater part of the continent enjoyed in 1960. This position has been succinctly captured in the words of Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja:

The concept of the nation became attached to the territorial entities of the colonial partition, not as a matter of necessity in the organisation of the anti-colonial struggle ... but as a result of the interplay of imperialist and African petit bourgeois interests⁹.

Echoing Nzongola-Ntalaja are Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba and George Kieh Klay, Jr. Wamba-dia-Wamba, who in registering his discontentment with the colonial orientation of Africa' nation-state contended that the colonially-created nation:

... built on the basis of (the) consolidation, rather than (the) creative destruction of the colonial legacy, is itself indicative of a neo-colonial commitment reflecting a class alliance. It is not surprising, then, to see that most of the theories of building new nations out of arbitrarily created colonial territories, find supporting echoes, if not inspiration from organic intellectuals of imperialism---modernisation theoreticians especially¹⁰.

Kieh Klay, Jr. on his own part reveals the major negative impacts of the situation on the post-colonial African states. On this, it is worth citing the author *in extenso*:

The African people had barely recovered from the after effects of the festivities marking formally the end of colonial rule, when they realised that the post-colonial state multiplex was a replica of its colonial progenitor. This was because the compradorial classes to whom the European colonialists and imperialists had transferred political power failed to design the modalities exigent for the transformation of the colonial state order. Consequently, from the outset of the post-colonial era, African states became collectively plagued with multifaceted crises of cultural, economic, political, and social underdevelopment. Amidst the inability of the African compradorial classes to address the burgeoning problem of state failure, several states degenerated into civil war. For example, by the end of the decade post-independence era, more than thirty wars had been fought in Africa. During the 1980s, Africa was torn by nine wars, numerous other instances of large-scale violent conflicts, and a kaleidoscope of coups and demonstrations. With the end of the Cold War, and its attendant positive impact on some of the major civil wars in Africa – Mozambique and South Africa – there was hope that the decade of the 1990s and beyond would witness the emergence of peace in Africa. To

⁹ Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, *Nation Building and State Building in Africa*, (Mimeographed paper), Harare, 1988.

¹⁰ Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba, "Discourse on the National Question", in: G. Shivji, Issa (eds.), *State and Constitutionalism: An African Debate on Democracy*. Harare, SAPES, 1991.

the contrary, the end of the Cold War has witnessed the eruption of new civil wars in Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone, etc.¹¹

It is undeniable therefore, that the nationalists that took the leadership of the post colonial state had herculean tasks ahead, i.e. how to weaken ethnic consciousness and move the country forward. This was premised on the assumption that multi-ethnic identities in Africa were adversative and obstructive to national unity. Thus, the post colonial African governments embarked on ambitious project of nation-building with the overall aims of overcoming their underdevelopment, eradicating multiple ethnic identities or at best subordinating minor ethnic identities to that of the dominant groups. What is particularly striking is that nation-building was essentially state-driven and often relied on a top-down approach¹² with high degree of overcentralisation. Ironically the unitary approach to unity project became counterproductive and self defeating as the new African leaders kept ethnic consciousness alive and highly relied on ethnic affiliation for regime survival. The overall implication of this is that the incumbent African leaders placed one ethnic group over and above the others and reinforced this with the patrimonial system. With this system, ethnicity became institutionalised and "the state remained the central focus for private accumulation of wealth, reforming national economies into patronage networks for political elites, and severely damaging the productive side of the economy, bringing no development at all"¹³.

At another level, the desire for socio-economic advancement of Africa by the post colonial governments had destructive effects on the political institutions of the continent. This is because, in the conception of the post independence elite, achieving sustainable, self-generating economic development and social modernisation of the continent is a function of jettisoning political pluralism and gunning for either single party rule or military authoritarianism with the hope of curtailing fundamental freedoms of the populace. In spite of the aversion to, and abandonment of political pluralism and the entrenchment of dictatorial style of governance, the post-independence political leaders diluted the secular character of most, if not all, independent African states by courting one religion or the other and furthermore, brought ethnicity to the fore. In this respect, ethnicity and religion occupied

¹¹ *George Klay Kieh Jr*, "Civil Wars in Africa: Now and Then", in: *Eghosa E. Osaghae et al* (eds.), *The Nigerian Civil War and its Aftermath*. Ibadan, John Archers Publishers for the Programme on Ethnic and Federal Studies, 2002. Also see, *Conflict Trends*. Pretoria, South Africa, African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Dispute, 2001, p. 1; *Raymond Copson*, "Peace in Africa", in: *Francis Deng and I. William Zartman* (eds.), *Conflict Resolution in Africa*. Washington D.C, The Brookings Institution, 1991, p. 20; *George Klay Kieh, Jr.*, "The Political and Economic Roots of Civil Conflicts in Africa: Implications for US Foreign Policy", *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, vol. 7, Spring 1996, p. 41.

¹² The basic objective of the top-down approach to nation-building project was to integrate the multi-ethnic nationalities that formed the state under one centralised authority.

¹³ *Erik Franckx et al*, 2000, Op. cit, p. 15

vantage positions in, and have very central roles to play in the act of governance. In the light of this, political power was highly defined by, and seen through ethno-religious prism. The case of Cote d'Ivoire illustrates this point. During the long reign of late President Felix Houphouet-Boigny (1960-1993), apart from the fact that the state resources were being distributed in a patrimonial way, political power was highly monopolised by the Baoule tribe of the Akan ethnic group to which the president belonged and by extension valorised Christianity to the detriment of other ethnic groups and faiths. Despite the preference for authoritarianism by the post-independence political elite, we can confidently argue that a certain degree of peace and stability were recorded and apparently pushed the frontier of nation-building forward. The 'relative' harmony was a function of both endogenous and exogenous factors, viz, the economic prosperity of the immediate post-independence years, the state's financial and economic capabilities to finance social services, adequate provisioning of social services to the populace, availability of financial assistance from the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), and above all, Africa, during the period was able to receive huge assistance due to the prevailing Cold War politics. Apparently, these assistances from the external environment coupled with the 'relative' economic boom of the immediate post-independence years enabled African governments to maintain peace and stability as a result of the state-driven expansionism in socio-economic sector of the state. The 'relative' peace achieved through the public sector expansionism started wearing by the late 1970s. This development together with its implications for the nation-state project constitutes our major task in the subsequent sections.

The African Nation-State Project: The *Problematiques* and Challenges

The challenges to the African nation-state project are multi-dimensional; hence, they will be discussed under four broad headings.

The Economic Challenge to the African Nation-State Project

The peace and stability that followed Africa's independence in the 1960s was short-lived. African nationalists that led the continent to freedom favoured the unitary approach to the nation-building project and the hallmark of this approach inclined towards authoritarianism which preferred the colonial state's top-down nation-building agenda. Apparently, the authoritarian nature of the system sooner or later started revealing the weaknesses of the African post-colonial state. The economic prosperity of the 1960s and 1970s started sliding by the second half of the 1970s. This economic downturn was caused by a host of factors amongst which were the dependency and monocultural nature of African economies, unequal exchange facing Africa's agricultural products, price fluctuations that led to unfavourable terms of trade, budget deficit, the lost of market by some African states for their vital mineral resources as other avenues for the same products became open to the

industrial powers, etc. The economic recession was finally developed into a full blown economic crisis following the oil crisis conditioned by the 1973 Arab-Israel conflict. This became detrimental to Africa's economic performance due to the harsh decision of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The oil price increase was highly unfavorable to Africa since most of the countries are non-oil producing states¹⁴. The scenario was disheartening and the implication of this is that non-oil producing countries were compelled to pay more for the same quantity of oil. This unfortunate situation is well captured by Roel van der Veen¹⁵ when he contended that:

countries that needed large amounts of oil for their export industries were to some extent able to offset these higher import prices by passing them on in the prices for their exports. This generally made industrial outputs more expensive. As a result, African countries without their own oil (the vast majority) had to pay far more not only for their oil imports but also for the other – often industrial – products that they required. The terms of trade differential between industrial products and primary commodities (agricultural products and minerals) thus shifted in favour of the industrial products. During the mid-1980s, for example, Zaire and Zambia were being paid just over half of what they had been receiving ten years earlier for the same volume of copper exports (on which they were both heavily dependent).

Apparently, the oil crisis put the Western industrialised countries in a very tight situation to which they responded by cutting their importations from Africa. This became a big blow to the African economies as exports from this part of the world slumped drastically. Furthermore, this sad development did not cut down African imports from the West whose products prices had skyrocketed due to the abysmal oil price increase. The declining terms of trade difficulties that confronted African economies made borrowing from financial institution inevitable. Interestingly, the oil crisis had enriched the OPEC member states as there were stupendous excess 'petrol dollars' pumped into these financial institutions in the West that were interested in lending them out. It is imperative to lay emphasis on the fact that the motive behind this borrowing was that the money will be fed into investments that will eventually increase production which will in turn generate extra fund to pay back such loans. As good as these goals were, it is discouraging that the reverse proved to be the case. In the contrary, the money was used to "redeem existing debts, pay public sector wages, shore-up loss-making state industries and pay for imports. These imports almost always consisted of consumer goods, rarely of capital goods. Politically and socially, these imports were crucial. These duties raised on them funded to a large share of the national budget, and imports were used either directly or indirectly to fuel the clientelist networks that kept

¹⁴ The exceptions to this are countries like Nigeria, Angola and Gabon that are oil producing countries.

¹⁵ *Roel van der Veen, What Went Wrong with Africa?: A Contemporary History*. Amsterdam, KIT Publishers, 2004, p. 61; *Cristopher Clapham*, *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986, p.165.

the continent's political and social systems up and running"¹⁶. The cumulative effects of these were highly catastrophic for African governments as the negative impacts of this development weakened their economic capacity and opened the road to borrowing from the various international financial institutions (IFIs). The economic crisis of the late 1970s had by the early 1980s crippled most African states and eroded their capacity to provide social services and citizens' welfare was nothing to write home about. The high cost of living with corresponding low standard of living compelled the masses to re-strategize and adopted mechanisms for coping with the worsening economic crisis.¹⁷

Following from the above, it became frighteningly clear that Africa's economic slump had eroded the state legitimacy with harsh effects on the populace. Then what options left for the governments to rescue the situation? Having realised their precarious situations, and the coming anarchy in terms of regime security/survival, African governments ended up with the options of accepting the neo-liberal, anti-statist, anti-developmental structural-adjustment programmes [SAP] of the International Monetary Fund [IMF], and the World Bank [WB], the so called Bretton Woods Institutions [BWIs] for the stabilisation and recovery of their economies¹⁸. The hallmark of the BWIs induced adjustment package entails the following: enormous currency devaluations, liberalisation of exchange and interest rate, privatisation of public enterprise, subsidies removal from a quite number of social services. Others include; trade liberalisation, massive retrenchment in, and reform of public sectors, coupled with salary freezes so as to streamline public spending; and above all the economy should be governed by the market forces¹⁹. Forlornly, with the implemen-

¹⁶ Roel van der Veen, *Ibid.* p.61.

¹⁷ On Africa's economic crisis literature is rich, see: *Richard Sandbrook*, *The Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985; *Onimode Bade* (eds.), *The IMF, the World Bank and the African Debt*, 2 Vols. London, Zed Books, 1989; *K. Havnevik*, (eds.), *The IMF, the World Bank in Africa*. Uppsala, Sweden, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1987; *Ghai Dharam*, (eds.), *The IMF and the South: The Social Impact of Crisis and Adjustment*, London, Zed Books, 1991; *Julius Ihonvbere*, "Economic Crisis, Structural Adjustment and Social Crisis in Nigeria", *World Development*, vol. 21, no.1, 1993; *Gibbon Peter, et al* (eds.), *Authoritarianism, Democracy and Adjustment: The Politics of Economic Reform in Africa*. Uppsala, Sweden, The Nordic Afrikainstitutet, 1992; *Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, *Structural Adjustment in Africa: A Survey of the Experience*. Copenhagen, Centre for Development Research/Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995.

¹⁸ *Thandika Mkwandawire and Charles Soludo*, *Our Continent, Our Future: African Perspectives on Structural Adjustment*. New Jersey, Africa World Press Inc. for the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), Dakar, Senegal and International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Ottawa, 1999; *Thandika Mkwandawire*, "Maladjusted African Economies and Globalisation", *Africa Development*, vol. XXX, nos. 1&2, 2005, p. 1-33; also see *R. H. Green, and C. Allison*, "The World Bank's Agenda for Accelerated Development: Dialects, Doubts and Dialogues", in: *J. Ravenhill*, (eds.), *Africa in Economic Crisis*. London, Macmillan, 1986, p. 60-84.

¹⁹ See *K. Havnevik*, (eds.), 1987, *Op. cit.*

tation of SAP of the neo-liberal regime donors, it became apparent that the gains of the post-colonial years were discredited and citizens' welfare became the hot issue as government could not guarantee subsidized social services unlike before²⁰.

Unexpectedly, SAP became counterproductive as its implementation further eroded the state legitimacy by aggravating the pre-SAP social crisis such as frustrating the masses and wiping out the middle class. The IMF/World Bank adjustment policies of massive cutbacks in social services weakened the post-colonial state quest for nation building. These downsizing led to the reversal of the modernisation process so much that people migrated from the formal to the informal sector. Consequent on massive budgetary cuts and downsizing in staff strength in the civil service and private enterprises was not only associated with currency devaluations but an experience of a dearth in the agricultural sector as subsidies on basic staple food were revoked. To this end, most households experienced hunger, and poor health facilities²¹.

The prolonged economic crisis of the 1980s and the BWIs inspired economic reforms had devastating effects on the socio-economic cohesion of African states for eroding the capacity of African governments to *adequately* cater for the socio-economic needs of their citizens who were compelled to cater for themselves. The hardship brought about by the neo-liberal market reform of the IFIs triggered socio-political crisis in the adjusting states which ultimately had damaging effects on the nation-state project. First, is the truncating of the developmentalist orientation of the post-colonial state which later affected the construction of a multi-ethnic alliance (to the detriment of a viable alternative pact). In effect, the ethnic and religious leaders previously bound up with the state in the project called nation-building became antagonistic to the state in their demands for democratisation, accountability, and the stemming of the egregious mismanagement of the economies and corruption. People's disaffection with the state, especially in relation to its inability to meet up with the demands for development, opened up the weak/fragile basis of national unity. This further increased the sense of isolation of groups who now conceived the state as far-off or increasingly marginalizing its own citizenry.

²⁰ It is germane to point to the fact that SAP of the Breton Wood Institutions came under severe criticism from the African scholars simply because they argued that all its postulations are utopia. The argument that the economy will be fully self-regulating via open, if not perfect competition and in which the government will only act to provide the conducive environment/atmosphere necessary for the private business to flourish. As appealing as this thesis is, it is argued that this is suitable for the ideal state and economy which is very difficult if not impossible in reality. For details see, *UNRISD*, Geneva, 1995, Op. Cit.

²¹ See the following literature: *Eghosa Osaghae*, Structural Adjustment and Ethnicity in Nigeria. Uppsala, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet Research Report, no. 98, 1995; and *J. Haynes*, "Popular Religion and Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa", *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 16, no. 1, 1995.

Second, SAP further widened the already existing gap between the poor and the rich thereby reinforcing uneven development, which match up to clear regional and ethnic divisions in this manner amplifying political tensions. Poverty in the rural areas led, inexorably, to ever increasing teeming population of urban poor. In the years of unrestrained implementation of SAP, the dislocation of the middle class in Africa was a foregone conclusion. Political tensions pervaded every facet of the state. For example public enterprise privatisation is a case in point. Intense competition for the state's assets to be privatised ensued between the poor and those with financial wherewithal. The compradors who occupied the vantage positions among the ruling elite in collaboration with their external partners cornered the sale of government parastatals that were hitherto the private ground of national technocrats. As a result, the distributive role of the state through cronies thus evaporated. The attendant result was the exacerbation of ethnic tension with adverse consequences for the task of nation-building. Worse still is the social instability fuelled by a teeming population of disenchanting, marginalised and extremely pauperised people can only be a ready pool of recruitment for ethnic zealots who fed fat on the dissatisfaction of the majority of the citizenry.

The shift in economic policies from an interventionist stance which permitted and encouraged state intervention in the economy and the forceful competitiveness/naked materialism that is associated with SAP that brought forth religious and ethnic extremism unfortunately fed into the face-off with politics and democratisation processes in Africa. It is in this quasi state of *laissez faire* that the hapless African states which were incapacitated by the ever dwindling economic fortunes coupled with economic mismanagement, political instability and social decadence that the citizenry has to devise means of livelihood in the informal sector. Finally, SAP regime made African governments to lose control over their economies as economic policies of the adjusting states were being monitored, and controlled by the IFIs. Consequently, the state lost its power, legitimacy and national cohesion.

The Quest for Political Liberalisation, Multi-Partyism, and the Deepening Crisis of Governance

New democratic regimes in Africa face three monumental problems. First, they are mostly precipitates of the general disillusionment with the authoritarian military and other undemocratic forms of government that became unacceptable to the people and failed to receive support from the West in the wake of the end of the Cold War. Second, they rode to power, posing as clear and drastic alternatives to existing corrupt, repressive and violent regime ... Third, they received widespread support from international organisations, lenders, donors, international observer teams, and the goodwill of a democratising world. The inability of such 'new' governments to take full control of the state, to set up structures to mediate and contain opposition and contradictions, and to

meet, at the very least, some of the immediate expectations of the electorate can set a process of rapid delegitimisation in motion²².

The year 1989 marked the turning point in the East-West, super-power Cold War due to the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the disintegration of the Soviet behemoth into several independent Republics in 1991, and the advent of the *perestroika and glasnost* of the Gorbachevian administration in the former Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR). These developments witnessed the collapse of the hitherto despotic governments in Central and Eastern Europe. Following the above, the international system became spurred by popular internal pressures for the expansion of political space/democratisation in Africa. The popular demands for multi-partyism in Africa were championed by the organised civil society groups – religious groups, students, academics, trade unionists, etc. The underlining grounds for the upsurge in these demands were to compel the incumbent dictatorial African governments to open up the already reduced political arena for popular participation accompanied with the provision of, and guarantees for the protection of fundamental human rights of their citizenry, electoral reforms, recognition of the opposition parties, freedom of the press, etc. Furthermore, these developments, especially the end of the Cold War, openly exposed the sit-tight despotic African leaders to danger as they became completely irrelevant to, and burden on their foreign backers. During the Cold War, autocratic leaders in this part of the world enjoyed the full supports of the United States of America and former USSR and their allies depending on the ideological divide they belonged. These relations were dictated by the Cold War logic as there were serious competitions between the then super powers to extend their spheres of influence. For this reason, African leaders became 'clients' of their 'patrons' irrespective of their governance balance sheet.

The end of the Cold War has made Africa to be highly geo-politically/strategically less appealing to their hitherto patrons. These dramatic happenings in the international political system coupled with the positive response from the popular international opinion in supporting democratisation not only from the Eastern European countries but also all countries under one form of authoritarian government or the other, including of course Africa, in the long run led many Western governments to introduce 'new' political conditionalities into their relations with Africa. This 'new' political conditionalities, in the opinion of the Western governments, would encourage and promote political reform in Africa²³. The case of Angola and the French policy towards its former colonies draw home

²² *Julius Ihonvbere*, "From Movement to Government: The Movement for Multi-party Democracy and the Crisis of Democratic Consolidation in Zambia", *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, vol. 29, no. 11, 1995, p.1-2.

²³ *Thandika Mkandawire*, "Adjustment, Political Conditionality and Democratisation in Africa", (Mimeo), CODESRIA/SAPES; See *A. Stokke*, (eds.), *Aid and Political Conditionality*. London, EADI/Frank Cass.

this point. During the Cold War, the MPLA²⁴ government in Luanda enjoyed the full supports of the then Soviet Union and was able to withstand, and contain the UNITA's assaults due to the free flow of weapons from Moscow while Cuban soldiers were at its disposal. It was estimated that the USSR "pumped in US \$ 2 billion worth of arms every year during the 1980s, to prop-up the MPLA's 85,000 strong military machine. Apart from the most sophisticated air defence system and conventional weaponry, they could boast of SA-124 and SA-16 SAMs"²⁵. With the ebbing of the ideological confrontation between the West and the East, and the withdrawal of supports (financial and military), the stage was set for the African autocratic leaders to assess themselves and their regimes. Furthermore, the *La Baule* Franco-African conference of 1990 stipulated the new French agenda towards its former colonies in Africa viz, first, French financial and economic assistances to Franco-phone African states became conditioned by multi-party democracy so that citizens would freely choose their representatives through the ballot and second, France would no longer use its military bases in Africa to prop-up and rescue dictatorial regimes. Amuwo²⁶ puts the issue more graphically, thus:

At the 1990 Summit in *La Baule*, France, a seeming serious agenda was announced by Mitterrand against the backdrop of a New World Order favourable to pluralism, rule of law and democratisation of the political space, the French president, not wanting to run against the tide of history, as exemplified in East-Europe and specific militancy and agitations in much of Africa, outlined the *La Baule* doctrine: henceforth, aid would be cut to countries that refused to be democratised and 'democracy will be your best friend in the future'.

In the light of the aforementioned, it seems as if the events at the international environment (i.e. the end of East-West ideological conflict) brought about the increased clamour for democratisation in Africa. However, Niandou-Souley has argued that it should not be

²⁴ The chief protagonists of the Angola civil war were the Marxist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and anti-Marxist National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

²⁵ *Prashant Dikshit*, "Internal Conflict and Role of Light Weapons", in: *Jasjit Singh* (eds.), *Light Weapons and International Security*. Published by Indian Pugwash Society and British American Security Information Council, 1995, p. 42. During this period, UNITA also received substantial amount of military hardwares from the US, first via covert, CIA-managed channels, later through more open channels. The US' support for the UNITA ranged from assault rifles AK-47, various categories of machine guns, the 40mm grenade launcher, pistols, etc. For further reading see, *Isiaka Alani Badmus*, "Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation and Conflicts: Three African Case Studies", *Nigerian Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 35, no. 2, 2005, p. 61-104.

²⁶ *Amuwo Kunle*, "France and Africa in the Post-Cold War Era", paper read at the African Association of Political Science (AAPS) 20th Congress under the broad theme, African in the Post-Cold War Period, Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, 18-21 January 1993. Also, *Isiaka Alani Badmus*, "Even the Stones are Burning: Explaining the Ethnic Dimensions of the Civil War in Cote d'Ivoire", *Journal of Social Sciences: Interdisciplinary Reflection of Contemporary Society*, New Delhi, India (Forthcoming).

overemphasized because they were merely the catalyst rather than the main reason for the democratic claim in Africa. This scholar puts this on the economic crisis that rocked the continent in the early 1980s. This is aptly captured by Niandou-Souley, thus²⁷:

The financial crisis, and the structural adjustment policies that it induced, trigger off resistance movements which challenge the reconsideration of the material benefits gained by the social actors. The latter express their hostility towards the hardship measures and the restrictions that are necessary for the economic recovery. They see democracy as an option and they turn material demands into democratic claim. Being a consequence of the economic crisis, democratisation must therefore take up several economic challenges.

While one is not disputing the impacts of the African economic crisis/failure on the quest for political pluralism, the roles played by the international popular opinion in democratic demands in Africa are also remarkable. This is because while the acceptance and implementations of the reform package engendered authoritarian rule on the part of the state to curtail criticisms from the populace, the local oppositions to repressive rule and struggle for political liberalisation was aided by the popular international opinion especially from the West. Furthermore, the upsurge in mass protests in support of democratisation in Eastern and Central Europe had the spiraling impacts on the political upswellings in different parts of Africa. The demands for liberal, multi-party politics apparently forced the dictatorial African governments to accept the reality by opening up the political space.

With the return of a liberal, multi-party politics, the political sphere opened up, while domestic opposition parties in different African countries legalised their participation in the political arena. Though oppositions to the incumbent dictators were formidable in their struggle to change the political *status quo* in Africa, at another level, the poser becomes; Can oppositions sustain the tempo and stand the test of time?. It becomes discouraging therefore that most opposition parties were not only weak but, also inundated with the problems of finance and internal organisation. This state of affairs enabled the incumbent governments to hijack the transition process to their advantage. For instance, in the case of Cote d'Ivoire, the opposition party in the 1990 multiparty elections, the *Front populaire Ivoirien* (FPI) of Laurent Gbagbo was just a toothless dog which did not make any appreciable impact on the country's multiparty political system. In Togo, President Eyadema (Senior) was able to maneuver the electoral process, while the Nigerian military derailed the transition programme with the annulment of June 12 1993 Presidential election widely believed to have been won by Chief Moshood Abiola.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the quest for political pluralism that started in the tail end of the 1980s has not effectively materialised. This is because though the political space in Africa has been liberalised relative to the pre-1989 period, but the fact still remains that

²⁷ Niandou-Souley Abdoulaye, 1992, Op. cit, p. 379-380.

the indices of good governance and democratic variables have not been deeply entrenched in Africa as the recent political impasse in Togo further illustrates. Despite the acrimony that went with the 2005 Presidential elections in Togo, the party in power in collaboration with the country's military manipulated the political field through election rigging, intimidation, repression of opposition movements, etc which finally saw Mr. Faure Eyadema, the son of the late President as the new leader of this West African country. In a nutshell, the opening up of the continent's political space has not translated to democratisation in the real sense of the word and this is a real challenge to the African nation-state project.

The Ethno-Regional/Fundamentalist Challenge

One important factor that positively reinforced the quest for multiparty democracy and economic liberalisation in Africa is the upsurge of ethnic and religious identities construction and their mobilisation. The construction and mobilisation of these identities served as weapons that forced authoritarian governments to bow to popular demands that eventually opened up the political field. Superficially, the mobilisation along ethno-religious lines gave the impression to be in the best interest of the populace as hopes were heightened that it would lead to the empowerment of the citizens. Contrarily, identity construction and mobilisation turned to serve the interests of the self-centered leaders that were keen on controlling the state apparatus. The politicisation of ethnic and religious identities apparently fanned the fire of contradictions in the polity and increased the spate of intolerance among the populace. This, in the opinion of some scholars, tend to justify the claims of African despotic rulers that ethno-religious mobilisation is diametrically opposed to the interest of nation-building project; that ethno-religious construction and their mobilisation serve the interest of destruction and is highly dysfunctional to political development. At first glance, this view may hold sway, but one needs to emphasise the fact that ethno-religious consciousness and their mobilisation played a key role in opening up the already shrunk political space in Africa and obviously represent the true means of political participation. At one level, it is possible to argue that the authoritarian regimes in Africa themselves served as catalyst that promote these consciousness. This is simply because of the way in which the state resources were being used in favour of one particular ethnic group to the harming of others. Extraction and the usage of state resources in Africa are informally governed by an institutionalised behaviour among both leaders and followers which is often labeled as neopatrimonialism. This is a political system that is based on personalised rule and organised via well established networks of patronage, personal loyalty and coercion. Authoritarian African leaders in their heydays favoured this political system by monopolising material resources, turning the political game into a zero-sum struggle for control of the state. Under neopatrimonialism, "redistribution in the informal networks of patron-client relations is then necessary for rulers to secure their hold on power: political power takes regular flows of resources to followers – who are often ethnically and geographically

organised"²⁸. Therefore, neopatrimonialism revived ethnic consciousness in the populace, especially from those that were at the periphery of political power. Thus, the construction and mobilisation of ethnic and religious identities intended to reverse the *status quo ante*. This actually paid off as ethnic mobilisation resulted in multiplicity of viable political parties that were determined to liberate the oppressed. The example of Cote d'Ivoire is worth citing. Once a haven of political stability and economic prosperity in West Africa, the country descended into political anarchy as a result of the rupture between and among various political parties there were formed along ethno-linguistic lines. During Felix Houphouët-Boigny's presidency, Cote d'Ivoire under the *Parti Democratique de la Cote d'Ivoire* (PDCI) was a rentier state, where the state resources were redistributed in the informal networks of patron-client relations in favour of the Akan ethnic group, i.e. the president's ethnic group. The informalisation of political system, coupled with the reduced political field and, above all the discriminations against other ethnic groups (the Djoula and Bete in particular) revived ethnic consciousness and its mobilisation. This scenario led to the formation of political parties where the Djoula of the northern part of the country constituted the bulk of *Rassemblement des Republicains* (RDR), while the *Front Populaire Ivoirien* (FPI) enjoyed the support of the Bete to reverse the established trend. The mobilisation and politicisation of ethnic identity helped the disadvantaged groups to force their demands on the national agenda. It is interesting to note that the FPI is now steering the ship of the country²⁹. The point we are making here is that ethnic and religious identities mobilisation are not *always* inimical to the prosperity of Africa's nation-state project, sometime they contribute to the vibrancy of democratic politics. At this juncture, what is

²⁸ *Staffan Lindberg*, "Building on Neopatrimonialism and International Revenues: Prospect for Democratic Consolidation in Africa", Doctoral Research Proposal presented to the Department of Political Science, University of Lund, Sweden, 1999; Also see, *Bratton Michael and van de Walle Nicholas*, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in a Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 269; *Christopher Clapham* "Democratisation in Africa: Obstacles and Prospects", *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 14, no. 3; Lewis Peter, "Economic Reform and Political Transition in Africa", *World Politics*, vol. 49, no. 1; *Robert Jackson and Carl Roseborg*, *Personal Rule in Black Africa*. Berkeley: California University Press.

²⁹ *Dele Ogunmola and Isiaka Alani Badmus*, "Politica Etnorreligiosa, ConflitoS Intraestata e o futuro da Democracia na Costa do Marfim" [Ethno-religious Politics, Intra-state Conflict, and the Future of Democracy in Cote d'Ivoire], *Contexto Internacional*, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, vol. 26, no. 2, July-Dec. 2004; *Dele Ogunmola and Isiaka Alani Badmus*, "Ethno-religious Politics, Intra-state Conflict, and the Future of Democracy in Cote d'Ivoire", *Development and Socio-Economic Progress*, Cairo, Egypt, vol. 28, no. 88, May/August 2004; *Dele Ogunmola and Isiaka Alani Badmus*, "Le Chemin de l'autodestruction: origine et dynamique de la Guerre Civile en Cote d'Ivoire"[Bushpath to Self Destruction: The Origin and Dynamics of the Civil War in Cote d'Ivoire], *Afrique et Developpement*, CODESRIA, vol. XXX, no. 1&2, 2005; *Isiaka Alani Badmus* "Even the Stones are Burning: Explaining the Ethnic Dimension of Civil War in Cote d'Ivoire", *Journal of Social Sciences*, New Delhi, India (Forthcoming). *Isiaka Alani Badmus*, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil Wars in West Africa: The Case of Cote d'Ivoire", Research Proposal Submitted to CRISE, Oxford University, United Kingdom.

imperative is that for a sustainable Africa's nation-state project there is the need for the public sphere to be characterised by high degree of inclusion, where African governments formulate and implement policies that adequately cater for the demands of all groups and identities that form the state³⁰.

It is apparent that ethno-religious identities and their mobilisation are central to the nation-building project, so they can not be discarded by the authorities. In the light of this, it can be argued that the construction and mobilisation of these identities are not too often detrimental to democracy *except* when such identities are being utilised as instruments of change. This is in relation to the politicisation of ethno-religious identities in Africa. While the mobilisation along ethno-linguistic line can help to enrich the vibrancy of democratic politics in Africa by recognition of minorities' political and socio-economic problems, their manipulation and utilisation by the self-centered ethnic political leaders to achieve their parochial interests always result in the destructiveness of any ethno-religious identity mobilisation. Thus, rather than being seen as an obstacle to nation-building in Africa, ethnic and religious identities mobilisation has the prospects of extending the frontier of peace and stability in Africa. This actually depends on, first, how the leaders of the various identities mobilise and utilise these instruments, and second, how the state is ready to accommodate their competing particularistic demands. A case in point is Nigeria's recently concluded 2005 National Political Reform Conference (NPRC), which ended in ignominy, but was borne out of the needs to find lasting solutions to the demands of the various ethnic and religious movements in the country. However, though the Conference failed to resolve the thorny issues of Resource control/Derivation, and Rotational Presidency, it was able to reach consensus on a number of issues aimed at correcting the inherent structural problems in Nigeria's defective federation. Hence, ethno-religious identities construction and mobilisation are not adverse to the nation-state project due to their potentials of forcing the demands of the oppressed on the national agenda so as to serve as the basis for reconciliation and political inclusion.

Globalisation and the Threat to the Nation-States in Africa.

We cannot turn back globalisation. Our challenge is to make globalisation an instrument of opportunity and inclusion – not of fear and insecurity. Globalisation must work for all³¹.

³⁰ On this see *Mahmod Mamdani and Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba* (eds.), *African Studies in Social Movements and Democracy*. Dakar: CODESRIA, 1992.

³¹ *James Wolfensohn*, President, World Bank, April 2001, cited in Said Adejumbi, *Globalisation and Africa's Development Agenda: From the WTO to NEPAD*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Development Policy Management Forum Occasional Paper, No 12, 2003.

In the absence of fair and just global rules, globalisation has increased the ability of the strong to advance their interests to the detriment of the weak, especially in the areas of trade, finance and technology. It has limited space for developing countries to control their own development, as the system makes no provision for compensating the weak. The conditions of those marginalised in this process have worsened in real terms. A fissure between inclusion and exclusion has emerged within and among nations³².

Globalisation is creating new threats to human security in rich and poor countries³³.

Since the birth of the United Nations (UN) and its specialised agencies some six decades ago, the world had changed tremendously, and is still changing. But during the second half of the 20th century, this global metamorphose is being, majorly, influenced by the forces of globalisation which in its everyday usage implies the increased interaction between people and countries of the world. This, in the words of John Tomlinson, denotes "a rapidly developing process of complex interconnections between societies, cultures, institutions, and individuals worldwide. It is a social process which involves a compression of time and space, shrinking distances through a dramatic reduction in the time taken – either physically or representatively – to cross them, so making the world seem smaller and in a certain sense bringing human beings closer to one another"³⁴. The essence of globalisation is, going by the neo-liberal scholars of political economy, to mould the world in the image of market forces; thereby plummeting all the obstacles that confront human beings/human endeavours with the overall goal of making the world a better place to live. As good as this goal is, globalisation is confronted with definitional ambiguities in contemporary international relations discourse; thus it has become a contested concept. The varying interpretations of the concept in the international political economy discourse arise from the debate between two groups of scholars and policy analysts that base their analysis on different perspectives. First, there are those pundits that see globalisation as nothing but a transformative capitalist project with the fundamental task of making the nation-states' interna-

³² The New Partnership for Africa' Development (NEPAD). (October, 2001) cited in *Said Adejumo*, *Ibid*, p. 1.

³³ *The United Nations Development Programme*, Human Development Report 1999. New York, UNDP, 1999.

³⁴ *Tomlinson John*, "Cultural Globalisation: Placing and Displacing the West", *The European Journal of Development Research*, vol. 8, no. 2, December, 1996. Also see: *Deepak Nayyar and Julius Court*, *Governing Globalisation: Issues and Institutions*. Helsinki, Finland, United Nations University/World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU/WIDER), Policy Brief, no. 5, 2002.

tional borders useless and make nonsense of the traditional concept of state sovereignty³⁵, and those who insist, that it is "far from a linear, uniform or homogenising process"³⁶.

As already noted, globalisation is multifaceted in the contemporary world. Economic globalisation which has become the heart of the present day globalisation process connotes the expanding and strengthening of international relations in investments, trade, and global economic policies. This essentially, in the words Adejumbi refers to the "internationalisation of production, capital, and marketing in which the world is integrated into a global factory', 'global money market and 'global shopping centre'³⁷. To this end, Professor Mike Obadan, in his contribution contends that, "Economic globalisation refers to the process of change towards greater international economic integration through trade, financial flows, exchange of technology and information, and movement of people"³⁸. In support of the above thesis, Tandon gives the key features of globalisation as:

The contemporary globalisation's specific feature is financial liberalisation. It seeks to remove all national and cultural barriers to the free movement of international capital and to secure for it privileged treatment within the economic domain of every country³⁹.

The meaning as well as nature of globalisation have been extensively analysed and discussed in many academic fora and as a result we need not to detain ourselves here with repeating those issues. What is therefore of striking importance to this paper is to examine the impacts of globalisation on Africa. Is Africa a winner or loser in the globalised world? In answering these questions, it is essential for us to know from the outset that the nature of power relations in this globalised world is highly *asymmetrical* in the sense that economic

³⁵ *Ohmae Kenichi*, *The End of the Nation-State: The Rise of Regional Economies*. London, Harper Ellis, 1995; *D. Drezner*, "Globalisers of the World Unite", *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 21, no. 1, 1998.

³⁶ See *J. Saurin*, "International Relations, Social Ecology and the Globalisation of Environmental Change", in: *J. Vgler and M. Imer*, (eds.), *The Environment and International Relations*. London: Routledge, 1996; *R. Boyer, and D. Drache*, *State Versus Markets: The Limit of Globalisation*. New York, Routledge, 1996; *J. Zyman*, "The Myth of the 'Global Economy: Enduring National Foundations and Emerging Regional Realities", *New Political Economy*, vol. 1, no. 2, 1996, p. 157.

³⁷ *Said Adejumbi*, 2003, Op. cit, p. 3; See *Said Adejumbi*, "Economic Globalisation, Market Reforms and the Delivery of Social Welfare Services in Africa", in *Tade Aina and C.S.L. Chachage, and Elisabeth Anna-Yao* (eds.), *Globalisation and Social Policy in Africa*. Dakar, CODESRIA Books, 2002, p. 23-46; *World Bank*, *Global Economic Prospects and Developing Countries*. Washington D.C, World Bank, 1996; *James Rosenau*, "The Complexities and Contradictions of Globalisation. *Current History*, 96, no. 613, 1997.

³⁸ *Mike Obadan*, "Globalisation and Economic Management in Africa", in: *The Nigerian Economic Society*, *Globalisation and Africa's Economic Development*. Ibadan, The Nigerian Economic Society, 2004, p. 4.

³⁹ *Y. Tandon*, "Globalisation and Africa's Options", *AAPS Newsletters*, January-April, 1998, p. 2

power resides in the West and Japan, while Third World countries (TWCs) (including, of course, Africa) are at the periphery. What this implies is that while the industrialised countries in the West and Japan (being the hegemonic economic forces) constitute the drivers and principal beneficiaries of globalisation, the Less Developed Countries (LDCs) are victims, passive participants, observers, and are being dictated to. Therefore, the assertion that globalisation is a means by which the few powerful rich nations of the world fleece the resources of the majority poor hold-sway. In effect, the LDCs in general and Africa in particular are on the downsize of globalisation. To this end, globalisation has failed to address the inequality issues that characterised the current international economic system. Accordingly, the present 'unjust' international economic order has virtually debunked the 'win-win' for all actors' arguments advanced by the advocates of globalisation. According to the proponents of this thesis, globalisation serves the interest of raising the wealth, production, standard of living and social welfare of all and sundry. The theses of the advocates of globalisation have been well summarised by Professor Ruddar Datt⁴⁰, thus:

- (i) Globalisation will promote direct foreign investment and, thus, it enables developing countries to raise capital without recourse to international indebtedness.
- (ii) Globalisation enables developing countries to make use of technology developed by advanced countries without investments in Research and Development.
- (iii) Globalisation widens the access of developing countries to export their produce in the developed countries. Simultaneously, it enables the consumers of developing countries to obtain quality consumer goods, especially consumer durables, at relatively much lower prices.
- (iv) Globalisation introduces faster diffusion of knowledge and thus enables developing countries to raise their level of production and productivity. It, therefore, generates the momentum to reach international standards of productivity.
- (v) Globalisation reduces costs of transport and communication. It also reduces tariffs and thus enlarges the share of foreign trade as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP).

Contrarily, the reality proved that Africa has been adversely affected in all ramifications; implying that globalisation never radiates its gains on a global scale. The dismal overall global picture of the effects of globalisation comes to bear in:

The income gap between the fifth world's people living in the richest countries and the fifth in the poorest was 74 -1 in 1997, up from 60 to 1 in 1990 and 30-1 in 1960. These one-fifth in the richest countries have 86% of world GDP, 82% of world export markets, 68% of foreign direct investment, and 74% of world telephone lines. The world 200 richest people more than doubled their net worth in the four years to 1998, to more than \$1 trillion. The assets of the top three billionaires are more than the com-

⁴⁰ *Ruddar Datt*, "From Unfair to Fair Globalisation: Focus on India", *Peace Research: The Canadian Journal of Peace Studies*. vol. 37, no. 1, 2005, p. 57.

bined GNP of all least developed countries and their 600 million people. While the developed societies are in an 'age of affluence', about 1.2 billion people living below \$ 1 per day. Half of the world's population lives on less than \$ 2 a day⁴¹.

From the foregoing, Africa has been a victim of globalisation because the process has failed to account for Africa's development. Africa's socio-economic situations are miserable as it is being described as the 'poorest of the poor'. This is simply because poverty and social decays have enveloped the continent. Examples abound: Infant mortality rate is high. Available data from the World Bank shows that more than 200 out of every 1000 children die before the age of 5; Africa is suffering from lack of access to proper health facilities as more than 240 million people on the continent are living below the poverty line of \$1 per day. Worse still is the fact that Africa's share of global trade, investments and finance which are the core ingredients of economic globalisation have been greatly reduced. The problem was further compounded in the 1980s, by the adoption by African states of the BWIs inspired SAP. Apart from the fact that Africa has been a sleeping partner in the international trading regime, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), most of the rules of the organisation have been to the disadvantage of the LDCs, including, Africa. This situation has adversely opened African economies and its resources to the proper exploitation of the powerful North via their agents, the Multinational Corporations (MNCs) and local compradors. Turning to trade, the core of economic globalisation, while the volume of global output and trade rose fifth fold and nine fold respectively between 1950 and 1985⁴², the reverse was the case for Africa. Africa's share of global trade fell from about 5% in the 1980s to less than 2% in 2000. Furthermore, Africa "has continued to record worsening terms of trade that creates serious balance of payment and debt problems for many African countries"⁴³. In support the above argument, Africa's terms of trade moved from \$ 7.8 billion in 1990 to \$ 21.9 billion in 1996, while its share of global investment is nothing to write home about. With respect to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), between 1999 and 2000, Africa (including South Africa) attraction of FDI fell from \$ 10.5 billion to \$ 9.1 billion. In a nutshell, it is disheartening that the continent's share of global investments was less than 1% in 2000⁴⁴.

While Africa and other TWCs are at the margin of globalisation, the same cannot be said of the industrialised countries of the world. It is scary to understand that the United States, Europe, and Japan alone account for over 80% of the world trade and greater part of FDI.

⁴¹ *Adejumobi*, 2003, Op. cit, p. 5

⁴² *M. Williams*, International Economic Organisation. New York, Pinter, 1991, p. 152.

⁴³ Cited in *Said Adejumobi*, 2003, Op. Cit, p. 7. Also see, *Demba Moussa Dembele*, "The External Debt of African Least Developed Countries: In Search of Lasting Solution". Paper presented at the International Experts Meetings on Globalisation and Africa, Brussels, Belgium, 15-17 April 2004.

⁴⁴ *The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)*, World Investment Reports 2001. New York and Geneva, The United Nations, 2001, p. 19-20.

This attests to our earlier stated position that globalisation, in the real sense of it, does not serve the interest of the majority of the poor, but that of global capitalism that seeks to dominate and exploit the TWCs that are at the periphery of the world economy. This situation absolutely negates the earlier quoted assertion of Mr. James Wolfensohn, the President of the World Bank in April 2001. Ultimately, the widening developmental gap between the industrialised North and underdeveloped South prompted the Geneva-based United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) attack on globalisation as agent of underdevelopment because, according to UNRISD, globalisation is:

splintering many societies and doing little to eradicate poverty. Grudgingly, the international financial institutions have conceded that neo-liberal model has harmful consequences. But they prefer to mask the damage rather than to shift to more humane – and more productive – forms of development⁴⁵

On this note, one can clearly state that the globalisation process has been one of the key challenges to the African nation-state project, especially in Africa's loss of control over its own destiny.

Summary and Conclusion

In this study, my major objective was to unmask the principal challenges to the African nation-state project and how the continent has been coping with these multi-dimensional challenges. The enormity of these challenges has made the African nation-state to loose its destiny to the external forces of capitalism and globalisation. Furthermore, this paper has shown that the globalisation process is downsizing the states in Africa and thus the states have been unable to manage policies in the best interests of the people. To reverse this situation, it is suggested that the leaderships of the continent should be more determined and show high degree of commitment in their efforts to improve the socio-economic situations of the continent. Perhaps, priority need be accorded to poverty alleviation policies so as to increase the standard of living of the people of the continent. Also, it ought to be borne in mind that socio-economic policies no matter how perfect they are can only be meaningful in a democratic context. This suggests that for Africa to move forward, the elements of democracy should be fully entrenched without ethno-religious bias. With these, the continent can partner with other TWCs to demand for equity and justice in this globalised world.

⁴⁵ *The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD)*, Visible Hands: Taking Responsibility for Social Development. Geneva, UNRISD, 2000, p. 2.