The J amaican Constitution in Litigation of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights-Repercussions and Resonances

The paper firstly analyses the admissibility decisions of the United Nations Human Rights Committee (hereinafter the UNHR Com.) in a number of cases emanating from Jamaica1 , to assess the impact of the municipal law in this instance the Constitution of Jamaica in the 'international proceeding' under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant. Secondly, the leading case of PraU and Morgan v. The Attorney General 01 Jamaica is examined, as a notable example of litigation in which municipal and international proceedings and processes have reacted on each other, to culminate in a (municipal law) decision of far reaching significance for Jamaica and the Commonwealth Caribbean?

The communications all involve persons convicted of murder, after a judge and jury trial, which in all cases discussed, has been followed by an unsuccessful appeal to the Jamaican Court of Appeal. This Court has wide powers, frequently used, to order retrials and this has happened in a few of the cases. Additionally, under section 110 of the Jamaican Constitution, an appeal is possible to the Judicial Committee of Her Majesty's Privy Council (hereinafter the Privy Council), which is still the final court of the Common wealth Caribbean States, with the exception of Guyana. The appeal in criminal matters, however, is only by leave extended either by the Court of Appeal or the Privy Council itself and is only as of right -no leave of the court is needed, where a matter of inter preting the Constitution is involved. The Privy Council is not a reviewer of fact nor does it ordinarily reassess evidence, though this may be necessru;?' and is done in asserting, or as is more often the case, re-asserting some principle of law.
Turning from the criminal proceeding, the Constitution of Jamaica (promulgated on inde pendence in 1962) contains a chapter on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, familiarly referred to as (and hereinafter) the Bill of Rights, which, being modelIed on the European Convention on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, shares with the CCPR itself, a common 'ancestral' or progenitor document, namely the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? As a consequence, the Jamaican Bill of Rights, in addition to containing pro visions analogous to those of many found in the CCPR, follows the patterns established by its predecessor documents in providing for a cause of action on a alleged breach of any of the rights conferred.
Sec. 25 (1) and (2) of the Constitution, the redress clause of the Bill of Rights, reads as folIows: 6 7 226 25 -(1) [l]f any person alleges that any of the provisions of sections 14 to 24 of this Constitution [the Bill of Rights] has been, is being or is likely to be contravened in relation to hirn, then without prejudice to any other action with respect to the same matter which is lawfully available, that person may apply to the Supreme Court for redress.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to hear and determine any application made by any person in pursuance of subsection (1) of this section ... Provided that the Supreme Court shall not exercise its power under this subsection if it is satisfied that adequate means of redress for the contravention alleged are or have been available to the person concerned under any other law.

A.
The Exhaustion Rule and the Domestic Law

The Action jo r Breach oj Constitutionally Conjerred Rights
The rule of international law, incorporated in the Optional Protocol at Art. 5(2)(b) which most urgently and frequently compels examination of the Jamaican domestic law is the requirement that persons invoking international procedures of redress for alleged viola tions of an international obligation should first exhaust local or domestic remedies. Art. 5(2)(b) denies the competence of the UNHR Comm. to consider a communication unless it has ascertained that: The individual has exhausted all available domestic remedies. This shall not be the role where the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged.
In Pratt and Morgan v. Jamaica 8 , the applicants claimed before the UNHR Com. of a breach of the fair and speedy trial provisions of Art. 14 of the Covenant and also of Art. 7, which outlaws inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment, because in each case, of a delay of 45 months in the handing down of reasons for the dismissal of their appeal, which they thought was needed in order to apply for leave to appeal to the Privy Council.
The UNHR Com. interpreted section 25 of the Jamaica Constitution (set out above) in the context of Article 5(2)(b) of the Optional Protocol and in so doing became the first 'adju dicating body' of any kind to directly pronounce upon the effect and scope of the section, this issue not having then come before the Jamaican courts. Jamaica, in response to the communication, argued that it was not within the competence of the UNHR Com. to enter tain it, domestic remedies not having been exhausted. No proceedings had been brought by the applicants under the Constitution for redress for alleged breach of the right, not to be subjected to inhuman and degrading punishment or treatment 9 and the relating to the speedy trials lO . The Committee, focusing on the proviso in section 25(2) decided that the 8 9 10 The UNHR Com. found a breach of Art. 14 on a hearing on the merits and was of the view that while the delay complained of would not ordinarily constitute a breach of Art. 7, it was capable of so doing in a capital case.
Section 18, which confers the right not to be subject to inhuman and degrading punishment or treat ment specifically saves forms of punishment known to the law at the promulgation of the Constitution.
Seetion 20(2) confers the right to "be given a fair hearing within a reasonable time".
criminal appeal constituted adequate means of redress and could preclude a constitutional motion. As a consequence domestic remedies had in fact been exhausted.
It can be bluntly asserted that the decision was wrong, though plausible, where the section is read in a vacuum. 1 1 No court of the domestic system had ever urged this interpretation not having addressed the matter directly. In a number of cases, however, constitutional motions had been brought without any attempt to exhaust the criminal proceedings and no objection had been taken thereto under the proviso. Even more significantly, in at least one case, the one case in the domestic law which dominates in arguments before the Committee, namely Riley, the conclusion of the criminal proceedings, the abandonment or dismissal of appeals to the Privy Council, had not obstructed the constitutional proceeding under section 25, which in its turn reached the Privy Council. 12 Tbe foregoing notwithstanding, section 25(2) in particular does require more examination.
Firstly, it has always been the 'suspicion' of the writer, that the proviso to section 25(2) was a bizarre attempt to write into the domestic law a rule paralleling that of the exhaus tion of domestic remedies in international law, in which, in substitution for 'domestic remedies', remedies other than that given under the Bill of Rights in section 25, had to be exhausted. I3 Tbe principal objection to the proviso is, and continues to be its potential for robbing the individual of the constitutional action (and redress) -as is in fact illustrated by the Committee's interpretation of the proviso. 14 1 1 Tbe Comrnittee's struggles with domestic law have been the subject of comment by officials of the Tbe potential mischief has, however, in the domestic law of the Commonwealth Caribbean states bee n realized so far only once. No constitutional motion has been struck out on the grounds that alternative proceedings should have been instituted. but in the Barbados case of Harding v. Attorney-General, the Court having heard the constitutional motion and indeed found a breach (in relation to delayed crirninal appeal proceedings -a matter which prominently features in the Jamaican communications to the Comrnittee). denied redress under the Constitution on the grounds that alternative action should have been taken. Unreponed decision of the Barbados Supreme Court No. 1485 of 1990 (March It is of course logically arguable, that a criminal court of competent jurisdiction can consider a constitutional issue arising from a criminal proceeding, independent of the constitutional action (this would in practice be an appeal court), if only for the practical reason of saving time and resources. Indeed, in one leading case (wh ich later came before the Committee), the constitutional issue was argued on appeal to the Privy Council in criminal proceedings, no doubt as a matter involving the interpretation of the Constitution under section 110(1). 15 The Committee itself has pointed out in another Jamaica case, that the applicant was complaining to the Privy Council that his trial had been unfair, and that "Court of every State Party should ex officio test wh ether the lower court proceedings observed all the guarantees of a fair trial", in order to conclude that the constitutional action was no longer available, because this issue had been in effect decided in the crimi nal hearings. 16 Nevertheless, the problem created by the proviso is wh ether and to what extent criminal appeal hearings would in fact treat the issue of a constitutional breach, arising from the trial, as a constitutional issue and be prepared to redress it as such. There have been a number of cases, in which the appeal court has been requested to redress a breach of the Constitution (by rejecting unconstitutionally obtained evidence for example) and has refused, treating the issue as purely, one of the criminal law. 17 The other problem of treating the criminal proceedings as one in which the constitutional issue should or can be heard, because of the proviso to section 25(2), is that several constitutional issues arising out of criminal matters (and implicating rights parallelling those in the CCPR) are arguably not best suited to courts hearing a criminal appeal. This would for example be the case where it is argued that a specific form of punishment prescribed by the law infringed the punishment and torture, or questions or retroactive penal legislation and double jeopardy -all matters addressed both by the Jamaican Consti tution and the Covenant.
Subsequent to Morgan and Pratt, the UNHR Com. regularly applied its interpretation of section 25(2) to bring communications within its competence and regularly requested the State Party to inform it whether or not the Jamaican courts had pronounced on the section, as to its effect on the availability of the action under the Constituency. In the absence of such pronouncement, the Committee's interpretation prevailed so that the domestic remedy was considered exhausted.
But the course of the section 25 interpretation was to take a new twist. The Jamaican authorities decided to execute Morgan and Pratt anyway -and despite findings of viola tions of the Covenant and a 'recommendation' by the Inter-American Commission for a commutation of sentence. The two gentlemen, eventually, in February 1990 instituted constitutional proceedings alleging violations of section 20(1) of the Constitution relating to delay and the Committee was 'robed' of its interpretation of section 25(2). The constitu tional notion could be brought after the criminal proceedings had fully run its course.
In post-admissibilitiy observations, beginning from the 43rd session in November 1991, the Committee's approach to the exhaustion rule where constitutional proceedings have not been pursued is as folIows: Where the facts permit, the Committee will declare that criminal appeal courts had a duty to examine the fairness of the trial. 18 If then asserts that as legal aid is not available for the constitutional motion, "it is not the author's indigence which absolves hirn from pursuing Constitutional remedies, but the State Party's unwill ingness or inability to provide aid,, 19 . The absence of legal aid thus makes the constitu tional remedy 'unavailable' for Art. 5(2)(b) purposes. It is not connected to actual lack of means in an author and is increasingly now an assertion? O The Committee has also contended that where, in criminal appeals, the author has claimed to be "a victim of injustice", the fair trial issue is before the court that issue implicating a violation of section 20 of the constitution. In this way, though not actually asserted, the constitutional remedy is in effect exhausted on the dismissal of the criminal appeal. 21 The argument, though perhaps plausible is nevertheless untenable, where in any event the right to bring the constitutional motion persists.
Wright para. 7.4 .• Th omas para 10.2; Hibbert para 6.2. The point has been buttressed by reference to "the unreasonably prolonged" proceedings that the pursuit of the constitutional remedy would entail (Henry para. 7.4).
Little para. 7.2. In this case and in Henry, specific fair trail issues were not put before the Privy Council on the criminal appeal. In Morgan and Pratt, Jamaica argued that the Committee could not in its admissibility deliberations apply understandings of the 'domestic remedies exhaustion rule', other than that stated in Art. 5(2)(b) of the Optional Protocol which excuses exhaustion where the "application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged". The Committee's response in this and at least one other of the Jamaican cases has been the proposition: "[That] the local remedies rules does not require resort to appeals that objectively have no prospect of success is a weil established principle of international law and of the Committee's juris prudence,, 2 3 .
The authors had claimed that the delay in the proceedings itself constituted 'cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment' in violation of Art. 7 of the CCPR. Counsel pointed to adecision of the Privy Council, Riley and Ors. v. Attorney-General (Jamaicay 24 ,t o argue that the point had been authoritatively decided against the authors by that decision, negating the need to exhaust domestic remedies. In fact, the issue in Riley was not that put forward by the authors, that case having decided that to carry out the death sentence after prolonged delay, did not infringe the Jamaican Constitution's analogue of Art. 7, viz., section 17. The argument of Jamaica, that it was open to the authors to claim that Riley had been decided per incuriam, was however rightly rejected by the Committee? 5 The Committee could then apply the understanding of the exhaustion rule under discussion to conclude that counsel could objectively take the view that a constitutional motion would inevitably fail.
It is to be noticed, however, that though a matter of admissibility, the issue raised is the substantive meaning to be given the contested right and therefore, the very question of the breach of the international obligation. Further, and distinct from the foregoing, it may be easy to conclude in a given case that a domestic remedy will fail, not because of an adverse authoritative decision of a domestic court but simply because the claim has no merit. In Collins, in which the complaint related to the alleged bias of the judge; the evaluation by the judge of the evidence in instructing the jury and an allegation of jury The Committee's earliest application of the rule occurred in Lovelace v. Canada, No. 24 (1977(August 14, 1979. Selected Decisions under the Optional Protocol, 10.
Ibid. , para 12.5. The State Party would have been better advised to argue that the author's claim that delay constituted inhumane and degrading treatment had not been detennined by the domestic court. At the same time however, the Committee's further assertion that the dissenters in Riley "did acknow ledge that the constitutional remedy was only available where there was no other adequate redress", is incomprehensible, since this was not an issue before the Privy Council.
tampering by an investigating officer, the author had been advised by leading English counsel that a petition to the Priv l Council for leave to appeal in a criminal proceeding would fail, as having little merit?
The Committee having decided that there was no domestic remedy in the form of a crimi nal appeal to the Privy Council, noted immediately thereafter that "the evaluation of evidence and the summing op of legal issues by the judge was neither arbitrary nor amounted to a denial of justice and the judgment of the Court of Appeal clearly addressed the grounds of an appeal". The Committee concluded from this that the Privy Council petition "would have no prospect of success,,? 7 The domestic exhaustion rule then leads to the proposition that a claim wh ich would fail for lack of merit in the domestic law creates a lack of an effective remedy in that law. This, no doubt points to difficulties in aspects of the exhaustion rule itself, and raises wider issues as to its application in international human rights regimes. As one function of the rule in general international law is to be a filter or indeed, barrier, preventing the overwhelming of the international complaints system concerned, its operation should be adapted from its general international law context as necessary to promote that function, in connection with complaints before the Committee. A disturbing feature of the views here considered and once again highlighted in Collins is the misreading of the domestic legislation. Section 110 of the Jamaica Constitution was interpreted in Collins, as it impinged on the existence and hence exhaustion of a domestic remedy -and as just seenas it involved the 'prospect of success' aspect of the domestic remedy rule. Section 110 (as relevant) reads as follows: ( constitutes a condition for such leave. The sub-section sets out a circumstance in wh ich an appeal lies, as of right and is therefore not subject to a discretion of any kind. Section 110(2) and (3) reads: (2) An appeal shall lie from decisions of the Court of Appeal to Her Majesty in Council with the leave of the Court of Appeal in following cases -(a) where in the opinion of the Court of Appeal the question involved in the appeal is one that, by reason of its great general or public importance or otherwise, ought to be submitted to Her Majesty in Council, decisions in any civil proceedings; and (b) such other cases as may be prescribed by Parliament. (3) Nothing in this section shall affect any right of Her Majesty to grant special leave to appeal from decisions of the Court of Appeal to Her Majesty in Council in any civil or criminal matter.
The very point of sub-section (3), coming after sub-section (2), is to emphasize that the Privy Council is not bound by sub-section (2) and is free to exercise its discretion to grant leave or not, independent of the terms of the last mentioned sub-section. Moreover, sub section (3), explicitly, does not itself confer powers on the Privy Council, but refers to the pre-existing power to grant special leave to appeal to it. Every petition for leave to appeal to the Privy Council granted by it has previously been refused by the Court of Appeal, so that while (emphasizing once again that the Privy Council is free from sub-section (2» the Privy Council does not actually apply seetion 110(2) if it did, it would cIearly have a different view of it from that held and applied by the Jamaican Court of Appeal. Quite appropriately, the Privy Council is not required to state reasons for the refusal or grant of a petition and it may thus be possible to concIude that a grant of a petition is premised on the Privy Council's perception that the interests of justice or the existence of an issue require it to hear and determine the matter.
The following is the Committee's interpretation of seetion 110, in Collins: In determining whether to grant leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee, the Court of Appeal of Jamaica must generally ascertain under section 110 paragraph l(c) and 2(a) of the Jamaican Constitution, whether the proceedings involve a question as to the interpretation of the Jamaican Constitution or a question of great general or public importance or otherwise such that it should be submitted to the Privy Council.
pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by section 110, �ara. 3, the Judicial Commit tee [of the Privy Council] applies similar considerations?
The conclusion drawn at the end of the foregoing 'analysis' is inevitably that there is no effective and available remedy, as the petition is bound to or is very likely to fail. The explanation of the 'analysis' of the domestic law as exemplified above can only be that the Committee, consisting in large part of distinguished legal practitioners, academics and the like, declined to read section 110 and relied exclusively on counsel's interpretation ? O The alternative, that the Committee read the section and in its own deliberate judgment construed it as in the passage quoted, is not to be contemplated. One may make bold to say that this manner of treating the domestic law is likely to dis courage adhence to the Optional Protocol and certainly does not inspire confidence in the Committee. This body could very easily devise means of making itself better able to handle issues from the domestic law.
The admissibility jurisprudence of the cases here considered yield, it is suggested, at least two propositions one for admissibility itself under the Optional Protocol and one for the promotion of the notion of a fair trial on which all the sub-paragraphs of Article 14 is premised.
The first point is to be derived from the refusal to require a judicial remedy to be exhausted for which there is not state-provided legal assistance. This may be seen as an enhancement of the domestic remedies exhaustion rule as derived from general inter national law and one adapting that rule to the particular character of the litigation, through the international procedures of international human rights. Thus while the Committee's interpretation of Section 25 of the Jamaica Constitution to deny that a domestic remedy exists (as constitutional action) is wrong, it is correct in principle to assert that legal assis tance goes to the availability of a judicial remedy for the purposes of Art. 5(2)(b) of the Optional Protocol.
The second point arises from the assertion of a duty, on the courts of State Parties, to test the fairness of trial proceedings. 31 While this duty, attributed to courts in the course of admissibility discussions, cannot in the view of the writer establish that a remedy has been exhausted, as suggested in Henry, the proposition is, taken by itself correct in prin ciple and could be a useful factor in determining violations by State Parties of Article 30 31 Often, the Committee sets out counsel's argument, leaving it unclear whether or not it has been accepted by it, but creating a suspicion that it has so bee n.
Collins provides yet again an example, and a near ludicrous one. Section 25 of the Jamaican Constitution which creates an action for redress of breach of fundamental right is side-noted 'Enforcement of protective provisions'. As one of these rights, is that to a fair triaI, English counsel concJuded (at para 3.11) that the only means of enforcing that right would be a re-trial, presumably a 'fair re-trial'. In Sawyers and McClean, it was argued no less absurdly that "as long as the Court of Appeal and the Privy Council conduct fair hearings, they provide adequate means of redress", and "the remedy under section 25 is not open to convicted persons" (at para. 10.2). Has the Committee endorsed these assertions?
Supra, note 16 and accompanying text. 14.1. So that where a challenge to criminal proceedings, incIuding the appeal proceedings is before the Committee, as raising a fair trial issue, the proposition could weil go to establishing understanding of the nature of the obligation on states, created by ArticIe 14.1.
B. Pratt and Morgan v. The Attomey-General of Jamaica The Constitutional motion brought by Morgan and Pratt, eventually found its way to the final court -the Privy Council, which gave judgment on November 2nd 1993, fourteen years and 11 months after the pronouncement of the death sentence.
The decision that execution after prolonged delay constituted inhuman and degrading treatment in breach of section 17 of the Constitution, involved the overtuming of a line of cases culminating in Rilel 2 , and the adoption of the dissent in the last named case. The Privy Council founded its judgment on "Iong hallowed practice in England and former British Colonies". It observed that the rules and practices in England and the colonies laid down a strict timetable for appeals to the Privy Council and provided that execution would only be stayed so long as the timetable was adhered to. 33 These rules had been in force in Jamaica up to the date of its independence. Ironically then, the Judicial Committee based its decision on existing law and policy, which in principle was also the basis of the deci si on overtumed by the case ? 4 Constitutional interpretation in and for the Commonwealth Caribbean still, it seems, cannot detach itself from existing law and practice, and PraU and Morgan is not adecision as firmly rooted in principle as was the dissent adopted by it, from the Riley case.
Having asserted that the death row phenomenon must not become "part of our jurispru dence" , the Privy Council had to adress the issue as to the length of time that could trigger unconstitutional delay, constituting inhuman and degrading treatment. Since, it was argued, it was in the nature of the human condition that a condemned person would take every opportunity to save his Iife through use of the appellate procedure, where such procedures, enabled the condemned person to prolong the hearings over a period of years, then the fault was to be attributed to the appellate system. As a consequence, the judg ment indicates that the period spent on appeals, was not to be excIuded. In proposing a two year period for the completion of domestic proceedings, the Privy Council expressly 32 Supra, note 12. 33 Supra, note 2 at 773J. 34 This was the result of two different issues being canvassed. Riley asked whether the punishment was lawfu1. whereas the case under discussion fo cused on the effect of delay.
denied a purpose of laying down a rigid timetable -and asserted rather -a "reasonable target" .
In examining appeals and forms of recourse open to a condemned person in lamaica, the Privy Council had to take into account applications under the Optional Protocol, to the UNHR Com. (and the Inter-American Commission) as ones which could add to the time period between the sentence of death and the final date for execution. Their Lordships asserted that they wished to say nothing to discourage continued adherence 'to the bodies' concemed and expressly relied on the admissibility decision in Pratt and Morgan V. Jamaica (and in Carlton Reid), that a complainant before the Committee need not start constitutional proceedings, before making applications to that body. They therefore decided that such a complaint could be lodged immediately after a case had been disposed of by the ludicial Committee. In addition the non-appellate character of the Committee was emphasized.
The judicial ruminations then lead to the crucial proposition that "in any case in which execution is to take place more than five years after sentence there will be strong grounds for believing that the delay is such as to constitute 'inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment'." Returning to the matter of recourse to proceedings under the United Nations Covenant and Protocol, it must be noticed that while the UNHR Com.'s admissibility decision in Pratt and Morgan is correct on the issue to the effect of authoritative decisions of national courts on the exhaustion of local remedies, it was incorrect in its assertion that the crimi nal appeal was an alternative means of redress to the constitutional action, making it unnecessary to institute those proceedings before coming before the Committee.
Indeed, in ar ecent decision, Bradshaw V. Barbados 35 , the Committee declared inadmis sible an application, in which constitutional proceedings had already begun and had been dismissed both at first instance and by the Barbados Court of Appeal and in which the final (constitutional) appeal is currently pending. Complete exhaustion of the constitu tional redress action is therefore required unless it can be shown that these are being umeasonably delayed.
As a consequence of the above, the Privy Council's total 'five year limit' does not adequately take into account delays that will in fact occur as a result of the pursuit of 35 Cornmunication No. 489/1992(July 19, 1994. The Constitution of Barbados is on the Jamaican model and nearly identical therewith.
'international remedies, 36 -and this is a difficulty even when it is considered that the five year period raises a presumption of, rather than establishes unconstitutional delay. The hurried execution in Trinidad and Tobago in July 1994 of a person sentenced to death within four days of the expiry of five years from sentence indicates that in practice five years will be taken by governments in the Commonwealth Caribbean as a fixed time in law, within which executions must be carried out to avoid unconstitutional delay.
The recurrence of references to retention of the death penalty and its consequences contain a clue as to the policy implications of the decision and the whole question of the death penalty. This in turn could produce two opposed states of affairs.
While the substantive decision in Pratt and Margan may be seen as self-evident, the impact of the decision or process in capital cases and on criminal justice in general could be revolutionary. For unless the Executive and indeed the whole court and legal system now proceeds with unaccustomed expedition, capital punishment will de fa cta be abolished. At the same time, however, expedition may weIl now come, thus making executions more prevalent, where previously, vacillations as to the policy to be pursued on the death penalty issues, combined with delay in the appeal and other procedures caused persons to linger on death row, with litde indication that they would ever be executed.
The case too may have a remoter and far-reaching consequence, namely the abolition of appeals -all appeals -to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and the creation of a Caribbean Court of Appeal, as a final court the the States of the Commonwealth Carib bean. Pratt and Margan, viewed as a decision which gives 'comfort to murderers' and which may aiso be seen, however, dimly as not favouring the death penalty, in states in which that penalty has decided popular and in most cases governmental support could buttress caIls, becoming more and more persistant for a final regional Court and the aboli tion of appeals seen as anachronistic and inconsistent with the status of independence.
36 The assertion (at 788j) that the UNHR Corno could dispose of a case within 18 rnonths is quite unrealistic. That period is that is generally taken to rule on the admissibility of the communication.

The Constitution of Peru of 1993
By Jürgen Saligmann After his "coup d'etat from above" in April 1992, Peru's president Alberto Fujimori came under intense international press ure. He therefore caused a constituent assembly to be elected which produced a new constitution ratified by referendum at the end of 1993. On the basis of the 1979 constitution, itself the result of a non-democratic period of govern ment, certain modifications were added whose impact on the political system of Peru cannot yet be precisely assessed.
The provisions on basic rights have not been fu ndamentally changed apart from the intro duction of capital punishment for terrorist acts. Changes are of a largely peripheral nature, mainly adapting the law to existing circumstances. The same cannot be said of the provi sions on the organisation of government where the possibility to re-elect an incumbent president was introduced and the bicameral parliament replaced by a unicameral congress.
The relationship of the presidency and congress has likewise been remoulded, but time will have to tell wh ether this has strengthened the position of parliament.

By Margaret DeMerieux
Jamaica is an adherent to the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which permits persons within its jurisdiction to bring individual com plaints before the U.N. Human Rights Committee.
Proceedings before the Committee engage the Constitution in two ways. The international law requirement that domestic remedies be exhausted before recourse is had to inter national proceedings, requires the Committee to examine the Jamaican Constitution to determine compliance with this rule. Domestic remedies arise under the Constitution.
This leads to the second point of 'interrelation' between domestic law and the Constitution and Covenant. The Constitution contains a Bill of Rights, which has its roots in the same family of instruments on human rights (and in particular the Universal Declaration) as the Covenant. As a result, provisions of the Bill of Rights bear a striking resemblance to those of the Covenant and especially Article 14 thereof constituting the right to fair trial. The interpretation of that Artide by the Committee has implications therefore, for the interpre tation of the analogous Bill of Rights provision in the domestic law. This is highlighted in the decision of Morgan and Pratt v. A.G. (Jamaica) as discussed in this artide.